Suchergebnisse

The paper presents an analysis of the importance of some of thedeterminants of youth electoral absenteeism, which are in the focusof the predominant explanatory models of electoral participation –socio-demographic, party identification and cognitive model. Therelevance of numerous socio-demographic characteristics, partyidentification, political cynicism, political interest, and political knowledgeas predictors of youth electoral absenteeism were analyzed. Thisresearch was conducted on a sample of 788 fourth grade secondaryschool students attending 25 secondary schools in Belgrade. Theresults indicated that party identification, political interest, organizationalmembership and mother's level of education were significant predictorsof electoral absenteeism. For young persons without party identificationthe odds of non-voting were 3.6 times higher than the non-voting oddsof their counterparts but with party identification. The odds of electoralabsenteeism increased with the decreasing level of political interestor organizational membership as well as with the increasing level ofmother's level of education. The obtained results were discussed in thecontext of the proposed explanatory model of electoral participation aswell as some previous research findings. ; U radu se analizira znac

It is considered that political knowledge is one of the most prominent features of democratic citizenship, which makes its analysis especially relevant in a democratising society. This paper explores the predictors and correlates of youth political knowledge in Serbia. Political knowledge was measured by 12 multiple-choice questions pertaining to three areas: everyday politics, the rules of political game and foreign politics. Research participants were 788 fourth-grade students from 25 Belgrade secondary schools. The results show that the level of youth political knowledge is generally low and unevenly distributed among students. Its main predictors are interest in politics, academic achievement, gender and father's interest in politics. Other predictors that are usually regarded as very important (e.g. socioeconomic status, civic education) proved to be non-significant. Although political knowledge is positively correlated with political tolerance, political activism and diffuse political support, the coefficients are very low. The concluding part discusses possible causes of the obtained results.

Predmet rada je analiza relativne važnosti nastave građanskog vaspitanja kao činioca nekih političkih orijentacija. Analizirana je značajnost (ne)pohađanja građanskog vaspitanja kao jednog od prediktora političkog znanja, političke efikasnosti, političke tolerancije, političkog aktivizma i odnosa prema demokratskom sistemu. Istraživanje anketnog tipa sprovedeno je u 25 srednjih škola s teritorije grada Beograda, na uzorku od 788 učenika četvrtog razreda. Rezultati analize ukazuju na to da je (ne)pohađanje građanskog vaspitanja najznačajniji prediktor uopštenog odnosa prema demokratskom političkom sistemu, dok u svim ostalim slučajevima nema značajnih razlika između učenika koji pohađaju ovaj predmet i onih koji ga ne pohađaju. U zaključnom delu diskutuju se neka ograničenja nastave građanskog vaspitanja, kao i značaj šireg školskog i društvenog konteksta za ostvarivanje propagiranih obrazovnih ciljeva. ; The paper explores the relative importance of civic education courses as the factor of some pro-democratic orientations. The significance of civic education (non) attendance as a predictor of political knowledge, political efficacy, political tolerance, political activism and support for democratic political system is analyzed. The survey was conducted in 25 secondary schools from the territory of the city of Belgrade on the sample of 788 final year students. The results indicate that civic education (non) attendance is the most important predictor of the support for democratic political system, while in all other cases the differences between those who attend it and those who do not are not significant. The concluding section discusses some shortcomings of civic education courses as well as the role of the wider school and social context in the accomplishment of the propagated educational goals.

It is considered that political knowledge is one of the most prominent features of democratic citizenship, which makes its analysis especially relevant in a democratising society. This paper explores the predictors and correlates of youth political knowledge in Serbia. Political knowledge was measured by 12 multiple-choice questions pertaining to three areas: everyday politics, the rules of political game and foreign politics. Research participants were 788 fourth-grade students from 25 Belgrade secondary schools. The results show that the level of youth political knowledge is generally low and unevenly distributed among students. Its main predictors are interest in politics, academic achievement, gender and father's interest in politics. Other predictors that are usually regarded as very important (e.g. socioeconomic status, civic education) proved to be non-significant. Although political knowledge is positively correlated with political tolerance, political activism and diffuse political support, the coefficients are very low. The concluding part discusses possible causes of the obtained results.

Predmet rada su činioci i struktura političke kulture mladih u Srbiji. Politička kultura shvaćena je kao sveukupnost političkih i politički relevantnih orijentacija među pripadnicima jedne političke zajednice koja obuhvata nekoliko tipova orijentacije: kognitivne, afektivne, motivacione, vrednosne i ponašajne. ; The paper explores the factors and structure of youth political culture in Serbia. Political culture is defined as a comprehensive sum of political and politically relevant orientations of the members of a political community and comprises several types of orientations: cognitive, affective, motivational, evaluative and behavioural. Accordingly, five components of youth political culture were distinguished and operationalised by a large number of indicators. The empirical basis for the thesis is a survey conducted in 25 randomly selected secondary schools from the city of Belgrade. The total of 788 students from four different types of secondary school participated in the research: grammar schools (N=202), technical (N=207), economic (N=211) and medical (N=168). The sample was restricted to students of the final year (average age M=18.10, SD=.40). Three-quarters of students (75%) in the sample attend urban secondary schools and one quarter suburban (25%). There were more female participants (58%) than male (42%). Research results indicate that the level of youth political knowledge is low. The majority are not informed about topical social and political issues nor acquainted with certain basic rules regarding the functioning of the Serbian political system, such as the election threshold, government composition or the number of MPs. The prevailing feelings towards numerous analysed political objects are negative. Young people are highly dissatisfied with the current socioeconomic situation. The President, the Government, the Parliament, police, judiciary, the European Union or NATO, are not much trusted. Political cynicism is dominant, while for the majority politics is not the field of interest nor is considered important in life. Most students believe that they cannot influence political affairs (however, surprisingly, they are ready to vote in the following elections) while their opinions on social activism are divided. The attitude towards pro-system values is often ambiguous and vague. The attitude towards democracy is predominantly positive. However, the majority of students do not perceive favourably the newly established mechanisms and institutions of market economy and are hence more inclined towards the socialist than (pro-)market orientation. It can be said that they do not support the freedom of speech, multi-party system and rule of law.

Membership in the EU is sometimes presented as a reward for Serbia's eventual acknowledgement of Kosovo's independence. Although membership in the EU has been a strategic goal of Serbian foreign policy, the EU is often perceived as working against Serbian national interests regarding Kosovo's status. Relying on the cognitive dissonance theory, we hypothesize that in addition to a direct negative association between the support for Serbia's territorial integrity and the EU membership, there is also an interactive effect: the association should be moderated by one's opinion on when and whether Serbia will become a member of the EU. These hypotheses are examined using public opinion data based on a large national sample of adult Serbian citizens. The results support the interaction hypothesis: the attitude that Kosovo should remain part of Serbia is a stronger predictor of the (negative) evaluation of the EU among those respondents who do not believe that Serbia will become an EU member in the future.

This paper analyses the main elements of the ethnic identity politics narratives in official documents of the most relevant rightist political parties and movements in Serbia. The analysis shows that the main elements of identity politics narratives among the Serbian (far) right political parties and movements are typically based on grievance and threat motifs. These motifs depict the majority ethnic group, the Serbs, as the target of attacks from various sides and one that needs protecting from "them," who have many faces. "We" is primarily identified by ethnic criteria; "our own people first" captures the principle that guides the selection of advocated policy positions. These include the usual facets of rightist ideology. However, our analysis points to a relatively specific function that these identity narratives have – these specific policies and, as a unifying theme, general ideology is, in part, justified by the need to protect those with a shared identity. The parties' and movements' programs and manifestoes are not just an ideological "menu", evidence of policy agenda, but an "instrument" of persuasion, vigorously addressing group-related and existential motivation. The threat narrative represents a sort of coded hostility towards outgroups (people, institutions, ideologies) that not only justifies the often radical policy stances. However, it frames it as an unavoidable act for the "greater good" and necessary when faced with adversity and imminent threat to the group's "survival".

Ideologies are often understood as general principles that connect attitudes towards various political issues into (more or less) coherent belief systems. On the psychological level, ideologies also function as selfcategorizing labels that help placing oneself vis-à-vis political objects, and thereby perform a political orientation function. Yet, doubts have often been expressed about citizens' levels of political interest and sophistication that are deemed necessary for establishing and maintaining the connection between ideological labels and political opinions. This is especially seen as a potential problem in the so-called young democracies. In order to address this problem, the paper analyzes the relationship between ideological self-labeling and political opinion in Serbia. Opinion in question concerns the attitude towards the secession of Kosovo, a southern autonomous province in Serbia.

Cilj ovog rada je analiza odnosa između pozitivne i negativne identifikacije sa strankom i političkog znanja, kao i njihovih međuodnosa u pogledu izborne izlaznosti. Korišćeni su podaci iz ispitivanja javnog mnjenja u Srbiji posle izbora 2012. na nacionalno reprezentativnom probabilističkom uzorku građana (N=1568). Podaci su pokazali da je političko znanje značajno i pozitivno povezano i sa pozitivnom i sa negativnom identifikacijom sa strankom. Veću verovatnoću da će glasati imaju građani koji imaju više političkog znanja i koji imaju pozitivnu identifikaciju sa strankom. Međutim, pokazalo se da uticaj političkog znanja na izbornu izlaznost moderira samo pozitivna identifikacija sa strankom. Političko znanje značajno predviđa izlaznost samo u grupi građana bez pozitivne identifikacije sa strankom. Negativna identifikacija sa strankom ne menja odnos političkog znanja i izlaznosti. Rezultati su razmatrani u terminima Mičigen modela identifikacije sa strankom i teze kognitivne mobilizacije. Uloge afektivne i kognitivne motivacije u izbornom učešću su dodatno naglašene i razmatrane. ; This paper aims at analysing the relationship between positive and negative party identification and political knowledge, as well as their interplay in regard to electoral turnout. The data from the Serbian 2012 post-election public opinion survey on the nationally representative probability-based sample of voting age citizens were used (N = 1568). The data show that political knowledge is significantly and positively correlated both with positive and negative party identification. Citizens who are more knowledgeable and positively identified are also more likely to vote. However, it is shown that the influence of political knowledge on electoral turnout is moderated only by positive party identification. Political knowledge significantly predicts turnout only in the group of citizens without positive party identification. Being negatively identified with a political party does not modify the relationship between political knowledge and turnout. The results are discussed in terms of the Michigan model of party identification and cognitive mobilisation thesis. The roles of affective and cognitive motivation in electoral participation are additionally stressed and debated.

This paper aims at analysing the relationship between positive and negative party identification and political knowledge, as well as their interplay in regard to electoral turnout. The data from the Serbian 2012 post-election public opinion survey on the nationally representative probability-based sample of voting age citizens were used (N = 1568). The data show that political knowledge is significantly and positively correlated both with positive and negative party identification. Citizens who are more knowledgeable and positively identified are also more likely to vote. However, it is shown that the influence of political knowledge on electoral turnout is moderated only by positive party identification. Political knowledge significantly predicts turnout only in the group of citizens without positive party identification. Being negatively identified with a political party does not modify the relationship between political knowledge and turnout. The results are discussed in terms of the Michigan model of party identification and cognitive mobilisation thesis. The roles of affective and cognitive motivation in electoral participation are additionally stressed and debated.

This paper aims at analysing the relationship between positive and negative party identification and political knowledge, as well as their interplay in regard to electoral turnout. The data from the Serbian 2012 post-election public opinion survey on the nationally representative probability-based sample of voting age citizens were used (N = 1568). The data show that political knowledge is significantly and positively correlated both with positive and negative party identification. Citizens who are more knowledgeable and positively identified are also more likely to vote. However, it is shown that the influence of political knowledge on electoral turnout is moderated only by positive party identification. Political knowledge significantly predicts turnout only in the group of citizens without positive party identification. Being negatively identified with a political party does not modify the relationship between political knowledge and turnout. The results are discussed in terms of the Michigan model of party identification and cognitive mobilisation thesis. The roles of affective and cognitive motivation in electoral participation are additionally stressed and debated.

Autonomy is treated as a major element in a number of value models and often as a very important feature of the democratic political culture. The aim of this paper is to analyse the valuing of autonomy in a number of ex-communist and non-communist European countries, as well as the changes in that regard in the period between 1999 and 2009 and their main determinants. The data from the European Values Study and the World Values Study were used and aggregate, country level analysis was performed. A total of 38 European countries were included, which comprised 47.999 respondents for 1999 and 58.155 respondents for 2009. Autonomy valuing was operationalized via the preference for the qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home, opposing support for independence/determination and religious faith/obedience. The Freedom House scores and Human Development Index values were used as measures of civic and political rights and socio-economic development of the countries, respectively. The results indicate that half of the ex-communist and the majority of the non-communist European countries show a significant increase in the autonomy preference over the ten-year period. In the non-communist countries, the autonomy shift is significantly enhanced by the rising level of socio-economic development. Enhanced guarantees of civil and political rights and freedoms are, however, the major factors in promoting autonomy in the ex-communist societies. The obtained findings are discussed in terms of the institutional model of political culture, as well as in the context of the main assumptions of the self-determination theory.