Suchergebnisse

We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruit-ing high-quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y CajalProgram. We claim that, after a number of calls for applicants, the programdesign changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applica-tions and candidates, we find that the new program design led to significantchanges in the probability of being awarded a contract. In particular, oppor-tunities for candidates with no attachment to the system were equalized. ; Research funding from Ministry of Education, Grant Nos.ECO2009-11165 and ECO2012-31358 (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2011-25330 (Romero-Medina andTriossi) and ECO2009-10287 (Sánchez-Mangas) is acknowledged. ; Publicado

We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded with a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates without attachment to the system were equalized. ; We thank the Subdirección General de Formación y Movilidad del Personal Investigador (Spanish Office of Training and Mobility of Researchers) for providing the raw data, and Miguel Benavente for help in data handling. Research funding from Ministry of Education, Grant Nos. ECO2009-11165 (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2011-25330 (Romero-Medina and Triossi) and ECO2009-10287 (Sánchez-Mangas) is acknowledged.