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AbstractKnowledge on environmental disasters and legislation is limited. I narrow this knowledge gap by examining the relationship between environmental accidents and climate legislation in the People's Republic of China. I offer an account of local environmental accidents and local environmental legislation and focus on political centralization to understand bill submission and bill enactment in local climate legislation in China. I built a unique provincial panel dataset for the period of 1997–2014 (N = 527) for the data analysis and found that environmental accidents are correlated with local climate legislation. I also discuss how local government leaders make rational choices under the incentive system in the Chinese bureaucracy in the wake of environmental accidents.Related ArticlesBrogan, Michael James. 2017. "Evaluating Risk and Natural Gas Pipeline Safety." Politics & Policy 45(4): 657–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12211Liu, Zezhao, and Zhengwei Zhu. 2021. "China's Pathway to Domestic Emergency Management: Unpacking the Characteristics in System Evolution." Politics & Policy 49(3): 619–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12407Neill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. "A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill through a Principal–Agent Lens." Politics & Policy 40(4): 629–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00371.x

SummaryInstitutional analyses of the developmental state claim that the principal source of state capacity is internal cohesiveness, which is defined as the tendency for the rank and file of the civil service to be in unity while working together towards national goals. In the literature on the China model, the strong capacity of the Chinese state has been taken for granted, and internal cohesiveness in the Chinese bureaucracy has not been problematized. This knowledge gap is narrowed by studying data on the Bureau of Urban Management (i.e. Chengguan) in China. Recent studies are reviewed of bureaucratic logics and behaviour that question the extent of collaboration between higher authorities and their subordinates (i.e. vertical cohesiveness) in China. Next, the essay theorizes about how these bureaucratic logics may also undermine collaboration among government bureaus (horizontal cohesiveness). Background information is offered about Chengguan and reports on the challenges identified by Chengguan officers to work with people in other bureaus. The research does not find any solid evidence of horizontal cohesiveness in the Chinese bureaucracy. This calls for an effort to reassess the validity of the China model. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Using survey data (n = 1,600) collected in Ürümchi in Xinjiang, China, this paper examines the Han-Uyghur gap in schooling and offers a nuanced account of educational stratification by ethnicity in urban China. Data analysis shows that Han Chinese are more likely than Uyghurs to receive schooling, and the ethnic variation persists when holding main background characteristics constant. However, the differences in schooling between Han and Uyghur men fade away when background characteristics are controlled for, whereas no similar patterns are found among women. Gender roles account for both ethnic parity in schooling between Han and Uyghur men and ethnic inequality in schooling between Han and Uyghur women, which underlies the overall Han-Uyghur gap in educational attainment in Ürümchi. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

AbstractRising Uyghur ethnic consciousness in the post-1978 era is believed to cause tense Uyghur-Han relations and conflicts in Xinjiang. There are different accounts linking rising Uyghur consciousness with variables such as Han migration into Xinjiang, ethnic inequalities, Uyghur language, and Islamic religiosity. Yet there is no concrete effort to summarize, elaborate, and verify these accounts. Nor is there a quantitative study of the levels of Uyghur ethnic consciousness in Xinjiang. Using data from a survey (N = 799) conducted in Ürümchi in 2007, this paper shows a high level of ethnic consciousness among Uyghurs. It also shows that Uyghur consciousness is based more on cultural and psychological properties than on instrumental sentiments.

There has been little research conducted on economic beliefs among Uyghurs in Xinjiang, although they are part of the reason Uyghurs have developed feelings of relative deprivation and unfairness. Do most Uyghurs support economic individualism, which holds that the poor are responsible for their misfortunes, economic inequality is good, and the government should not interfere in the economy? Or do they endorse economic communitarianism, which holds that the government shall provide for the poor and reduce inequality via intervention? Are there some people in the Uyghur community who are more economically communitarian than others? Are Uyghur economic beliefs related to the usual socio-demographic measures such as age, sex, education, occupational attainment and income? Is there a religious influence on Uyghur economic attitudes? If not, how can Uyghur economic preferences be accounted for? This paper addresses these questions using data from a survey conducted in Ürümchi in 2007. It shows that the vast majority of Uyghurs endorse economic communitarianism. In addition to Islamic orthodoxy, Uyghur consciousness is related to this endorsement. However, Uyghur socioeconomic status is not correlated with their economic preferences. This is partly because Uyghur-Han inequality affects Uyghur attitudes more than intra-group differentiation in social status among Uyghurs. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

AbstractThis article asks: is the cost of being Uyghurs higher for young Uyghurs than for old Uyghurs in Ürümchi? I address this question with data from a survey of 2,947 people conducted in Ürümchi in 2005. The cost of being Uyghurs refers to the extent of economic inequality in the earnings of Han Chinese and Uyghurs. I develop three hypotheses on the effect of age on earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Data analyses show that although young Uyghurs are better educated and earn more than old Uyghurs, they are more likely than old Uyghurs to suffer from being Uyghurs in Ürümchi. This finding has policy implications for the reduction of ethnic disparity in Xinjiang.

This article asks: is the cost of being Uyghurs higher for young Uyghurs than for old Uyghurs in Ürümchi? I address this question with data from a survey of 2,947 people conducted in Ürümchi in 2005. The cost of being Uyghurs refers to the extent of economic inequality in the earnings of Han Chinese and Uyghurs. I develop three hypotheses on the effect of age on earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Data analyses show that although young Uyghurs are better educated and earn more than old Uyghurs, they are more likely than old Uyghurs to suffer from being Uyghurs in Ürümchi. This finding has policy implications for the reduction of ethnic disparity in Xinjiang. (China Q/GIGA)

This paper asks: do most Uyghurs perceive themselves to be middle class or lower class? What are the major determinants of their perceptions? Data are drawn from a 2007 survey (N = 900) conducted in Ürümchi in China. This paper focuses on individualized and subjective hierarchical differentiation and reports three main findings about class identity among Uyghurs. Firstly, class identity is not closely linked to occupational attainment and income among Uyghurs. However, education is a key determinant of Uyghur class identification. Secondly, psychological well-being measures are not predictors of the choice of class label by Uyghurs. Thirdly, ethnic consciousness is closely related to class identification among Uyghurs, holding main background characteristics constant. Uyghurs give more attention to their group concerns (discrimination, prejudices, intergroup inequality, etc.) than to their individual worries (such as unemployment or stress) when choosing a class label. (J Contemp China/GIGA)