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Let me document my suggestion that modernist poetics tends to give a privileged position to what has traditionally been known as the sublime by adducing two examples from rather disparate traditions. Martin Heidegger's ontological poetics can reasonably be viewed as a renewal of the aesthetics of the sublime -- although Heidegger never uses the term sublime, so far as I know -- and is explicitly hostile to the limitations of aesthetics, conceived as an autonomous study of a certain kind of experience. Harold Bloom does recur to the Romantic terminology of sublimity in his attempt to construct a poetics which will focus on the Freudian and Nietzchean themes of power and repression. Heidegger is interested in the Ur-sprung of the work of art, that is, the original leap or thrust by means of which it opens up a new sense of the world; this is experienced as shock or displacement and as a threat to what is so far established. Such displacement, combined with Heidegger's concern with death, which occupies a central place in his hermeneutics, is sufficient to demonstrate the parallels between his poetics and the classical theory of the sublime. Heidegger's basic revision of the classical theory is his historicizing of it so that the sublime is not simply the monstrous, novel, or shocking but is construed as the appearance of such qualities in a new epoch which is sent to us by Being. In a commentary on some lines of Holderlin ("…poetically man dwells ."), Heidegger discusses the problem of measure and the measureless, a theme which occurs in accounts of the sublime. In Holderlin's lines, says Heidegger, God is the measure for man and yet God is unknown. But how can that which is unknown serve as a measure? Poet and thinker seem to agree that God is known by appearing "as the one who remains unknown," just as Kant de-scribes the search for measure inspired by the mathematically infinite as leading to an awareness of the moral self, whose law of duty pro-vokes a sense of awe (Achtung) but which is mysteriously unknowable to each of us, despite it being our own deepest nature. Holderlin had suggested that God was "manifest like the sky." Here one thinks of Kant's "starry skies above and the moral law within." The measure, Heidegger continues, "consists in the way in which the god who re-mains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God's appearance through the sky consists in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness but only by guarding the concealed in its self-concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by way of the sky's manifestness."

A recent newspaper story suggests a significant change in the attitude of some baseball fans. While the phenomenon of harassment of players from the stands is not new, there seems to be a new spirit behind the hurling of bottles and other dangerous debris. Whereas such attacks were once motivated by scorn for poor performance or by a violent enthusiasm for the opposing team, spectators are now also apparently moved by envy. They are, according to a number of sportswriters, jealous and resentful of the high salaries and prestige of professional ballplayers. No doubt envy is an ancient phenomenon, but it is not one much discussed in recent moral philosophy. Both the neglect and the signs that it is becoming an increasingly large problem of personal and social life (I'll later be adding more to what might be taken to be the merely idiosyncratic behavior of sports fans) suggest the need for an analysis of its motives, dynamics and possible antidotes. Nietzsche seems to be one of the few modern thinkers who have devoted much attention to envy after the scholastics' attempt at an encyclopedic and systematic account of the virtues and vices. Nietzsche's concern with the subject is much more pervasive than is suggested by the scanty references to Neid and its derivatives in Schlechta's index; moreover, his analysis must be distinguished from the treatment of the allied concept of ressentiment which has generated much attention. (For example, envy is discussed at least fourteen times in Human, All-Too-Human, appropriately enough.)

I mean by the title of this essay to allude to Nietzsche Contra Wagner and thereby to suggest the use which Nietzsche made of Renan in formulating some of his most distinctive thoughts. More specifically I suggest that Nietzsche's later view of history, especially as expressed in The Genealogy of Morals and The Antichrist, is a critique and parody of Renan's History of the Origins of Christianity. (I speak deliberately of Nietzsche's "view of history" rather than his "philosophy of history" because the latter phrase contains too many associations which Nietzsche's view rejects.) What is at issue is not a question of influence, as that term is usually understood, but rather the possibility of delineating in some detail the way in which Nietzsche formulated the models of genealogy (to speak now in his own terms) as more or less explicit alternatives to those of history. As Michel Foucault has suggested, The Genealogy of Morals is to be read not simply as one more historical essay on the origin and development of the moral ideas in the tradition of Buckle, Lecky, Spencer, and Mill. These English psychologists are criticized at the very beginning of Nietzsche's book for their philosophical and therefore unhistorical way of thinking. They search for an origin (Ursprung), a single basic principle or arche, which will illuminate an entire development. The appropriate genealogical metaphor is not origin but ancestry or heritage (Herkunft). In fact Nietzsche understands history as the philosophical pursuit of origins and genealogy as the discovery of tangled affiliations, dense roots, and hidden incestuous connections. Nietzsche's usage of "history" and "genealogy" is not always consistent, for he sometimes speaks of "history" alone when he means authentic, genealogical history - as in the seminal and summary declaration that "only that which has no history is definable". In what follows I shall be treating The Genealogy of Morals and some of Nietzsche's other later writings primarily as methodological tracts on history and genealogy; in this context Nietzsche's subtitle for the Genealogy, Eine Streitschrift (A Polemical Book) suggests that he is polemicizing not only against the values of Christianity, socialism, democracy, and the community of scientific inquirers, but also against a certain way of construing the beginnings, meaning, heritage, and affiliations of those values - that is, against an historical method which owes more to these values than it can in good conscience acknowledge. The historiographical distinctions between Nietzsche and Renan are connected with more general differences between them which have to do with the nature of narrative in general and with the role which literary, rhetorical, and theatrical models have to play in the construction of narrative. Renan's History is inconceivable apart from the models of narrative provided by French literature of the nineteenth century; Nietzsche's critique of "realistic" historical narrative through his attack on Renan is inseparable from his own criticism of the narrative mode which it shares with the literature of its time and place. The connection between aesthetics and history which is everywhere implicit in Renan becomes a subject of explicit discussion in Nietzsche. Historical or genealogical claims will appear to be inseparable from aesthetic values, especially in the case of the differing interests which the two narrators take in what we would today call the theater of cruelty.

Critics have often suggested that Hobbes is a paradigm case of a philosopher whose own style of writing violates the norms he sets down for rational discourse. Philosophy, he says, "professedly rejects not only the paint and false colors of language, but even the very ornaments and graces of the same." More specifically he says that metaphors must be "utterly excluded" from "the rigorous search of truth . seeing they openly professe deceit, to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were manifested folly." Nevertheless, attention focuses on his flair for the dramatic or metaphorical, as in the great mise en scene that is the state of nature or in the overriding metaphor in which the state is regarded as an artificial man. Now while I agree that Hobbes is a crucial case in determining the interplay of philosophical themes and literary modes (and I approach this distinction with some caution), I want to attend to some rather different aspects of his philosophical writing. In doing so, I will limit myself to his acknowledged masterpiece, the Leviathan, which is the mature fruit not only of his thought on ethics and politics but also of his reflections on the problematics of philosophical communication.

Whatever else they are, works of art are intentional human products. Our responses to such works are understandings and interpretations. That the works are or may be physical objects, cultural symptoms, or commodities and that audiences may be shocked, sexually excited, or politically instructed are irrelevant to the cognitive poles of intention and interpretation; these make art philosophically significant and differentiate it from that which has no meaning, despite possible similarities in apparent structure or emotional effect. Cognitivist theories of art usually tend to focus rather exclusively on just one of the two poles which characterize art so conceived - the artist's intention or the interpretation given by audience or critics. Philosophers with idealistic commitments have often argued, as do Croce and Collingwood, that the artist's experience, understood as a unique expression, is not merely the meaning of the work of art, but the work itself. New Critics object to any reference to the artist's intentions as tending to distort the sense of "the text itself." The structure of disputes in aesthetics, to a large extent, consists either of conflicts within these tendencies or between them. So intentionalists may very well disagree as to whether intentions are general or unique, conscious or unconscious. Those who reject intentionalism but retain a cognitive conception of interpretation may disagree as to the proper criteria of interpretation and the degree to which a work admits multiple significations. These family quarrels can sometimes be shelved for polemics against the "intentional fallacy" or for charges that a work sundered from its author's intention must be radically ambiguous. Such disputes can lead to rather extreme and uncomfortable claims. One such extreme holds that the meaning of a work is simply identical with the author's intention, the audience's role being simply to identify themselves with the artist's thought. The complement of this view is that which takes as paradigms of art those independently existing works which encourage us to discover a multiplicity of meanings, interpretations, and possibilities. The choice between individual solitary expression or a celebration of ambiguities is not a happy one.

Does Sartre have a coherent ethical position? At the end of Being and Nothingness he raises questions about the ethical implications of his ontology but refers them to a promised future work. For the student of existentialism it is an interesting question whether any of Sartre's later works offer this anticipated and definitive statement. Yet in the controversy over whether Saint-Genet or the Critique of Dialectical Reason fills the gap in Sartre's thought, the one concise presentation of his ethics in Existentialism Is a Humanism has been generally neglected. This neglect has not been groundless, for the essay, originally delivered as a popular lecture, is clearly fragmentary and at least apparently inconsistent. Nevertheless, the essay is an outline of Sartrian ethics, although it is in need of some qualifications. The need for these qualifications arises primarily from the fact that Sartre neglects to incorporate his own earlier analysis of choice and deliberation in the lecture; yet when this effect is repaired in the Critique of Dialectical Reason some unexpected limitations of Sartre's position are revealed. The former point leads to an alteration of the form of ethical choice and the latter to a restriction of the apparently universal content of the ethical ideal.

From the Rice Thresher Archive, a collection of newspaper articles published in the student newspaper for Rice University. Genre: News

A New York Times Bestseller! Our world is about to change. In Digital Destiny: How the New Age of Data Will Change the Way We Live, Work, and Communicate, Shawn DuBravac, chief economist and senior director of research at the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), argues that the groundswell of digital ownership unfolding in our lives signals the beginning of a new era for humanity. Beyond just hardware acquisition, the next decade will be defined by an all-digital lifestyle and the "Internet of Everything"--where everything, from the dishwasher to the wristwatch, is not only online, but acquiring, analyzing, and utilizing the data that surrounds us. But what does this mean in practice? It means that some of mankind's most pressing problems, such as hunger, disease, and security, will finally have a solution. It means that the rise of driverless cars could save thousands of American lives each year, and perhaps hundreds of thousands more around the planet. It means a departure from millennia-old practices, such as the need for urban centers. It means that massive inefficiencies, such as the supply chains in Africa allowing food to rot before it can be fed to the hungry, can be overcome. It means that individuals will have more freedom in action, work, health, and pursuits than ever before.

America seems to be on a downward slide. Our government spends too much; our economy creates too little; and we aren't preparing our children to compete in a global marketplace. Yet our politicians - Republican and Democrat alike - just don't get it. While once-great cities fall into decay, Washington thrives, living off the hard work and tax dollars of the private sector. It's time for an American comeback -- and it starts with innovation.Throughout its history, America's great innovators have been the drivers of our unsurpassed economic success. American innovation transformed a country of r

Issues in Ape and Human Evolution -- African Apes as Time Machines -- Primate Divergence Times -- The Cerebellum: An Asset to Hominoid Cognition -- Bonobos, the "Forgotten Ape"? -- The Status of Bonobo (Pan Paniscus) in the Democratic Republic of Congo -- The Status of Bonobos in Their Southernmost Geographic Range -- Current Situation of Bonobos in the Luo Reserve, Equateur, Democratic Republic of Congo -- Chimpanzees, the Best Known Ape -- Pan in Pandemonium -- Predation of Mammals by the Chimpanzees of the Mahale Mountains, Tanzania -- Representational Capacities in Chimpanzees: Numerical and Spatial Reasoning -- Gorillas, the Greatest of the Apes -- The Status of Gogillas Worldwide -- Twenty-Seven Years of Project Koko and Michael -- Who's in Charge? Observations of Social Behavior in a Captive Group of Western Lowland Gorillas -- Physiological Bases for Behavior and Aging: Great Apes and Humans -- The Great APE Aging Project: A Resource for Comparative Study of Behavior, Cognition, Health, and Neurobiology -- An International Database for the Study of Diabetes, Obesity, and Aging in Great Apes and Other Nonhuman Primates -- Studies of Age-Related Neuronal Pathology in Great Apes -- Metabolites of Ovarian Hormones and Behavioral Correlates in Captive Female Bonobos (Pan Paniscus) -- Sexual Motivation of Male Chimpanzees During the Female Cycle, Including Preliminary Data on Age Effects -- The Bushmeat Crisis: African Apes at Risk -- Bushmeat, Primate Kinship, and the Global Conservation Movement -- Status of the Proposed Lomako Forest Bonobo Reserve: A Case Study of the Bushmeat Trade -- What Happened to Gorilla Gorilla Uellensis?: A Preliminary Investigation -- Apes, Persons, and Bioethics.

Nietzsche's use of metaphor has been widely noted but rarely focused to explore specific images in great detail. A Nietzschean Bestiary gathers essays devoted to the most notorious and celebrated beasts in Nietzsche's work. The essays illustrate Nietzsche's ample use of animal imagery, and link it to the dual philosophical purposes of recovering and revivifying human animality, which plays a significant role in his call for de-deifying nature