Suchergebnisse

Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq examines how the U.S. Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008 and develop a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability. Dr. Richard Shultz views this success through the lens of organizational theory, arguing that the Marine Corps' organizational culture underscores learning and embeds lessons from its history into the Corps memory. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/1000/thumbnail.jpg

In context of post-cold war US military capability and strategy. Reprinted from "The future of airpower in the aftermath of the Gulf war," edited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Deterrence and defense, and strategic and tactical employment of air assets against Iraq.

Considers state sponsored terrorism and confrontations between the US and Libya since 1980.