Suchergebnisse

Do radical political demands increase the risk of ethnic civil conflict? And why do ethnic movements make radical demands in the first place? We contend that when movements are fragmented, individual organizations use far-reaching claims relative to the status quo to attract attention from the government, boost intra-organizational discipline, and outbid rivals. Yet, such radical claims also increase the risk of conflict escalation. We test our arguments at both the ethnic group and organizational levels, using a new dataset on ethno-political organizations and their political demands. Our results show that the scope of demands increases the more organizations exist within an ethnic movement and that radical demands increase the risk of civil conflict onset. This effect is specific to the dyadic government-movement interaction, irrespective of other ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, at the organizational level, radicalization in demands increases the likelihood that an organization becomes engaged in civil conflict. ; ISSN:0022-0027 ; ISSN:0731-4086 ; ISSN:1552-8766

Do radical political demands increase the risk of ethnic civil conflict? And why do ethnic movements make radical demands in the first place? We contend that when movements are fragmented, individual organizations use far-reaching claims relative to the status quo to attract attention from the government, boost intra-organizational discipline, and outbid rivals. Yet, such radical claims also increase the risk of conflict escalation. We test our arguments at both the ethnic group and organizational levels, using a new dataset on ethno-political organizations and their political demands. Our results show that the scope of demands increases the more organizations exist within an ethnic movement and that radical demands increase the risk of civil conflict onset. This effect is specific to the dyadic government-movement interaction, irrespective of other ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, at the organizational level, radicalization in demands increases the likelihood that an organization becomes engaged in civil conflict.

Do radical political demands increase the risk of ethnic civil conflict? And why do ethnic movements make radical demands in the first place? We contend that when movements are fragmented, individual organizations use far-reaching claims relative to the status quo to attract attention from the government, boost intra-organizational discipline, and outbid rivals. Yet, such radical claims also increase the risk of conflict escalation. We test our arguments at both the ethnic group and organizational levels, using a new dataset on ethno-political organizations and their political demands. Our results show that the scope of demands increases the more organizations exist within an ethnic movement and that radical demands increase the risk of civil conflict onset. This effect is specific to the dyadic government-movement interaction, irrespective of other ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, at the organizational level, radicalization in demands increases the likelihood that an organization becomes engaged in civil conflict.

Are certain ethnic cleavages more conflict-prone than others? While only few scholars focus on the contents of ethnicity, most of those who do argue that political violence is more likely to occur along religious divisions than linguistic ones. We challenge this claim by analyzing the path from linguistic differences to ethnic civil war along three theoretical steps: (1) the perception of grievances by group members, (2) rebel mobilization, and (3) government accommodation of rebel demands. Our argument is tested with a new data set of ethnic cleavages that records multiple linguistic and religious segments for ethnic groups from 1946 to 2009. Adopting a relational perspective, we assess ethnic differences between potential challengers and the politically dominant group in each country. Our findings indicate that intrastate conflict is more likely within linguistic dyads than among religious ones. Moreover, we find no support for the thesis that Muslim groups are particularly conflict-prone.

Revolutionen sind Volksaufstände gegen die herrschende Elite mit dem Ziel eines radikalen politischen Wechsels. Aber wer ist das Volk? In zahlreichen Nahost- und nordafrikanischen Ländern (MENA-Region), die während des Arabischen Frühlings politische Aufstände erlebt haben, ist die Frage nach dem Demos zentral, also die Frage, wer die politische Gemeinschaft überhaupt ist, die über sich selber bestimmen soll. Im Zeitalter des Nationalstaates wird nach Meinung der Autoren der Demos oftmals mit einer ethnisch definierten Gemeinschaft gleichgesetzt. Dies wiederum führt in multiethnischen Ländern zu ausgrenzenden politischen Systemen, die auf der problematischen Mehrheitsregel basieren. Insbesondere der Aspekt der politischen Integration ethnischer Minderheiten wird in herkömmlichen Demokratietheorien oftmals vernachlässigt. Die Autoren zeigen in ihrem Beitrag auf, dass die MENA-Region nicht nur das globale Schlusslicht in Bezug auf die Demokratisierung ist, sondern ebenso mit Blick auf die ethnische Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung. Zudem ist die ethnische Ausgrenzung ein wichtiger und signifikanter Erklärungsgrund für ethnische Bürgerkriege in der Region. Deswegen ist zu befürchten, dass Länder in der MENA-Region auch nach einem Übergang zu prozeduralen Demokratien weiterhin unstabil und konfliktgefährdet bleiben, solange sie nicht zu einem umfassenden, integrativen Begriff des Demos übergehen. Die Autoren diskutieren vor diesem Hintergrund institutionelle Lösungen zur Förderung der Integration und der Stabilität. (ICI2)

Data and codebook for the updated EPR-O data. It includes 86 countries covering the years from 1946 to 2019 or 2000 - 2019 for the additional countries.

The original EPR-Organizations dataset (see Supplementary Material at https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002721996436) includes 40 countries covering the years from
1946 to 2013. We extend this data in two ways:
1. We expand the time coverage for previously coded countries for the years 2014 - 2019
2. We add new countries with a temporal coverage of the years from 2000 - 2019

For more information on the dataset consider the cited sources as well as the codebook.

Please cite the following sources when using the dataset:

Vogt, M., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cederman, L.-E. (2021). From Claims to Violence: Signaling, Outbidding, and Escalation in Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65(7-8), 1278-1307. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002721996436

Gremler, F., Vogt, M. & Weidmann, N. B. (2024). Intra-Ethnic Divisions and Disagreement Over Self-Determination Demands in Ethnic Movements. Political Science Research and Methods (forthcoming).

This article introduces the new Family of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data sets, version 2014, which is the latest in a series of data sets on ethnicity that have stimulated civil war research in the past decade. The EPR Family provides data on ethnic groups' access to state power, their settlement patterns, links to rebel organizations, transborder ethnic kin relations, and intraethnic cleavages. The new 2014 version does not only extend the data set's temporal coverage from 2009 to 2013, but it also offers several new features, such as a new measure of regional autonomy that is independent of national-level executive power and a new data set component coding intraethnic identities and cleavages. Moreover, for the first time, detailed documentation of the EPR data is provided through the EPR Atlas. This article presents these novelties in detail and compares the EPR Family 2014 to the most relevant alternative data sets on ethnicity.

Abstract
Despite significant advances in our understanding of the politics of religious ideology and identity across time and space, scholars disagree on how to conceptualize "religious" conflicts and "religious" actors, and how to infer religious motivations from actors' behavior. This Forum brings together scholars with diverse research agendas to weigh in on conceptual, methodological, and ethical questions surrounding the study of contemporary religious conflicts. We ask: How do we know when individuals and groups are acting on religious, as opposed to other, motivations? To what extent can analysts rely on actors' own claims about their motivations? How does the "secular bias" affect scholarly research on religion and conflict? Is there a bias over which conflicts and actors come to be labeled and coded as "religious" by scholars, policymakers, and the media? The Forum fosters a debate aimed at identifying gaps within and between academic research and policy as well as media analyses on religion and political violence. The contributors examine contradictory conclusions by academics and policy analysts rooted in diverging assumptions and arguments about "religious" actors, "religious" motivations, and "religious" conflicts. The Forum proposes some ways for scholars to overcome these challenges as well as offers implications for policymakers and journalists who shape the public discourse.