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Reprinted from the National municipal review, April, 1914, vol. III, no. 2. ; Cover-title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

How do political parties shape state capacity? We argue that democratic leaders backed by personalist parties are more likely than other leaders to undermine impartial state administration. Personalist parties are those where the leader has more control over the party than other senior party elites. Elites in these parties have careers closely tied to the leader, are unlikely to normatively value an impersonal bureaucracy, and lack collective action capacity independent from the leader. Therefore, personalist parties are less likely than other parties to restrain leaders from undermining impartial state administration. Results from various designs for causal inference show that party personalism decreases impersonal state administration, particularly when the party controls a legislative majority. However, party personalism does not influence other dimensions of state capacity, such as fiscal capacity or territorial control. The findings have implications for how political parties enable democratically elected leaders to erode open-access societies and ultimately, democracy.

This paper re-examines the findings from a recently published study on hydrocarbon rents and autocratic survival by Lucas and Richter (LR hereafter). LR introduce a new data set on hydrocarbon rents and use it to examine the link between oil income and autocratic survival. Employing a placebo test, we show that the authors' strategy for dealing with missingness in the new hydrocarbon rents data set – filling in missing data with zeros – creates bias in the reported estimates of interest. Addressing missingness with multiple imputation shows that the LR findings linking oil rents to democratization do not hold. Instead, we find that hydrocarbon rents reduce the chances of transition to a new dictatorship, consistent with the conclusions of Wright et al.

Researchers measure regime stability in autocratic contexts using a variety of data sources that capture distinct concepts. Often this research uses concepts developed for the study of democratic politics, such as leadership change or institutionalized authority, to construct measures of regime breakdown in non-democratic contexts. This article assesses whether the measure a researcher chooses influences the results they obtain by examining data on executive leadership, political authority, and autocratic regimes. We illustrate the conceptual differences between these variables by extending recent studies in the literature on the political consequences of non-tax revenue and unearned foreign income.

Over the past two decades, donors increasingly linked foreign aid to democracy objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet systematic research on this topic typically focuses on how aid influences democratic transitions. This study investigates whether and how foreign aid affects the process of democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa by examining two potential mechanisms: (1) the use of aid as leverage to buy political reform, and (2) investment in the opposition. We test these mechanisms using five dependent variables that capture different aspects of democratic consolidation. Using survival analysis for the period from 1991 to 2008, we find that democracy and governance aid has a consistently positive effect on democratic consolidation. Economic aid, on the other hand, has no effect on democratic consolidation.

There is little consensus on whether foreign aid can reliably increase economic growth in recipient countries. We review the literature on aid allocation and provide new evidence suggesting that since 1990 aid donors reward political contestation but not political inclusiveness. Then we examine some challenges in analyzing cross-national data on the aid/growth relationship. Finally, we discuss the causal mechanisms through which foreign aid might affect growth and argue that politics can be viewed as both (a) an exogenous constraint that conditions the causal process linking aid to growth and (b) an endogenous factor that is affected by foreign aid and in turn impacts economic growth.