Suchergebnisse

Este artículo quiere entender la evolución de los procesos de consolidación de la paz en los últimos años, a través del análisis de cómo la conceptualización de la alteridad por parte de los organismos internacionales está cambiando. El argumento es que en las intervenciones posbélicas de la década de los noventa y de los primeros años del siglo XXI, los procesos intersubjetivos de las sociedades que salían del conflicto se consideraban un problema a corregir con la creación de instituciones eficientes supervisadas por expertos internacionales. Sin embargo, con la pérdida de confianza en la posibilidad de promover la democracia internacionalmente y con la voluntad de solventar los errores de unas intervenciones excesivamente intrusivas, la alteridad es cada vez más un recurso que puede utilizarse para desarrollar una paz respetuosa con el contexto de cada sociedad. Para analizar cómo la alteridad se ha entendido más positivamente en los últimos años, algo transcendental para explicar cómo organizaciones internacionales entienden la paz actualmente, el artículo se centra en los conceptos de "apropiación local" y "resiliencia". La conclusión es que este cambio positivo para respetar otras culturas también esconde dos potenciales problemas. El primero es que estamos perdiendo la capacidad para teorizar sobre la paz y el segundo es que la autonomía o soberanía nacional de las sociedades posbélicas continua en el limbo ; This article seeks to understand the evolution of the processes of peacebuilding in the past years by analysing how international organisations have recently conceptualised alterity in a different manner. It is argued that throughout the post-war interventions of the 1990s and early years of 2000s, the inter-subjective processes of post-conflict societies were considered a problem to be corrected by the means of creating efficient institutions supervised by international experts. However, the optimism in relation to the promotion of democracy abroad withered away and there was the need to solve the errors of highly intrusive interventions. On these assumptions, alterity is increasingly seen as a resource that can be used to develop a peace project respectful of the context of each society. In order to analyse how alterity is understood more positively in the past years —which is crucial to explain how international organisations currently practice peace— the article will focus on the concepts of "local ownership" and "resilience". The conclusion is that the positive shift to embrace other cultures also hides two potential problems. The first is that we are losing the capacity to theorise about peace and the second is that the autonomy or national sovereignty of post-war societies still remains in limbo

Este artículo quiere entender la evolución de los procesos de consolidación de la paz en los últimos años, a través del análisis de cómo la conceptualización de la alteridad por parte de los organismos internacionales está cambiando. El argumento es que en las intervenciones posbélicas de la década de los noventa y de los primeros años del siglo XXI, los procesos intersubjetivos de las sociedades que salían del conflicto se consideraban un problema a corregir con la creación de instituciones eficientes supervisadas por expertos internacionales. Sin embargo, con la pérdida de confianza en la posibilidad de promover la democracia internacionalmente y con la voluntad de solventar los errores de unas intervenciones excesivamente intrusivas, la alteridad es cada vez más un recurso que puede utilizarse para desarrollar una paz respetuosa con el contexto de cada sociedad. Para analizar cómo la alteridad se ha entendido más positivamente en los últimos años, algo transcendental para explicar cómo organizaciones internacionales entienden la paz actualmente, el artículo se centra en los conceptos de "apropiación local" y "resiliencia". La conclusión es que este cambio positivo para respetar otras culturas también esconde dos potenciales problemas. El primero es que estamos perdiendo la capacidad para teorizar sobre la paz y el segundo es que la autonomía o soberanía nacional de las sociedades posbélicas continua en el limbo.

This article seeks to understand the evolution of the processes of peacebuilding in the past years by analysing how international organisations have recently conceptualised alterity in a different manner. It is argued that throughout the post-war interventions of the 1990s and early years of 2000s, the inter-subjective processes of post-conflict societies were considered a problem to be corrected by the means of creating efficient institutions supervised by international experts. However, the optimism in relation to the promotion of democracy abroad withered away and there was the need to solve the errors of highly intrusive interventions. On these assumptions, alterity is increasingly seen as a resource that can be used to develop a peace project respectful of the context of each society. In order to analyse how alterity is understood more positively in the past years —which is crucial to explain how international organisations currently practice peace— the article will focus on the concepts of "local ownership" and "resilience". The conclusion is that the positive shift to embrace other cultures also hides two potential problems. The first is that we are losing the capacity to theorise about peace and the second is that the autonomy or national sovereignty of post-war societies still remains in limbo. ; Este artículo quiere entender la evolución de los procesos de consolidación de la paz en los últimos años, a través del análisis de cómo la conceptualización de la alteridad por parte de los organismos internacionales está cambiando. El argumento es que en las intervenciones posbélicas de la década de los noventa y de los primeros años del siglo XXI, los procesos intersubjetivos de las sociedades que salían del conflicto se consideraban un problema a corregir con la creación de instituciones eficientes supervisadas por expertos internacionales. Sin embargo, con la pérdida de confianza en la posibilidad de promover la democracia internacionalmente y con la voluntad de solventar los errores de unas intervenciones excesivamente intrusivas, la alteridad es cada vez más un recurso que puede utilizarse para desarrollar una paz respetuosa con el contexto de cada sociedad. Para analizar cómo la alteridad se ha entendido más positivamente en los últimos años, algo transcendental para explicar cómo organizaciones internacionales entienden la paz actualmente, el artículo se centra en los conceptos de "apropiación local" y "resiliencia". La conclusión es que este cambio positivo para respetar otras culturas también esconde dos potenciales problemas. El primero es que estamos perdiendo la capacidad para teorizar sobre la paz y el segundo es que la autonomía o soberanía nacional de las sociedades posbélicas continua en el limbo.

This article analyses how the concept of 'local ownership' has been employed within policy frameworks in the context of peacebuilding since the late 1990s. It identifies the paradox that lies in the increasing willingness to transfer ownership to the local population and the also explicit assumption that self-determination and self-government have to be avoided in democratisation and post-conflict situations. It is argued that it is important to investigate the paradox, the fact that ownership and self-government have opposed connotations within contemporary frameworks of peacebuilding, because in the literature this position is not seen as being contradictory. Far from being seen as a strategy containing an irreconcilable paradox, local ownership is conceptualised so that it resolves at the same time two problems at the core of international governance settings: it limits the international administrators' intrusiveness in national affairs and avoids the risk of giving too much responsibility to local authorities. While it is presented as a progressive strategy on all fronts, the conclusion of this article is that the concept of ownership, as it has been interpreted by the discourses of peacebuilding analysed here, has been of little value to post-conflict societies and, furthermore, it has denied their moral and political autonomy. This denial, disguised as a discourse that promises to embrace difference, is particularly flawed because it seems to permanently defer equality between internationally supervised populations and the rest of sovereign nations.

This article explores the nature of resilience-informed international interventions today by thinking about 'difference'. Up to the 1990s, international interventions were often characterised by a patronising tone in which backward others needed help to develop. Some 20 years later, key lessons learned were that others were so fundamentally different that efforts to assist them invariably failed. This article argues that contemporary approaches seeking to foster resilience are simultaneously propelled by both approaches. They are thus underpinned by two conflicting understandings of difference: the other that is in need and the other that cannot be attended. Even more, we contend that this contradiction is put to productive use in resilience-building: protracted crises today demand practitioners to 'be there', engaged permanently, to speculate, experiment, and affirm radical uncertainty. In order to analyse the novel features of resilience, we draw on Graham Harman's speculative realism and look at policy programming of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has provided assistance and is unequivocally committed to the European perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The EU strategy has evolved from a top-down approach to democratization and statebuilding in the 2000s towards a more pragmatic approach that seeks to foster resilience. However, BiH still suffers from internal party contestation and political paralysis, socio-economic challenges and areas of limited statehood. Thus, to what extent is the EU enhancing resilience? In this article we answer this question by examining how the EU is contributing to the three sources essential to obtain resilience, as understood by this Special Issue: efficient governance institutions, social trust, and the legitimacy of governance actors. By revising the EU support of BiH and interpreting to what extent it is contributing to these three sources, we conclude that the EU intervention in BiH is resulting in continuity – a process of slow progress that is increasingly perceived as frustrating for the local population – rather than peaceful change. This is the Digital ePrint version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization on the 17 of May 2021. The Version of Record of this manuscript is freely available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2021.1900120. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

After four months of war in Gaza, the European Union, or at least its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, seems determined to talk about peace. Borrell is even saying that the international community will have to "impose" it. But in such an asymmetrical conflict, how can peace be imagined? The Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 in which more than 1,100 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed and some 240 people were taken hostage, unleashed a devastating war with a direct impact on regional stability. The Israeli response has resulted in the deaths of more than more than 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of them women and children, and the forced displacement of more than one and a half million Palestinians who are living in subhuman conditions without shelter, food, or water, and still threatened by Israeli army bombing attacks.With growing international pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is still persisting in its military campaign in pursuance of its goals: eradication of Hamas, freeing the hostages, and ensuring that Gaza will never again pose a threat to Israel. However, increasing numbers of international and regional actors are beginning to talk about peace. For the European Union and the international community, this peace entails the two-state solution, which goes back to the original formula put forth by the United Nations in 1947.The EU's advocacy of the two-state solution is nothing new. What has changed is that since the beginning of the year, EU institutions have tried to resume a certain impartiality in the conflict and are beginning to speak out in favour of peace. First, in Lisbon, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, stated: "Peace will only be achieved in a lasting manner if the international community gets involved intensely to achieve it and imposes a solution". Later, at the University of Valladolid, in his speech on being invested with an Honorary Doctorate, the head of EU diplomacy pointed out that Israel has financed Hamas with the aim of weakening the Palestinian National Authority.Even more ambitiously, at the end of January, Borrell presented to the foreign ministers of the EU 27 and representatives from Israel and the Arab countries a 10-point plan for the creation of two states. This plan envisages a "Preparatory Peace Conference" and talks until it is possible for the parties to agree on a solution. Always wary of idealism, Borrell did not speak of "peace" but of "solutions": "We have to stop talking about the 'peace' process and start talking more concretely about the 'two-state solution' process".Despite international consensus on the formula presented by the United Nations, and Borrell's determination to move closer to the inevitable horizon of peace, there are obstacles that will be difficult to overcome.First, how could peace that entails the creation of a Palestinian state be "imposed" when Israel vehemently opposes this? The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu recently declared that in any future arrangement, "the state of Israel has to control the entire area from the river to the sea". Heavy external pressure would be needed to convince the Israeli government, and this seems impossible in view of the unconditional support that it has had—and continues to have—from Washington, regardless of the war crimes the Israeli army is committing. As yet, there is no sign that either Moscow or Beijing intends to be involved in any peace initiative. Key regional stakeholders like Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf states are concentrating all their diplomatic efforts on achieving a ceasefire in Gaza. As long as the Gaza Strip is being bombed and regionalisation of the conflict continues, the Arab countries see as unrealistic any peace-making effort that does not start with achieving an end to the war, and that does not include official recognition of a Palestinian state.Despite its economic power, the European Union—Israel's main trading partner and largest provider of foreign aid to the Palestinians—has been unable to make any progress towards achieving peace between the two sides. The initial reluctance of Brussels, like Washington, to pressure Israel to end its military campaign has "shredded" EU credibility in Palestine and a good part of the Middle East. However, in order to redress this situation, Brussels could promote EU-wide recognition of a Palestinian state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration, which stated its readiness to consider this "in due course".The second stumbling block builds upon the question: who would sign a peace agreement? Even if peace could be imposed from the outside, the Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders have diametrically opposed positions. The Israeli government wants total control of all territories it occupies, including Gaza, and rather than any intention to put an end to colonisation, it aims to keep encouraging it. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) opposes any kind of solution that does not include an end to the occupation and creation of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders. Notwithstanding the PNA's crisis of diminished legitimacy, Palestinians do agree that ending the Israeli occupation is the first step towards the creation of a Palestinian state.It is estimated that more than 700,000 Jewish settlers are living illegally in occupied Palestinian territories. Moreover, since 7 October, eviction of Palestinians from their homes and colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem have intensified with Israeli government and military support, as expanding the illegal settlements was already a priority of the Netanyahu government. It is a gradual but implacable strategy. In the words of the BBC, one day a motorhome moves in, the next a few houses are built, and then an urban centre is established. In these circumstances, any proposal for negotiation that does not envisage an end to the occupation is, perforce, doomed to failure.An even thornier matter is the role of Hamas in future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. This militant Palestinian group which committed the atrocities of 7 October is a stakeholder that Israel wishes to eradicate and that the United States and the European Union have labelled as a terrorist group. Hence the dilemma is the following: on the one hand, any attempt at negotiation that includes Hamas will be used by Israel as an argument not to engage and, on the other hand, excluding Hamas—which is supported by part of the population of Gaza and, in growing numbers, by the population in the West Bank—will only increase the division within the Palestinian leadership.Talking about peace is as necessary as it is easy to see an infinite number of obstacles. Imposing peace would seem unviable without a more powerful and more credible Europe, without a more impartial United States, and without other legitimate stakeholders who are able to bring Israeli and Palestinian positions closer together. In such a lopsided conflict, the most likely scenario is that Israel will keep rejecting any solution that involves the creation of a Palestinian state, that Hamas will survive the current war and the international community will continue to back the two-state solution without taking any real measures to end the occupation. Keywords: Israel, Palestine, negotiation, peace, Gaza, EU, Washington, Netanyahu, PNA, Hamas, Middle East All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Tras cuatro meses de guerra en Gaza, la Unión Europea, de la mano del Alto Representante para la Política Exterior y de Seguridad, Josep Borrell, parece determinada a hablar de paz, incluso a «imponerla desde la comunidad internacional». ¿Pero cómo imaginar una paz ante un conflicto tan asimétrico? Los ataques del 7 de octubre liderados por Hamás, con más de 1.100 israelíes muertos, la mayoría civiles, y el cautiverio de cerca de 240 rehenes, ha desatado una guerra de destrucción con un impacto directo en la estabilidad regional. La respuesta israelí ha causado la muerte de más de 27.000 palestinos, la mayoría de ellos mujeres y menores de edad, y el desplazamiento forzoso de más de un millón y medio de palestinos en condiciones infrahumanas, sin techo, sin apenas alimentos o agua, todavía amenazados por los bombardeos del ejército israelí.Mientras crece la presión internacional para lograr un alto el fuego en Gaza, el gobierno de Benjamín Netanyahu persiste en la campaña militar para alcanzar sus objetivos: la erradicación de Hamás, la liberación de los rehenes, y garantizar que Gaza no vuelva nunca a representar una amenaza para Israel. Aun así, son cada vez más los actores internacionales y regionales que empiezan a hablar de paz. Una paz que, para la Unión Europea y para la comunidad internacional, pasa por la creación de dos Estados, retomando la fórmula originaria sugerida por Naciones Unidas en 1947.La defensa de la solución de dos Estados por parte de la UE no es nueva. Lo que es innovador es que, desde principios de año, las instituciones comunitarias han intentado retomar una cierta equidistancia en el conflicto y empiezan a hablar de paz con osadía. Primero fue en Lisboa, donde el Alto Representante, Josep Borrell, aseguró: «la paz solamente se podrá alcanzar de forma duradera si la comunidad internacional se involucra dramáticamente en conseguirlo e impone una solución». Después, en la Universidad de Valladolid, en su discurso de investidura como doctor honoris causa, el jefe de la diplomacia europea apuntó que Israel ha financiado a Hamás con el objetivo de debilitar a la Autoridad Nacional Palestina.Más ambicioso todavía, a finales de enero, Borrell presentó un plan de 12 puntos para la creación de dos Estados ante los ministros de Exteriores de los veintisiete y representantes de Israel y de los países árabes. El plan prevé una conferencia preparatoria de paz y conversaciones hasta que sea posible que los interlocutores acuerden una resolución. Tan reacio al idealismo como acostumbra, Borrell no habló de paz sino de soluciones: «tenemos que dejar de hablar del proceso de paz y comenzar a hablar más concretamente sobre el proceso de solución de dos Estados».A pesar del consenso internacional acerca de la fórmula sugerida por Naciones Unidas, y de la determinación de Borrell para acercarnos al horizonte inevitable de una paz, existen obstáculos difícilmente superables.En primer lugar, ¿cómo podría «imponerse» una paz que implica la creación de un Estado palestino con el desacuerdo frontal de Israel? Como señaló recientemente el primer ministro israelí, Benjamín Netanyahu: «debo aclarar que en cualquier acuerdo de futuro, el estado de Israel debe tener el control total del área, desde el río hasta el mar». Para convencer al gobierno de Tel Aviv, sería necesaria una fuerte presión externa que parece imposible a tenor del apoyo incondicional a Netanyahu que ha mantenido – y sigue manteniendo – Washington, incluso ante los crímenes de guerra que el ejército israelí está cometiendo. Hasta el momento, no hay indicación de que Moscú o Beijing tengan la intención de involucrarse en cualquier iniciativa de paz. Los actores regionales clave como Egipto, Turquía y los países del Golfo están centrando todos sus esfuerzos diplomáticos en conseguir un alto el fuego en Gaza. Mientras los bombardeos persistan en la Franja y la regionalización del conflicto continúe, los países árabes consideran poco realista cualquier intento de paz que no comience con la consecución del fin de la guerra y que no incluya el reconocimiento oficial del Estado palestino.A pesar de su poder económico, la Unión Europea ―principal socio comercial de Israel y mayor proveedor de ayuda exterior a los palestinos― ha sido incapaz de impulsar la paz entre unos y otros. La renuncia inicial de Bruselas, como Washington, a presionar a Israel para que detenga su campaña militar, ha deslegitimado a la UE en Palestina y en buena parte de Oriente Próximo. Sin embargo, para revertir esta dinámica, Bruselas podría impulsar el reconocimiento del Estado palestino a nivel de la UE en línea con la declaración de Berlín (1999), en la que prometía hacerlo «a su debido tiempo».El segundo obstáculo obliga a definir ¿quién firmaría la paz? Aunque pudiera imponerse una paz desde fuera, los interlocutores israelíes y palestinos tienen visiones diametralmente opuestas. El gobierno israelí quiere el control total de los territorios palestinos que ocupa, incluyendo Gaza, y no tiene intención de detener la colonización sino de seguir fomentándola. Por su parte, la Autoridad Palestina (ANP) se opone a cualquier tipo de solución que no contemple el fin de la ocupación y la creación de un Estado palestino con las fronteras de 1967. A pesar de la crisis de legitimidad de la ANP, los palestinos comparten que el fin de la ocupación israelí es el primer paso hacia la creación del Estado palestino.Se calcula que más de 700.000 colonos judíos viven ilegalmente en los territorios palestinos ocupados. Además, desde el 7 de octubre se ha acelerado la expulsión de palestinos de sus casas y la colonización de Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este con el apoyo del gobierno y la protección del ejército israelí, puesto que la expansión de los asentamientos ilegales ya era una prioridad para el gobierno de Netanyahu. Es una estrategia gradual pero implacable: un día una caravana, el siguiente unas casas, y después un núcleo urbano, como explica la BBC. Bajo estas condiciones, cualquier propuesta de negociación que no contemple el fin de la ocupación estará inevitablemente condenada al fracaso.Más espinosa todavía es la cuestión del rol de Hamás en las futuras negociaciones entre israelíes y palestinos. El grupo militante palestino responsable de las atrocidades del 7-O es un actor que Israel quiere erradicar, y que Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea han calificado de grupo terrorista. El dilema por lo tanto es el siguiente: por un lado, cualquier intento de negociación que incluya a Hamás será un argumento para que Israel no se involucre; por otro, excluir a Hamás, que mantiene el apoyo de parte de la población en Gaza y un creciente respaldo en Cisjordania, aumentará la división en el seno del liderazgo palestino.Hablar de paz es tan necesario como fácil es intuir un infinito de obstáculos. Imponer la paz parece inviable sin una Europa con más legitimad y poder, sin unos Estados Unidos más equidistantes y sin otros interlocutores legítimos que puedan acercar las posiciones entre israelíes y palestinos. En un conflicto tan asimétrico, el escenario más probable es que Israel siga rechazando cualquier solución que implique la creación de un Estado palestino, que Hamás sobreviva a la guerra en curso, mientras que la comunidad internacional seguirá apostando por la solución de los dos Estados sin tomar medidas concretas para poner fin a la ocupación.Palabras clave: Israel, Palestina, negociación, paz, Gaza, UE, EE.UU, Netanyahu, ANP, Hamás, Oriente Próximo Todas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB como institución.

After four months of war in Gaza, the European Union, or at least its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, seems determined to talk about peace. Borrell is even saying that the international community will have to "impose" it. But in such an asymmetrical conflict, how can peace be imagined? The Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 in which more than 1,100 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed and some 240 people were taken hostage, unleashed a devastating war with a direct impact on regional stability. The Israeli response has resulted in the deaths of more than more than 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of them women and children, and the forced displacement of more than one and a half million Palestinians who are living in subhuman conditions without shelter, food, or water, and still threatened by Israeli army bombing attacks.With growing international pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is still persisting in its military campaign in pursuance of its goals: eradication of Hamas, freeing the hostages, and ensuring that Gaza will never again pose a threat to Israel. However, increasing numbers of international and regional actors are beginning to talk about peace. For the European Union and the international community, this peace entails the two-state solution, which goes back to the original formula put forth by the United Nations in 1947.The EU's advocacy of the two-state solution is nothing new. What has changed is that since the beginning of the year, EU institutions have tried to resume a certain impartiality in the conflict and are beginning to speak out in favour of peace. First, in Lisbon, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, stated: "Peace will only be achieved in a lasting manner if the international community gets involved intensely to achieve it and imposes a solution". Later, at the University of Valladolid, in his speech on being invested with an Honorary Doctorate, the head of EU diplomacy pointed out that Israel has financed Hamas with the aim of weakening the Palestinian National Authority.Even more ambitiously, at the end of January, Borrell presented to the foreign ministers of the EU 27 and representatives from Israel and the Arab countries a 10-point plan for the creation of two states. This plan envisages a "Preparatory Peace Conference" and talks until it is possible for the parties to agree on a solution. Always wary of idealism, Borrell did not speak of "peace" but of "solutions": "We have to stop talking about the 'peace' process and start talking more concretely about the 'two-state solution' process".Despite international consensus on the formula presented by the United Nations, and Borrell's determination to move closer to the inevitable horizon of peace, there are obstacles that will be difficult to overcome.First, how could peace that entails the creation of a Palestinian state be "imposed" when Israel vehemently opposes this? The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu recently declared that in any future arrangement, "the state of Israel has to control the entire area from the river to the sea". Heavy external pressure would be needed to convince the Israeli government, and this seems impossible in view of the unconditional support that it has had—and continues to have—from Washington, regardless of the war crimes the Israeli army is committing. As yet, there is no sign that either Moscow or Beijing intends to be involved in any peace initiative. Key regional stakeholders like Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf states are concentrating all their diplomatic efforts on achieving a ceasefire in Gaza. As long as the Gaza Strip is being bombed and regionalisation of the conflict continues, the Arab countries see as unrealistic any peace-making effort that does not start with achieving an end to the war, and that does not include official recognition of a Palestinian state.Despite its economic power, the European Union—Israel's main trading partner and largest provider of foreign aid to the Palestinians—has been unable to make any progress towards achieving peace between the two sides. The initial reluctance of Brussels, like Washington, to pressure Israel to end its military campaign has "shredded" EU credibility in Palestine and a good part of the Middle East. However, in order to redress this situation, Brussels could promote EU-wide recognition of a Palestinian state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration, which stated its readiness to consider this "in due course".The second stumbling block builds upon the question: who would sign a peace agreement? Even if peace could be imposed from the outside, the Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders have diametrically opposed positions. The Israeli government wants total control of all territories it occupies, including Gaza, and rather than any intention to put an end to colonisation, it aims to keep encouraging it. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) opposes any kind of solution that does not include an end to the occupation and creation of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders. Notwithstanding the PNA's crisis of diminished legitimacy, Palestinians do agree that ending the Israeli occupation is the first step towards the creation of a Palestinian state.It is estimated that more than 700,000 Jewish settlers are living illegally in occupied Palestinian territories. Moreover, since 7 October, eviction of Palestinians from their homes and colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem have intensified with Israeli government and military support, as expanding the illegal settlements was already a priority of the Netanyahu government. It is a gradual but implacable strategy. In the words of the BBC, one day a motorhome moves in, the next a few houses are built, and then an urban centre is established. In these circumstances, any proposal for negotiation that does not envisage an end to the occupation is, perforce, doomed to failure.An even thornier matter is the role of Hamas in future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. This militant Palestinian group which committed the atrocities of 7 October is a stakeholder that Israel wishes to eradicate and that the United States and the European Union have labelled as a terrorist group. Hence the dilemma is the following: on the one hand, any attempt at negotiation that includes Hamas will be used by Israel as an argument not to engage and, on the other hand, excluding Hamas—which is supported by part of the population of Gaza and, in growing numbers, by the population in the West Bank—will only increase the division within the Palestinian leadership.Talking about peace is as necessary as it is easy to see an infinite number of obstacles. Imposing peace would seem unviable without a more powerful and more credible Europe, without a more impartial United States, and without other legitimate stakeholders who are able to bring Israeli and Palestinian positions closer together. In such a lopsided conflict, the most likely scenario is that Israel will keep rejecting any solution that involves the creation of a Palestinian state, that Hamas will survive the current war and the international community will continue to back the two-state solution without taking any real measures to end the occupation.Keywords: Israel, Palestine, negotiation, peace, Gaza, EU, Washington, Netanyahu, PNA, Hamas, Middle East All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

This article explores the nature of resilience-informed international interventions today by thinking about 'difference'. Up to the 1990s, international interventions were often characterised by a patronising tone in which backward others needed help to develop. Some 20 years later, key lessons learned were that others were so fundamentally different that efforts to assist them invariably failed. This article argues that contemporary approaches seeking to foster resilience are simultaneously propelled by both approaches. They are thus underpinned by two conflicting understandings of difference: the other that is in need and the other that cannot be attended. Even more, we contend that this contradiction is put to productive use in resilience-building: protracted crises today demand practitioners to 'be there', engaged permanently, to speculate, experiment, and affirm radical uncertainty. In order to analyse the novel features of resilience, we draw on Graham Harman's speculative realism and look at policy programming of the Syrian refugee crisis.