In 2020, DGAP's Strategy Group on Russia focused on Moscow's long-term efforts to diversify its foreign policy portfolio, turn away from Europe, and build-up other non-Western vectors in its diplomacy. Against this background, this report assesses Russia's relations with the EU, China, and the United States. While Russian relations with the West are unlikely to improve in 2021 – especially ahead of this fall's Duma election – there is still a chance for limited engagement on issues of mutual interest.
Viktor Orbán, expecting a far-right surge, previously framed the recent European Parliament election as a "revolutionary moment for Brussels." Instead, it turned out to be a revolutionary moment against him at home. The new Tisza party of Péter Magyar, a former ruling party appointee, pvractically eradicated the traditional opposition forces in Hungary and weakened Viktor Orbán's Fidesz. This has consequences not only for the country's domestic politics but also its role in the EU.
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
On January 20, 2020 - just days after his state-of-the nation speech followed by the surprising resignation of the Russian government and the appointment of a new prime minister - President Vladimir Putin submitted constitutional changes to the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. They are likely to be approved there and then legitimized by a popular vote planned for April 2020. The amendments that Putin proposed reveal much about the future of Russia's political system and Putin's role in it.
Political leaders could abuse the coronavirus crisis to undermine democracy. Europe's biggest risk is Hungary. In late March, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán could use his two-thirds majority in parliament to push through a law that would empower him to rule by decrees with no specified time limit. If he succeeds, it will undermine the European Union's core principles, making the EU even more fragmented and difficult to manage once the pandemic is over.
The impending presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, is highly likely to result in the smooth victory of incumbent Alexandr Lukashenko. Despite this fact, the unprecedented - and still growing - politicization of Belarusian society constitutes a challenge to the regime that will not fade even after a clear-cut election. The resulting tensions will require more diplomatic attention from Germany and the European Union.
In the Russian regional elections on 8 September 2019, the ruling party United Russia managed to largely hold on its control over state assemblies and governorships. Even in Moscow, where United Russia was significantly weakened, there was no liberal breakthrough. But the elections did not solve any of the inherent political and social tensions - it only made them more visible. Thus, protest potential is going to remain high, which will likely cause the regime to become even more repressive.
This report deals with Russia's geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects across the wider Baltic Region. The second part sums up NATO's response to this evolving strategic challenge, including the potential military threat posed by Russia.
Regional elections were held in Hungary on October 13, 2019. Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party preserved its dominance over regional assemblies as well as most rural towns and villages. Meanwhile, a united opposition managed to take control of 10 of 23 Hungarian cities, including 14 of 23 districts in Budapest – enabling it to determine the capital's lord mayor. Although these developments mark the end of Orbán's decade-long invincibility, they do not necessarily pave the way to opposition success in national elections scheduled for 2022.
China and Russia want to maintain Germany's political status quo: Centrist, at times mercantilist policies, have often worked in their favor. Now, with the Green Party ascendant and public opinion shifting, neither Russia nor China can be sure that classic "centrism" will emerge after September. Russia and China will increase their influence and interference efforts in the run-up to the election and beyond, using informational, political, and cyber tactics, and economic and political networks.
Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has failed and is now a protracted war of attrition. Russia has adapted to this situation and prepared for a longer war. The legitimization of the Putin system is increasingly built around the war. As long as Ukraine has no security guarantees, a ceasefire is not realistic from either side. Therefore, the focus should be on protecting the territory Ukraine controls and defining together with the Western partners how security can be provided and what victory means. Key Findings: Since the Kremlin has no interest in a ceasefire agreement on acceptable terms for Ukraine, the West needs to support Ukraine so that time is no longer on Russia's side. That means closing sanctions gaps, securing long term funding, and bringing Ukraine closer to NATO. Ukraine winning all territories back next year is unlikely. Therefore, the focus should be on protecting the territory controlled by Kyiv and preparing a new Ukrainian offensive in 2025 through an increase of production of ammunition and weapons by the West in 2024. Domestic resilience is crucial for Ukraine. EU integration brings the opportunity for fundamental political changes in the country. With the war, the EU has more leverage to demand reforms in areas like fighting corruption, rule of law, and administrative reforms. Only security guarantees by Western countries can open the path for a ceasefire agreement and the acceptance of temporary territorial losses. If the West is really serious about an end to the war, it needs to come to an agreement on security guarantees for Ukraine.
Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia's war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia's economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
Around 442,000 people have so far fled Ukraine - not just to the EU, but also to neighbors like Moldova. This is a humanitarian issue, and should not be conflated with "migrant instrumentalization" (MI), whereby a state pushes people across a border to coerce the EU to change position. Yet Russia is likely to employ MI in this way, especially if it moves deep into Western Ukraine. Drawing on an in-depth study, we show how the EU can meet this specific threat.
As protests continue to galvanize Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is consolidating his grip on power. Volatile domestic dynamics - and Russia's reactions to them - will shape the discredited regime's future. This paper outlines four possible scenarios for Belarus up to one year from now. They include options for Russia and the EU, whose strategic objectives differ, but whose short-term interests align: preventing bloodshed, avoiding open geopolitical conflict, and preparing for a post-Lukashenko transition.
While Russia's chairmanship of the Arctic Council emphasizes peaceful cooperation, the country's military buildup in the region continues. Due to climate change and great-power rivalry, the Arctic is no longer a remote and exceptional place, but part of a complex security environment. To deal with Russia in the Arctic, NATO allies need a double-sided strategy combining credible deterrence with dialogue. Regional actors like Norway are well placed to shape this approach, but the EU, including Germany, should do more.
