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This paper presents results from a comparative and qualitative discourse-historical analysis of governmental crisis communication in Austria, Germany, France, Hungary and Sweden, during the global COVID-19 pandemic lockdown from March 2020 to May 2020 (a 'discourse strand'). By analysing a sample of important speeches and press conferences by government leaders (all performing as the 'face of crisis management'), it is possible to deconstruct a range of discursive strategies announcing/legitimising restrictive measures in order to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic where everybody is in danger of falling ill, regardless of their status, position, education and so forth. I focus on four frames that have been employed to mitigate the 'dread of death' (Bauman, 2006) and counter the 'denial of death' (Becker, 1973/2020): a 'religious frame', a 'dialogic frame', a frame emphasising 'trust', and a frame of 'leading a war'. These interpretation frameworks are all embedded in 'renationalising' tendencies, specifically visible in the EU member states where even the Schengen Area was suddenly abolished (in order to 'keep the virus out') and borders were closed. Thus, everybody continues to be confronted with national biopolitics and body politics (Wodak, 2021).

Since the 1980s, the transformation of the former Eastern bloc, Germany's reunification, the enlargement and deeper integration of the European Union, together with persistent debates on immigration, migration and flight, focused attention on issues of historical and cultural (local, regional and national) identities. In the Member States of the European Union, the propagation of a new European identity was accompanied by the emergence or re-emergence of fragmented and unstable national and ethnic identities. Seemingly established collective, national identities became contested political terrain and the focus of political struggles.

This paper presents results from a comparative and qualitative discourse-historical analysis of governmental crisis communication in Austria, Germany, France, Hungary and Sweden, during the global COVID-19 pandemic lockdown from March 2020 to May 2020 (a 'discourse strand'). By analysing a sample of important speeches and press conferences by government leaders (all performing as the 'face of crisis management'), it is possible to deconstruct a range of discursive strategies announcing/legitimising restrictive measures in order to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic where everybody is in danger of falling ill, regardless of their status, position, education and so forth. I focus on four frames that have been employed to mitigate the 'dread of death' (Bauman, 2006) and counter the 'denial of death' (Becker, 1973/2020): a 'religious frame', a 'dialogic frame', a frame emphasising 'trust', and a frame of 'leading a war'. These interpretation frameworks are all embedded in 'renationalising' tendencies, specifically visible in the EU member states where even the Schengen Area was suddenly abolished (in order to 'keep the virus out') and borders were closed. Thus, everybody continues to be confronted with national biopolitics and body politics (Wodak, 2021).

The term 'illiberal democracy', coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997, has gained much traction, specifically since its use by Hungarian Prime Minster Victor Orbán in 2014. Ever since, Orbán and his governing party Fidesz have been implementing this vision resulting in major cutdowns on free speech, freedom of press, of various NGOs which support human rights, and so forth. Moreover, Fidesz won the 2018 national election with a strong focus on antiimmigration policies. Although Orbán's restrictive migration policies were widely criticised during the so-called refugee crisis 2015, many EU member states have started to follow the Hungarian policy of closing borders and protecting the EU from asylum-seekers and an alleged invasion by Muslims. Hence, I claim that formerly taboo subjects and expressions in mainstream discourse are being accepted more and more ('normalisation'). Such normalisation goes hand in hand with a certain 'shamelessness': the limits of the sayable are shifting regarding both the frequency of lies and the violating of discourse conventions – as well as regarding repeated attacks on central democratic institutions. Normalising the assessment of migrants as a threat to inner security and a burden on the welfare state and education system must be perceived as an international development – generally instrumentalising a 'politics of fear'.

Integrating theories about discourse with social science theories allows to grasp the dynamic and fluid co-construction of European identities, both top-down and bottom-up. Such interdisciplinary approaches are able to systematically deconstruct the everyday workings of European institutions, or support our understanding of the impact of traditional and social media in their production and reproduction of pro-European or Eurosceptic sentiments and attitudes. In this chapter, I first present some important characteristics of Discourse Studies (DS) and Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), specifically of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). I then, secondly, summarize the most relevant discursive research strands on European integration. Thirdly, I illustrate the interdisciplinary nexus of discourse-oriented European studies with a case study on the mediatization and politicization of the refugee crisis in Austria, from 2015-2016

Integrating theories about discourse (Discourse Studies; DS) with social science theories allows to grasp the dynamic and fluid co-construction of European identities, both top-down and bottom-up. Such interdisciplinary approaches systematically deconstruct the everyday workings of European institutions and support our understanding of the impact of traditional and social media in their production and reproduction of pro-European or Eurosceptic sentiments and attitudes. In this chapter, I first present some important characteristics of Discourse Studies and Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), specifically of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). I then, secondly, summarize the most relevant discursive research based on a range of theories and methodological approaches on European integration. Thirdly, I illustrate the interdisciplinary nexus of discourse-oriented European studies with a case study on the mediatization and politicization of the refugee crisis in Austria, from 2015-2016. I specifically focus on legitimation strategies and argumentation schemes which accompany the implementation of ever more restrictive policy decisions.

AbstractIn this paper, I discuss the attempt by all right-wing populist parties to create, on the one hand, the 'real' and 'true' people; and on the other, the 'élites' or 'the establishment' who are excluded from the truedemos. Such divisions, as will be elaborated in detail, have emerged in many societies over centuries and decades. A brief example of the arbitrary construction of opposing groups illustrates the intricacies of such populist reasoning. Furthermore, I pose the question why such divisions resonate so well in many countries? I argue that – apart from apolitics of fear(Wodak 2015) – muchresentmentis evoked which could be viewed as both accompanying as well as a reaction to the disenchantment with politics and the growing inequalities in globalized capitalist societies.

More than three years have passed since former British Prime Minister David Cameron delivered a much acknowledged and controversial speech on 23rd January 2013, in respect to the British relationship with the European Union. Europe and the European Union (EU) are now, of course, facing different challenges than three years ago. The contrasting national and transnational identities which emerge in the so-called Bloomberg Speech (BS) imply a nationalistic body politics which constructs the United Kingdom and England as separate entities contrasted to "the continent", i.e. Europe. Hence, BS oscillates between two extremes, in its attempt to alternatively observe maximum distance to the EU and some proximity to its economic policies. Moreover, both the topoi of urgency and threat/danger are appealed to – warning the EU that it would suffer under the loss of the United Kingdom; but also warning British voters that Brexit would damage their future and prosperity. This speech can be perceived as the starting point for the referendum on June 23rd, 2016 – which resulted in a tiny majority wanting to leave the EU ('Brexit'). Of course, there is no clear causal connection between BS and Brexit; but many arguments of the "remain and leave campaigns" can be traced to the BS; as well as the huge ambivalence framing Cameron's position towards the EU.

In recent years, we can observe a shift towards the right, in politics and the related political discourse. This paper analyses this development for debates on migration in Austria, while drawing on the concept of "normalisation". The basic assumption is illustrated with an example of Austrian debates following the terrorist attacks in Paris, 7.–9.01.2015. In the quantitative and qualitative analysis of a complete sample of 72 newspaper articles in the period of two weeks in January/February 2015, it becomes obvious that the notion of "unwillingness to integrate" ("Integrationsunwilligkeit"), a completely vague notion (a "floating signifier") which remains undefined and was used only by the right-wing populist party FPÖ in the 1990s, has since moved to the middle of the political spectrum and was suddenly employed by the political mainstream in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the analysis provides some evidence for the merging of two completely unrelated arguments: an argument about how to deal with non-compliance of adolescent migrant school children with an argument about the prevention of radicalisation in society.