Suchergebnisse

We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders' desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectives— respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust—guided reforms to the US Army's centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA's mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army's desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army's objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC. (JEL D47, H56, J45)

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)