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It is often claimed that the idea of toleration emerged from and depends upon a Protestant context that limits its usefulness today. These claims implicate the political thought of John Locke, clearly a key figure for the history of toleration, and also an emphatically Protestant one. The fullest support for the claim in question is offered by Jeremy Waldron's God, Locke and Equality, which argues that the idea of equality on which Locke based his case cannot be separated from its religious foundations. Taking issue with Waldron's view, this article argues that in the course of defending toleration Locke came to advance an idea of equality that may be termed 'dialogical', in that it rested on the equality that is necessarily presupposed by argumentative exchange. While that idea of equality is fully consistent with Locke's Protestantism, it does not, the article argues, depend upon it. Rather, it depends on the minimum requirements of shared citizenship. Civil equality is modelled, in Locke's defence of toleration, on what is presupposed by shared membership in political society, and no religious view is indispensable to it. Moreover, while the 'Protestant' reading of Locke may seem unique in introducing an element of compulsion, the 'dialogical' reading may introduce as much compulsion as is needed for the purposes of contractualist political theory. Adapted from the source document.

This article attempts to respond to the major critical themes in the commentaries by Jones, Hibbert and Lecce on the book Cosmopolitan Regard. The book's 'statist' assumptions are acknowledged, and defended in light of the project that is undertaken. Its use of an un-sociological notion of legitimacy (in contrast to 'justification') is explained. Its argument is characterized as one that seeks to constrain agency rather than to prescribe distributive outcomes of a strongly egalitarian kind. Finally, the argument's dependence on empirical assumptions is recognized.

It is often claimed that the idea of toleration emerged from and depends upon a Protestant context that limits its usefulness today. These claims implicate the political thought of John Locke, clearly a key figure for the history of toleration, and also an emphatically Protestant one. The fullest support for the claim in question is offered by Jeremy Waldron's God, Locke and Equality, which argues that the idea of equality on which Locke based his case cannot be separated from its religious foundations. Taking issue with Waldron's view, this article argues that in the course of defending toleration Locke came to advance an idea of equality that may be termed 'dialogical', in that it rested on the equality that is necessarily presupposed by argumentative exchange. While that idea of equality is fully consistent with Locke's Protestantism, it does not, the article argues, depend upon it. Rather, it depends on the minimum requirements of shared citizenship. Civil equality is modelled, in Locke's defence of toleration, on what is presupposed by shared membership in political society, and no religious view is indispensable to it. Moreover, while the 'Protestant' reading of Locke may seem unique in introducing an element of compulsion, the 'dialogical' reading may introduce as much compulsion as is needed for the purposes of contractualist political theory.

The 'Pascalian' tradition in French thought is a moral rigorism that demands practical embodiment while denying that any embodiment of its demands can ever be complete. The power of this tradition may be seen even in French political moralists of the 20th century. It is revealed in Bergson's view that the open morality must seek practical expression through the closed society, while constantly subverting it. It is revealed in Levinas's claim that the 'saying' requires to be 'said' but always undermines the said, so that what is explicit is 'always wanting'. Directly, and also through the influence of Levinas, the Pascalian tradition exerts a complex influence on Derrida, in whose thoughts about the topic of justice moral rigorism transforms into an idea of radical epistemic incompleteness, or infinite deferral. 'Pascalians' such as Bergson, Levinas and Derrida are convinced, consequently, that the ethical can be given only sporadic or uninstitutionalized political expression; in this regard, they may be contrasted with 'Lockeans' who believe that political theory is at one remove from our deepest ethical or religious conclusions. In light of that contrast, the differences between Continental and Anglophone political theory may be traced to post-Reformation circumstances rather than, as is often supposed, to the Enlightenment.

"Vergangene Ungerechtigkeiten erfordern vor allem dann eine Reaktion, wenn sie für gegenwärtige Mängel verantwortlich sind. Aber Skeptiker argumentieren, dass es nicht nötig ist, deswegen ein eigenständiges Konzept namens 'Historische Gerechtigkeit' einzuführen. Unsere allgemeinen, herkömmlichen Gerechtigkeitskonzepte geben uns alle nötigen Ressourcen an die Hand, um aktuelle Ungleichheiten zu bewerten und angemessen auf sie zu reagieren. Ein auf Grundrechten basierender Ansatz zu generationenübergreifenden Fragen hat einige Vorteile, wenn man ihn mit konkurrierenden Herangehensweisen, wie beispielsweise die Idee einer generationenübergreifenden Gemeinschaft, oder die Rechtfertigung von Verpflichtungen durch traditionelle Kontinuität, vergleicht. Es ist möglich, zukünftigen Menschen Rechte zuzuschreiben. Allerdings sind die Argumente dafür, auch vergangenen Individuen Rechte zuzuschreiben, fragwürdig." (Autorenreferat)

"Vergangene Ungerechtigkeiten erfordern vor allem dann eine Reaktion, wenn sie für gegenwärtige Mängel verantwortlich sind. Aber Skeptiker argumentieren, dass es nicht nötig ist, deswegen ein eigenständiges Konzept namens 'Historische Gerechtigkeit' einzuführen. Unsere allgemeinen, herkömmlichen Gerechtigkeitskonzepte geben uns alle nötigen Ressourcen an die Hand, um aktuelle Ungleichheiten zu bewerten und angemessen auf sie zu reagieren. Ein auf Grundrechten basierender Ansatz zu generationenübergreifenden Fragen hat einige Vorteile, wenn man ihn mit konkurrierenden Herangehensweisen, wie beispielsweise die Idee einer generationenübergreifenden Gemeinschaft, oder die Rechtfertigung von Verpflichtungen durch traditionelle Kontinuität, vergleicht. Es ist möglich, zukünftigen Menschen Rechte zuzuschreiben. Allerdings sind die Argumente dafür, auch vergangenen Individuen Rechte zuzuschreiben, fragwürdig." (Autorenreferat)

Past injustices demand a response if they have led to present deprivation. But skeptica arthe that there is no need to introduce a self-contained concept of 'historical justice' as our general concepts of justice provide all the necessary resources to deal with present inequalities. A rights-based approach to intergenerational issues has some advantages when compared to rival approaches: those based on intergenerational community, for example, or on obligations deriving from traditional continuity. While it is possible to ascribe rights to beings who are not presently in existence, the case for ascribing rights to future generations is much stronger than for past generations.