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AbstractResearch Questions/IssuesWe integrate behavioral governance and learning theory to address the overarching research questions—"What are the core mechanisms driving a director's monitoring and advising effectiveness over board tenure?"; and "What factors affect how and when a director becomes and stays effective in the monitoring and advising roles?"Research InsightsOur research provides new insights into director effectiveness by examining how a director's tenure, both independently and in concert with other moderating factors, affects the director's ability to be effective in the key but distinct roles of monitoring and advising.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe provide a nuanced and dynamic theoretical understanding of director effectiveness over time. We explain that the monitoring and advising roles that determine director effectiveness are each driven by different theoretical mechanisms, and we offer testable propositions that shed light on a director's ability to become and stay effective in their monitoring and advising roles at different points in their tenure.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsBoards will benefit from the insights we provide for how a director's relationships with the board and CEO and a director's individual attributes help or hinder their monitoring and advising effectiveness over time. We discuss practical solutions for harnessing these insights to inform decisions around board composition, structure, and process. We also discuss policy implications, including staggered boards, refreshed boards, and term limits.

We develop a theory that examines how a particular type of third-party quality signal, certifications, influences an actor's long-term reputation by addressing two different types of uncertainty. The first type deals with the degree to which the capabilities of an actor can be inferred over time based on known performance dimensions. We label this technical uncertainty. The second type deals with assessing whether the perceived capabilities of the actor meet the standard of desirability, which we call performance standard uncertainty. We propose and test that certifications will positively influence the long-term reputation of actors in situations that involve minimal technical uncertainty, and that, across levels of technical performance, certifications will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with assessments of actors such that certifications will have the greatest impact on assessments of actors who are close to the uncertain standard of desirability. We test our hypotheses in the context of the voting for Major League Baseball's Hall of Fame, an environment where comprehensive technical performance measures leave little technical uncertainty. Our results support our hypotheses and suggest that certifications can influence an actor's reputation by reducing performance standard uncertainty rather than just technical uncertainty, as previously presumed.

Research has begun to reveal the malleability of implicit prejudice. One measure of this construct, the race Implicit Association Test (IAT), represents a widely-used tool to assess individuals' positive and negative associations with different racial groups. In two studies, we demonstrate the capacity of salient pressures to alter implicit racial responses. In Study 1, an enhancement of promoting pressures through an explicit instruction to stereotype was sufficient to increase pro-White bias on the IAT. In Study 2, an enhancement of inhibiting pressures through a simple instruction to avoid stereotyping was sufficient to reduce pro-White bias. Taken together, the studies suggest that implicit prejudice is amenable to voluntary control through the use of simple, direct means.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: ConceptualResearch Question/Issue: Prior research on corporate elites has focused on how interlocking directorships serve to create inter‐organizational linkages and on what happens when board members lose their seats and those linkages are broken. Rather than focusing on the ties in corporate networks, here we focus on the nodes of these networks, the individual members of boards of directors.Research Findings/Insights: We identify the conditions under which a director will be able to retain his/her board seat even after he or she loses the executive position that provided initial entry onto the board.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The case of outside directors who have lost their executive positions in their home organizations provides an excellent opportunity to examine two competing theoretical perspectives: the inter‐corporate and intra‐class perspectives on corporate elites.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (2002), directorships are demanding an increasing amount of directors' time and directors without full‐time executive positions elsewhere can actually devote more energy to board activities. An unintended consequence of this legislation is a potential decrease in the number of directors who hold several board seats simultaneously. This may reduce the efficiency of information flow across organizations and slow the diffusion of innovation.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: ConceptualResearch Question/Issue: This paper extends the theory of bundles of corporate governance mechanisms to address agency issues within the Anglo‐Saxon system of corporate governance. The focus of our study is to detail the role of firm performance as a key determinant of how the governance mechanisms of monitoring and incentive alignment serve as complements or substitutes in addressing agency issues. Previous research has looked at these mechanisms in isolation from each other, with limited regard for the contingencies of firm performance and external monitoring. We propose that it is best to look at these mechanisms as a bundle of mechanisms to protect shareholder interests, and that firm performance is a key determinant of the composition of this bundle.Research Findings/Insights: We introduce firm performance as a critical contingency that heightens shareholders' concerns over governance issues as they seek to retain control over adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We propose that when firms are performing poorly, outside monitoring by institutional investors can complement internal monitoring by boards of directors.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We examine governance bundles under both agency and stewardship theoretical lenses to tie together previous empirical research and advance theory. In specifying the role of firm performance in determining the mix of mechanisms within the governance bundle, we reconcile prior disparate findings as to whether or not these governance mechanisms act in a complementary or substitutable fashion.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The conceptualization of these governance mechanisms has practitioner merit in analyzing the challenges that board members face managing agency conflicts through the mix of governance mechanisms, given different levels of firm performance. Our research also shows that, under conditions of poor performance, shareholders can provide effective external monitoring that can improve the overall governance effectiveness of the firm.

There is little consensus on what constitutes adequate health insurance coverage. The concept of a lack of adequate coverage, or underinsurance, is a matter of ongoing debate. A measure of adequate coverage is of critical importance as the nature of health insurance products evolves. Changes to health coverage include more direct out-of-pocket spending by consumers and a reduction of covered benefits. This article updates and extends an earlier review of underinsurance measurement published in 1993. We present a conceptual approach to measuring underinsurance and provide a review of the empirical findings obtained from the application of these approaches. A discussion of the limitations in the selection of a measurement approach includes a review of the extant data sources used. We recommend a national effort to develop a consistent approach to monitor changes in the economic and structural dimensions of health insurance coverage with a concerted effort to define and measure underinsurance.

Organizations derive their social identity from membership in formal groups and strive to maintain a positive social identity. When their social identity is threatened and group boundaries are permeable, organizations defect to other groups. This paper suggests that organizations receive identity-discrepant cues when in-group members defect to an out-group, but how organizations respond to such cues hinges on their social affiliations to the in-group, out-group, and defectors. A study of organizations that migrated from the NASDAQ stock market to the New York Stock Exchange reveals that strong ties to in-group members (NASDAQ members) reduced the impact of identity-discrepant cues and diminished defections. Conversely, strong ties to out-group members (NYSE members) enhanced the impact of identity-discrepant cues and increased defection. Proximity to defectors increased cross-overs—organizations followed defectors to whom they had direct ties. Implications for the study of embeddedness are outlined.

Stemming from an 11-year DFID funded programme under its Renewable Natural Resources Research Strategy (RNRRS), Technology Development Assistance for Agriculture: Putting Research into Low Income Countries reviews part of this programme as a case study of a broader issue of technology development for Africa. Controversially, it critiques current international technology development assistance and focuses on the potential role of the private sector in agricultural technology development as well as providing insights for future cognate science policy and practice. The book focuses on the RIU "Best Bets" Africa sub-programme. This identified promising proposals to take existing agriculture research products and put these into use in ways that would benefit the poor in developing countries. The sum set aside for this was £5 million. The empirical sections of the book cover project selection, progress and programme management over a 2009-2012 period with special attention paid to lessons learned that may have implications for future cognate technology development assistance. This topical book gives direct evidence of meeting objectives and delivering real changes in technology development for Africa to postgraduate students, researchers, international bodies, NGOs, policy makers and government organisations working on natural resource management, technology development assistance, and low income country agriculture.