A Question of Faith: Religious Bias and Coercion Undermine Military Leadership and Trust
In: Armed Forces Journal, pp. 40-43, January 2008
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In: Armed Forces Journal, pp. 40-43, January 2008
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Working paper
In: Armed Forces & Society, 41(2), 221-242
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In: Armed Forces Journal, pp. 28-31, January/February 2011
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In: Air and Space Power Journal, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 68-76
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In: The international journal of transgenderism: IJT, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 4-13
ISSN: 1434-4599
In: Armed forces & society, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 221-242
ISSN: 1556-0848
This study is the first to systematically inquire into the lives of transgender men and women currently serving across the branches of the US military in the post-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) repeal era. We employed an interview protocol from a stratified convenience sample ( n = 14) of clandestinely serving active duty, guard and reserve military members from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who self-identified as transgender or transsexual. Using phenomenology as a methodological foundation, we present a revelatory case study based on lived experiences from firsthand accounts furthering the collective understanding of gender dysphoria in a contemporary military context.
In: European Journal of Management, 14(3), 147-159
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In: Armed forces journal: AFJ, Band 148, Heft 6/5987, S. 28-31
ISSN: 0004-220X, 0196-3597
World Affairs Online
In: Rationality and society, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 91-120
ISSN: 1461-7358
We consider mixed populations (N 1/4 21) of genuine (humans) and arti.cial (robots) agents repeatedly interacting in small groups whose composition is changed randomly from round to round. Our purpose is to study the spread of cooperative or non-cooperative behavior over time in populations playing a 3-person centipede game by manipulating the behavior of the robots (cooperative vs. noncooperative) and their proportion in the population. Our results convey a positive message: adding a handful of cooperative robots increases the propensity of the genuine subjects to cooperate over time, whereas adding a handful of non-cooperative agents does not decrease this propensity. If there are enough hard-core cooperative subjects in the population, they not only negate the behavior of the non-cooperative robots but also induce other subjects to behave more cooperatively.
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.
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