Productivity change in commercial fisheries: An introduction to the special issue
In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs
ISSN: 0308-597X
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In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 88, Heft 4, S. 974-985
SSRN
Many ocean fisheries are subject to a fundamental economic problem generally referred to as the common property problem. The common property problem manifests itself as excessive fishing fleets and fishing effort, depressed fish stocks and little or no profitability of the fishing activity, irrespective of the richness of the underlying marine resources. European fisheries represent some of the most dramatic examples of the common property problem. This paper employs simple empirical models and recently developed mathe-matical techniques to find optimal feed-back policies to examine the economic efficiency of three European fisheries, namely the Danish, Icelandic and Nor-wegian cod fisheries. The optimal harvesting policies for each of these fisheries are calculated. Comparing these optimal policies with actual harvests provides a measure of the relative efficiency in these three cod fisheries. The comparison confirms that the cod harvesting policies of these three coun-tries have been hugely inefficient in the past. Moreover, it appears that the inef-ficiency has been increasing over time. Only, during the last few years of our data are there indications that this downward trend may have been halted. This comparative improvement, slight as it is, may reflect the impact of a more re-strictive fisheries policy since the early 1990s.
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Real life implies that public procurement contracting of renewable resources results in repeated interaction between a principal and the agents. The present paper analyses ratchet effects in contracting of renewable resources and how the presence of a resource constraint alters the "standard" ratchet effect result. We use a linear reward scheme to influence the incentives of the agents. It is shown that for some renewable resources we might end up both with more or with less pooling in the first-period compared to a situation without a resource constraint. The reason is that the resource constraint implies a smaller performance de-pendent bonus, which reduces the first-period cost from concealing information but at the same time the resource constraint may also imply that second-period benefits from this concealment for the efficient agent are reduced. In situations with high likelihood of first-period pooling, the appropriateness of applying lin-ear incentive schemes can be questioned.
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In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 86, Heft 2, S. 531-542
SSRN
In: Environment and development economics, Band 10, Heft 6, S. 837-859
ISSN: 1469-4395
The relationship between productive efficiency and sustainable development of fishing industries in developing countries has received little attention. Ill-structured property rights in common-pool resources lead to a contradiction between private and social technical efficiency, with private and social costs dependent on the level of technical efficiency. Development policies that increase private efficiency can increase the social cost with ill-structured property rights and common-pool resources, and thereby increase social inefficiency. This paper examines this relationship through a case study of the mini purse seine fishery of the Java Sea, and finds that private technical efficiency does not depend on any measurable attributes of human capital, diverges substantially between the peak and off seasons, and differs between vessels more within the off season.
In: Marine policy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 135-159
ISSN: 0308-597X
Publisher's version, source: http://dx.doi.org/10.12952/journal.elementa.000114 . ; Harvest control rules have become an important tool in modern fisheries management, and are increasingly adopted to provide continuity in management practices, to deal with uncertainty and ecosystem considerations, and to relieve management decisions from short-term political pressure. We provide the conceptual and institutional background for harvest control rules, a discussion of the structure of fisheries management, and brief introductions to harvest control rules in a selection of present day cases. The cases demonstrate that harvest control rules take different forms in different settings, yet cover only a subset of the full policy space. We conclude with views on harvest control rules in future fisheries management, both in terms of ideal and realistic developments. One major challenge for future fisheries management is closing the gap between ideas and practice.
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- ; Harvest control rules have become an important tool in modern fisheries management, and are increasingly adopted to provide continuity in management practices, to deal with uncertainty and ecosystem considerations, and to relieve management decisions from short-term political pressure. We provide the conceptual and institutional background for harvest control rules, a discussion of the structure of fisheries management, and brief introductions to harvest control rules in a selection of present day cases. The cases demonstrate that harvest control rules take different forms in different settings, yet cover only a subset of the full policy space. We conclude with views on harvest control rules in future fisheries management, both in terms of ideal and realistic developments. One major challenge for future fisheries management is closing the gap between ideas and practice.
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In: Kvamsdal , S F , Eide , A , Ekerhovd , N-A , Enberg , K , Gudmundsdottir , A , Hoel , A H , Mills , K E , Mueter , F J , Ravn-Jonsen , L , Sandal , L K , Stiansen , J E & Vestergaard , N 2016 , ' Harvest control rules in modern fisheries management ' , Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene , no. 4 , 000114 . https://doi.org/10.12952/journal.elementa.000114
Harvest control rules have become an important tool in modern fisheries management, and are increasingly adopted to provide continuity in management practices, to deal with uncertainty and ecosystem considerations, and to relieve management decisions from short-term political pressure. We provide the conceptual and institutional background for harvest control rules, a discussion of the structure of fisheries management, and brief introductions to harvest control rules in a selection of present day cases. The cases demonstrate that harvest control rules take different forms in different settings, yet cover only a subset of the full policy space. We conclude with views on harvest control rules in future fisheries management, both in terms of ideal and realistic developments. One major challenge for future fisheries management is closing the gap between ideas and practice.
BASE
- ; Harvest control rules have become an important tool in modern fisheries management, and are increasingly adopted to provide continuity in management practices, to deal with uncertainty and ecosystem considerations, and to relieve management decisions from short-term political pressure. We provide the conceptual and institutional background for harvest control rules, a discussion of the structure of fisheries management, and brief introductions to harvest control rules in a selection of present day cases. The cases demonstrate that harvest control rules take different forms in different settings, yet cover only a subset of the full policy space. We conclude with views on harvest control rules in future fisheries management, both in terms of ideal and realistic developments. One major challenge for future fisheries management is closing the gap between ideas and practice.
BASE
In: Marine policy, Band 58, S. 1-5
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Kaiser , B A , Bakanev , S , Bertelsen , R G , Carson , M , Eide , A , Fernandez , L , Halpin , P , Izmalkov , S , Kyhn , L A , Österblom , H , Punt , M , Ravn-Jonsen , L , Sanchirico , J , Sokolov , K , Sundet , J H , Thorarinsdóttir , G G & Vestergaard , N 2015 , ' Spatial issues in Arctic marine resource governance workshop summary and comment ' , Marine Policy , vol. 58 , pp. 1-5 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.03.033
The rapidly changing Arctic marine ecosystems face new challenges and opportunities that are increasing and shifting governance needs in the region. A group of economists, ecologists, biologists, political scientists and resource managers met in Stockholm, SE, Sept 4–6, 2014 to discuss the governance of Arctic marine resources in a spatial context. We report on the findings here. ; The rapidly changing Arctic marine ecosystems face new challenges and opportunities that are increasing and shifting governance needs in the region. A group of economists, ecologists, biologists, political scientists and resource managers met in Stockholm, SE, Sept 4–6, 2014 to discuss the governance of Arctic marine resources in a spatial context. We report on the findings here.
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