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This paper develops a medium-scale dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model for fiscal policy simulations. Relative to existingmodels of this type, our model incorporates a two-country monetary union structure, which makes it well suited to simulate fiscal measures by relatively large countries in a currency area. We also provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the government expenditures side, by explicitly distinguishing between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, public purchases and the public sector wage bill. Finally, we consider a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, which allows to analyze the response of equilibrium unemployment to fiscal measures. In order to illustrate some of its applications, and motivated by recent policy debate in the Euro Area, we calibrate the model to Spain and the rest of the area and simulate a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios. We find that, in terms of output and employment losses, fiscal consolidation is the least damaging when achieved by reducing the public sector wage bill, whereas it is most damaging when carried out by cutting public investment.

Labor market studies on the effects of minimum wages are typically confined to the sector or worker group directly affected. We present a two-sector search model in which one sector is more productive than the other one and thus, pays higher wages. In such a framework, setting a minimum wage in the unproductive sector to reduce the wage gap causes a negative spillover effect on the productive sector. While the effect on job creation in the (targeted) unproductive sector is ambiguous, job creation in the (non-targeted) productive sector unambiguously decreases. This is driven by the fact that a minimum wage increases the outside option of unemployed workers - contributing to wage determination in the productive sector. Welfare effects are ambiguous. In principle, we cannot exclude that a minimum wage in a two-sector search model is welfare enhancing due to the possibility of an above optimal level of productive employment since firms do not take into account the effects of their individual job creation on aggregated search costs.

In a New Keynesian DSGE model with non-Ricardian consumers, we show that automatic stabilization according to a countercyclical spending rule following the idea of the debt brake is well suited both to steer the economy and in terms of welfare. In particular, the adjustment account set up to record public deficits and surpluses serves well to keep the level of government debt stable. However, it is essential to design its feedback to government spending correctly, where discretionary lapses should be corrected faster than lapses due to estimation errors.

We discuss how cross-country unemployment insurance can be used to improve international risk sharing. We use a two-country business cycle model with incomplete financial markets and frictional labor markets where the unemployment insurance scheme operates across both countries. Cross-country insurance through the unemployment insurance system can be achieved without affecting unemployment outcomes. The Ramsey-optimal policy however prescribes a more countercyclical replacement rate when international risk sharing concerns enter the unemployment insurance trade-off. We calibrate our model to Eurozone data and find that optimal stabilizing transfers through the unemployment insurance system are sizable and mainly stabilize consumption in the periphery countries, while optimal replacement rates are countercylical overall. Moreover, we find that debt-financed national policies are a poor substitute for fiscal transfers.

Using an estimated large-scale New-Keynesian model, we assess welfare and business cycle consequences of a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Relative to the status quo, long term consequences generate winners and losers depending on the degree of integration and on how key macroeconomic variables adjust. Short term differences between the regimes are minor, both in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks. This also explains why welfare differences are negligibly small across the fiscal union scenarios. Even when introducing risk premia on government bonds, this general finding is not changed - although risk premia per se decrease welfare notably. We further perform a counterfactual exercise analysing the effects of what would have happened had a fiscal union regime been installed at the start of EMU already. While key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly, debt dynamics could have changed notably over the estimation period.

Using an estimated large-scale New-Keynesian model, we assess welfare and business cycle consequences of a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Relative to the status quo, long term consequences generate winners and losers depending on the degree of integration and on how key macroeconomic variables adjust. Short term differences between the regimes are minor, both in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks. This also explains why welfare differences are negligibly small across the fiscal union scenarios. Even when introducing risk premia on government bonds, this general finding is not changed - although risk premia per se decrease welfare notably. We further perform a counterfactual exercise analysing the effects of what would have happened had a fiscal union regime been installed at the start of EMU already. While key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly, debt dynamics could have changed notably over the estimation period.

AbstractDespite the rising importance of fair trade (FT), a relatively small amount of academic research has been done in this area so far. Advocates of FT claim that it will ultimately improve the living conditions of the poor. Opponents hold that it will worsen their situation. More often than not, public discussion is affected by dogmatic views, prejudices and emotional charges. This paper aims to contribute to an objective discussion of the topic. We present a matching model to analyse the welfare effects of FT in an agricultural market. Our results show that producers obtaining FT certification are better off. All others will lose if incentives for importers to enter the market decline. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In a New Keynesian DSGE model with labor market frictions and liquidity-constrained consumers aggregate unemployment is likely to increase due to a non-persistent government spending shock. Furthermore, the group of asset-holding households reacts very differently from the group of liquidity-constrained consumers implying that the unemployment rate is likely to decrease for asset-holding households, while it increases among liquidity-constrained consumers. The main driver of our results is the marginal utility of consumption which moves in opposite directions for the two types. Regarding the model's parameters, we find that the size of the fiscal (unemployment) multiplier increases with i) highly sticky prices, ii) high degrees of risk aversion, iii) low convexity in labor disutility iv) high replacement rates, and v) debt-financed expenditures.

We investigate the behavior of the unemployment rate after a government expenditure shock and present evidence that the group of asset-holding households reacts very different from the group of liquidity-constrained consumers. Our findings suggest that the unemployment rate is likely to decrease for assetholding households while it increases among liquidity-constrained consumers. The main driver for our results is the marginal utility of wealth which moves in opposite directions for the different types of households after a government expenditure shock. We find that the size of the fiscal (unemployment) multiplier increases with i) highly sticky prices ii) high degrees of risk aversion iii) low real wage elasticities iv) high replacement rates and v) debt financed expenditures.

Employers who use temporary agency staff in contrast to regular staff are not affected by employment protection regulations when terminating a job. Therefore, services provided by temporary work agencies may be seen as a substitute for regular employment. In this paper, we analyze the effects of employment protection on the size of the temporary work agency sector in a model of equilibrium unemployment. We find that higher firing costs may even reduce temporary work agency employment if agencies themselves are subject to employment protection, a consideration which distinguishes our results from those for fixed-term employment arrangements.