Speculates on consequences of Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for US foreign policy; argues that despite isolationist tendencies, the US faces the dilemma of relying on international cooperation to effectively fight against terrorism. Summaries in English and Spanish p. 474 and 488.
Assesses US President Clinton's record on foreign policy; balances successes and failures and declares his legacy ambiguous. Summaries in English p. 464 and Spanish p. 478.
Between 2002 and 2005, a relatively coherent and profoundly renewed strategic approach to international relations was developed by the Bush administration. Premised on an optimistic assessment of great power relations ("a balance of power that favors freedom"), it emphasized the importance of promoting democracy as a way to solve many of the long-term political and security problems of the greater Middle East. It rested on the view that American military power and assertive diplomacy should be used to defeat tyrannies, challenge a pernicious status quo and coerce states into abandoning weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism - without worrying too much about legitimacy or formal multilateralism. The Bush doctrine led to tensions with the Europeans, who for the most part shared neither the world view that underpinned it nor its optimism about possible results, especially as far as geopolitical stability, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were concerned. Then, in 2005, two silent developments took place: the Bush administration, while insisting on staying the course rhetorically (through "transformational diplomacy"), reverted to classical realism in its actual diplomacy - largely for reasons of expediency. China and India, on the other hand, imposed themselves on the global agenda, bringing multipolarity back into the picture of the world to come. While generally closer to European views, the new American realist line remains distinct from the European insistence on strengthening the rules and institutions of global governance.
Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. A Brilliant Young Man in the Cold War University -- 2. A Political Adviser Is Born -- 3. The Rise of a New Foreign Policy Elite -- 4. From the Trilateral Commission to the White House -- 5. Portrait of an Academic in Politics -- 6. In the White House -- 7. The Age of Authority -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index -- Publications Index -- Photographs.
Justin Vaïsse dresse un bilan de la politique étrangère du premier mandat du président Obama. Loin des rigidités idéologiques, difficile à classer dans les courants habituels de la politique étrangère, Obama se révèle avant tout un président pragmatique. Sa représentation d'une Amérique en déclin face aux puissances émergentes le pousse à vouloir reformuler le leadership américain. Le concept de pivot est au cœur de la vision d'Obama, qui souhaite un rééquilibrage des ressources et de l'action politique et militaire des États-Unis vers l'Asie – en priorité la Chine – et les puissances émergentes en général, nouveau centre de gravité du monde. Cette politique sous-entend un certain désengagement du Moyen-Orient, qui reste complexe à mettre en œuvre.
Pour Justin Vaïsse, la multiplication des conflits dans le monde est le signe d'un rééquilibrage de la puissance : les États-Unis ne sont plus le garant de l'ordre mondial, la Chine et la Russie s'affirment, tandis que de nouveaux acteurs privés s'imposent dans les régions où les États sont fragilisés. Nicole Gnesotto insiste pour sa part sur l'impuissance des institutions internationales dans le contexte d'une mondialisation douloureuse.