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Working paper
Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party
In: The Economic Journal, Band 129, Heft 618, S. February 2019
SSRN
The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality
In: NBER Working Paper No. w22759
SSRN
Working paper
Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm
In: NBER Working Paper No. w21645
SSRN
Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19918
SSRN
Working paper
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
In: American journal of political science, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 127-143
ISSN: 1540-5907
We study a citizen-candidate-entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively 'extreme' citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more 'moderate' types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates. We show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office. Moreover, when the number of citizens goes to infinity, only the very most extreme citizens, with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space, become candidates. Finally, our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates' types that is revealed via parties. Adapted from the source document.
Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 127-143
ISSN: 0092-5853
The dynamics of distributive politics
We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game and conduct an experiment to test hypotheses generated by the theory for pure distributional (divide-the-dollar) environments. In particular, we investigate the effects of concavity in the utility functions, the existence of a Condorcet winning alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic. Status quo outcomes have great inertia. There are strong treatment effects, that are in the direction predicted by the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions.
BASE
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study
In: American political science review, Band 98, Heft 1, S. 77-90
ISSN: 1537-5943
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by quantal response equilibrium.
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study
In: American political science review, Band 98, Heft 1, S. 77-90
ISSN: 0003-0554
The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study
Trabajo publicado como artículo en American Political Science Review 98(1): 77-90 (2004).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001017 ; When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium. ; Aragonés acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2000-1186. Palfrey acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, grant number SES-0079301, and from the Hacker Social Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech.
BASE
Federal Mandates by Popular Demand
In: Journal of political economy, Band 108, Heft 5, S. 905-927
ISSN: 1537-534X
Political Confederation
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 69-83
ISSN: 1537-5943
This article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation. The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation. We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states.
Political confederation
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 69-83
ISSN: 0003-0554
This article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation. The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation. We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
Political Confederation
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 69
ISSN: 0003-0554