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The following Venezuela Findings Report, authored by Dr. Harold Trinkunas, is the product of a working group held in Miami on June 5, 2009, which included 11 prominent academic and private sector experts in Venezuelan history, culture, geography, economics, politics, and military affairs. ; At first glance, it is difficult to see the strategic culture of Venezuela in action since it has not fought a war with a foreign adversary since its independence from Gran Colombia in 1830. However, by looking at a broad concept of strategic culture that includes non-military sources of national power, we can detect a pattern across time in Venezuela's engagement with the international system. The essential elements of Venezuela's traditional strategic culture are an inward focus on political stability and an outward focus on peace. The legacy for Venezuelans of the wars of independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, in which their troops played a key role across northern South America, is a sense of nationalism, a desire for an autonomous role on the international stage, and a conviction that Venezuela can be a positive force for regional integration and freedom.1 Its role as a leading oil exporter contributes to a belief that Venezuela is a wealthy country that has the potential to accomplish great things. This sometimes produces an overestimation of its capabilities to accomplish change on the international stage. However, the legacy of political turmoil in the nineteenth century is a concern for both internal stability as well as the sense that the main threats to security are civil wars rather than external conflict.

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 ; To outside observers, Venezuelaâ s foreign policy under the Chávez administration appears radical, occasionally irrational, and increasingly militarized. Since coming to office, President Hugo Chávez has spent billions on a major weapons acquisitions program.

The current degree of politicization & civil military conflict is argued to be nearly unprecedented in Venezuela's recent democratic history. The expansion of the role of Venezuelan Armed Forces since the election of Chavez suggests that civilian control in Venezuela has been eliminated, & has produced critiques of the danger of expanding military role at the same time as dismantling institutional mechanisms of civilian control. The civil and military institutions of the Fourth & Fifth Republics are described as a settling into a dysfunctional though stable pattern in the 1980s that was transformed by Chavez's attempt to control Armed Forces personally by manipulating assignments & promotions. The civilians faced a divided yet politically significant military that demonstrated a high tolerance for government quasi-repressive activities, as exemplified in the use of armed forces in internal security roles during the 63 days of a general strike in December 2002. A broad expansion of the military's participation in government policymaking & implementation, combined with the elimination of institutions of containment & oversight, indicates that Venezuela's institutions of civilian control have unraveled. The reorientation of security forces toward internal roles & missions has been a leading indicator of civil military conflict & authoritarian rules in many states. The Venezuelan Armed Forces are predicted to remain at the center of a tug-of-war between the opposition and send government, and thus will continue to hatch pro-& anti- Chavez conspiracies, resulting in highly politicized & less professional Armed Forces, & a headache for future administrations. References. J. Harwell

For many who thought of Venezuela as a consolidated democracy, the 1992 coup attempts came as a complete surprise. Those familiar with the deterioration of its democratic regime, in contrast, were more surprised that the coups did not succeed. This article provides an institution-centered explanation of the puzzle of why the 1992 coups attempts occurred, why they failed, and why the Venezuelan military has remained quiescent in the years that followed. Institutions of civilian control created during the post-1958 "Punto Fijo" period, particularly those based on fragmenting the officer corps, prevented the collapse of the democratic regime in 1992. These same institutions allowed civilians to regain authority over the armed forces duting the Rafael Caldera administration and have ensured the subordination of the armed forces to the elected authorities to the present. It is also argued that the istitutional basis for civilan control has been dismantled during the Fifth Republic, heightening the likelihood of future civil-military conflict and threatening regime stability.

This article appeared in Strategic Insights (May 2002), v.1 no.3 ; On the evening of 11 April 2002, the third day of a general strike against the government, the Venezuelan armed forces rebelled against their president, Hugo Chávez Frias. Reacting to the bloody clashes between pro- and anti- government demonstrators near the presidential palace, the commander of the Army, General Efraim Vásquez Velasco, announced in a nationally televised address that he would no longer obey presidential orders. Other senior generals and admirals soon followed him onto the airwaves, expressing their solidarity with the Army commander and their opposition to the president. Within hours, the senior military officer in the Venezuelan armed forces, General Lucas Rincón Romero, announced President Chávez's resignation. This document discusses the future status of civil-military relations in Venezuela since any future democratic government in that country will have to contend with the reemergence of the military as a political actor.