Suchergebnisse

Freedom of speech as an important human right is diminished when speaking out for Palestinian rights. The paper examines this assertion through three case examples from Australia. These are academic freedom, media freedom and freedom of political representation and expression. To provide context to the free speech debates, an overview is presented of the confl ict as well as an outline of the Boycott, Divestments and Sanctions campaign. ; Wolność słowa jako ważne prawo człowieka zostaje ograniczona, gdy przemawia się za prawami Palestyńczyków. W artykule przeanalizowano powyższe twierdzenie na podstawie trzech przykładów przypadków z Australii. Są to: wolność akademicka, wolność mediów oraz wolność reprezentacji politycznej i wypowiedzi. W celu zapewnienia kontekstu debatom na temat wolności słowa przedstawiono przegląd konfl iktu, a także zarys bojkotu oraz kampanii sankcji.

In Australia since about the turn of the millennium, discrimination against Muslims has been increasingly normalized, made respectable, and presented as prudent precaution against violent extremism. Vilification of Muslims has posed as defending 'Australian values' against those who will not integrate. Liberal political leaders and press leader-writers who formerly espoused cultural pluralism now routinely hold up as inimical the Muslim folk devil by whose otherness the boundaries of acceptability of the national culture may be marked out and policed. The Muslim Other is positioned not only as culturally incommensurate, but dangerously so: dishonest, criminally inclined, violent, misogynist, homophobic, backward, uncivilized. On the far right, extremist nationalist organizations incite racist hatred under cover of this rhetoric, often cloaked as reasonable common sense. This paper undertakes an ideology analysis of political and media discussion, and examines the forms of social control that they advance and sustain.

This special issue gathers and enlarges upon papers that were first presented at the interdisciplinary 'Corruption Downunder' symposium held at the University of Auckland in November 2015; most of the papers published here stem from the lively and collegial discussions at the symposium. At that time New Zealand was authoritatively measured (by Transparency International) to be Number 2 'least corrupt' nation in the world; it is now tied at Number 1 with Denmark. What this rank, as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), actually counts for is something that we explore in this special issue. On the face of it, it would seem perverse to be focusing on corruption in such a place as New Zealand. With its larger northern neighbour Australia listed at a respectable 11th out of 175 that same year (2014 data), why would a bunch of academics want to engage in serious discussions about the problem of corruption 'downunder'? New Zealand has never been ranked outside of the top four, and has been ranked Number 1 in a total of 12 out of 22 years since the survey began. Australia is generally ranked in the top ten and has never been out of the top 13 least corrupt countries since the survey began.
To access the full text of the introducton to this special issue on corruption downunder, download the accompanying PDF file.

Since 11 September 2001, Muslim minorities have experienced intensive "othering" in "Western" countries, above all in those US-led anglophone nations which invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to prosecute their "war on terror". This paper examines the cases of Britain and Australia, where whole communities of Muslims have been criminalised as "evil" and a "fifth column" enemy within by media, politicians, the security services and the criminal justice system. Although constituted by disparate ethnic groups, the targeted communities in each of these nations have experienced similar treatment in the State's anti-terrorist measures, as well as ideological responses and everyday racism, making comparable the two cases.

This article compares the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Britain and Australia, from 1989 to 2001, as a foundation for assessing the extent to which the upsurge of Islamophobia after 11 September was a development of existing patterns of racism in these two countries. The respective histories of immigration and settlement by Muslim populations are outlined, along with the relevant immigration and 'ethnic affairs' policies and the resulting demographics. The article traces the ideologies of xenophobia that developed in Britain and Australia over this period. It records a transition from anti-Asian and anti-Arab racism to anti-Muslim racism, reflected in and responding to changes in the identities and cultural politics of the minority communities. It outlines instances of the racial and ethnic targeting by the state of the ethnic and religious minorities concerned, and postulates a causal relationship between this and the shifting patterns of acts of racial hatred, vilification and discrimination.

Since their introduction to Australia in the early 1970s, the politics of multiculturalism have entailed a degree of state control over the cultural affairs of (principally immigrant) ethnic communities. This was largely obtained by consent rather than coercion, and this consent was often purchased with various forms of state resourcing for community needs, with a measure of coercion attached to the threat, where necessary, of funding withdrawals. Beyond the basic framework of liberal-democratic norms, very little of the ground rules for the acceptable practice of minority culture were inscribed in legislation or state pronouncements. The pursuit of the 'War on Terror' since 9/11 has increasingly seen the intrusion of the state into cultural, and especially religious, matters of minority populations, overwhelmingly among Muslims, in Australia. Pronouncements are now routinely made by political leaders of what is acceptable in a sermon, for example, and what is 'extreme', 'radical' or unacceptable. Religious leaders themselves have been identified by state actors as exemplary or beyond the pale and to be replaced. The government has involved itself in the process of selection of religious representatives, and made strong representations about the selection of leaders and their necessary attributes, such as fluency in English, attitudes favouring 'integration', beliefs in women's rights, positive disposition towards the alliance with the United States, and so on. There have also been government demands for ethnic/religious schools to teach 'Australian values'. At present there is no legal basis for such prescription and proscription, which operates rather by hectoring and harassment and the implied conditionality of the remnants of multicultural funding. All of this action can be shown to be discriminatory, in that it is directed only towards Muslims. It also represents a dangerous trend in terms of undermining the right to religious freedom, enshrined in a number of international treaties to which Australia is a signatory.

Since their introduction to Australia in the early 1970s, the politics of multiculturalism have entailed a degree of state control over the cultural affairs of (principally immigrant) ethnic communities. This was largely obtained by consent rather than coercion, and this consent was often purchased with various forms of state resourcing for community needs, with a measure of coercion attached to the threat, where necessary, of funding withdrawals. Beyond the basic framework of liberal-democratic norms, very little of the ground rules for the acceptable practice of minority culture were inscribed in legislation or state pronouncements. The pursuit of the 'War on Terror' since 9/11 has increasingly seen the intrusion of the state into cultural, and especially religious, matters of minority populations, overwhelmingly among Muslims, in Australia. Pronouncements are now routinely made by political leaders of what is acceptable in a sermon, for example, and what is 'extreme', 'radical' or unacceptable. Religious leaders themselves have been identified by state actors as exemplary or beyond the pale and to be replaced. The government has involved itself in the process of selection of religious representatives, and made strong representations about the selection of leaders and their necessary attributes, such as fluency in English, attitudes favouring 'integration', beliefs in women's rights, positive disposition towards the alliance with the United States, and so on. There have also been government demands for ethnic/religious schools to teach 'Australian values'. At present there is no legal basis for such prescription and proscription, which operates rather by hectoring and harassment and the implied conditionality of the remnants of multicultural funding. All of this action can be shown to be discriminatory, in that it is directed only towards Muslims. It also represents a dangerous trend in terms of undermining the right to religious freedom, enshrined in a number of international treaties to which Australia is a signatory.

Since 11 September 2001, Muslim minorities have experienced intensive "othering" in "Western" countries, above all in those US-led anglophone nations which invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to prosecute their "war on terror". This paper examines the cases of Britain and Australia, where whole communities of Muslims have been criminalised as "evil" and a "fifth column" enemy within by media, politicians, the security services and the criminal justice system. Although constituted by disparate ethnic groups, the targeted communities in each of these nations have experienced similar treatment in the State's anti-terrorist measures, as well as ideological responses and everyday racism, making comparable the two cases.

This article compares the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Britain and Australia, from 1989 to 2001, as a foundation for assessing the extent to which the upsurge of Islamophobia after 11 September was a development of existing patterns of racism in these two countries. The respective histories of immigration and settlement by Muslim populations are outlined, along with the relevant immigration and 'ethnic affairs' policies and the resulting demographics. The article traces the ideologies of xenophobia that developed in Britain and Australia over this period. It records a transition from anti-Asian and anti-Arab racism to anti-Muslim racism, reflected in and responding to changes in the identities and cultural politics of the minority communities. It outlines instances of the racial and ethnic targeting by the state of the ethnic and religious minorities concerned, and postulates a causal relationship between this and the shifting patterns of acts of racial hatred, vilification and discrimination.

Since mass immigration recruitments of the post-war period, 'othered' immigrants to both the UK and Australia have faced 'mainstream' cultural expectations to assimilate, and various forms of state management of their integration. Perceived failure or refusal to integrate has historically been constructed as deviant, though in certain policy phases this tendency has been mitigated by cultural pluralism and official multiculturalism. At critical times, hegemonic racialisation of immigrant minorities has entailed their criminalisation, especially that of their young men. In the UK following the 'Rushdie Affair' of 1989, and in both Britain and Australia following these states' involvement in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the 'Muslim Other' was increasingly targeted in cycles of racialised moral panic. This has intensified dramatically since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing 'War on Terror'. The young men of Muslim immigrant communities in both these nations have, over the subsequent period, been the subject of heightened popular and state Islamophobia in relation to: perceived 'ethnic gangs'; alleged deviant, predatory masculinity including so-called 'ethnic gang rape'; and paranoia about Islamist 'radicalisation' and its supposed bolstering of terrorism. In this context, the earlier, more genuinely social-democratic and egalitarian, aspects of state approaches to 'integration' have been supplanted, briefly glossed by a rhetoric of 'social inclusion', by reversion to increasingly oppressive assimilationist and socially controlling forms of integrationism. This article presents some preliminary findings from fieldwork in Greater Manchester over 2012, showing how mainly British-born Muslims of immigrant background have experienced these processes.

Recent events in a ruling-class boys' boarding school college in Sydney prompted public discussion about "bullying." Debate ranged between those seeing an endemic problemto be cured and those who saw minor, unfortunate, and atypical incidents in a system where bullying is under control. It is argued here that such practice is inherent in ruling-class boys' education. It is an important part of making ruling-class men. Using life-history methods with available biographical material, the article shows thatruling-class schooling of boys in boarding schools involves "sending away" and initial loneliness, bonding in groups demanding allegiance, attachment to tradition, subjection to hierarchy and progress upward through it, group ridiculing and punishment of sensitiveness and close relationships, severe sanctions against difference, brutal bodily discipline, and inculcating competitive individualism. Brutalization and "hardening" are essential to all these processes and are characteristic of ruling-class masculinity.

Exploring how the boundary between the extremist far right and centre-right parties and politics became blurred, Normalization of the Global Far Right: Pandemic Disruption deconstructs one of the most pressing issues of today: the rise of the far right. Taking a critical look at the 'normalisation' of far-right thinking underpinned by gendered racisms, Vieten and Poynting trace the emergence of transnational far right populist movements and how these have been shaped by European colonialism, white supremacy, and ideological legacies of the Empire alike.

This special issue gathers and enlarges upon papers that were first presented at the interdisciplinary 'Corruption Downunder' symposium held at the University of Auckland in November 2015; most of the papers published here stem from the lively and collegial discussions at the symposium. At that time New Zealand was authoritatively measured (by Transparency International) to be Number 2 'least corrupt' nation in the world; it is now tied at Number 1 with Denmark. What this rank, as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), actually counts for is something that we explore in this special issue. On the face of it, it would seem perverse to be focusing on corruption in such a place as New Zealand. With its larger northern neighbour Australia listed at a respectable 11th out of 175 that same year (2014 data), why would a bunch of academics want to engage in serious discussions about the problem of corruption 'downunder'? New Zealand has never been ranked outside of the top four, and has been ranked Number 1 in a total of 12 out of 22 years since the survey began. Australia is generally ranked in the top ten and has never been out of the top 13 least corrupt countries since the survey began.