Suchergebnisse

The global economic governance: human development nexus / Simone Raudino -- Wealth and the democratization of global economic governance / Marcel Hanegraaff and Arlo Poletti -- The World Bank in the post-crisis landscape: stasis and change and the post-Washington consensus / Eugenia Baroncelli -- Competing visions of the Western international economic order and the Chinese belt and road initiative: challenges and opportunities / Uzma Ashraf -- Normative trade power Europe? the case of EU trade agreements with Asian countries / Daniela Sicurelli -- Is China colonizing Africa? Africa-China relations in a shifting global economic governance system / Adams Bodomo -- Economic crises and political downturns in the Southern cone: are MERCOSUR's neoliberal roots a constraint on development? / Roberto Lampa -- Commodity economies and international assistance: lessons drawn from Ukraine's experience / Sergey Korablin -- Global economic governance, human security, and socio-economic development in Latin America: the Colombian and Mexican experiences / Eunice Rendon -- Global economic governance and the challenge of human development: Afghanistan case study / Paul Fishtein and Emily Bakos

The global economic governance: human development nexus / Simone Raudino -- Wealth and the democratization of global economic governance / Marcel Hanegraaff and Arlo Poletti -- The World Bank in the post-crisis landscape: stasis and change and the post-Washington consensus / Eugenia Baroncelli -- Competing visions of the Western international economic order and the Chinese belt and road initiative: challenges and opportunities / Uzma Ashraf -- Normative trade power Europe? the case of EU trade agreements with Asian countries / Daniela Sicurelli -- Is China colonizing Africa? Africa-China relations in a shifting global economic governance system / Adams Bodomo -- Economic crises and political downturns in the Southern cone: are MERCOSUR's neoliberal roots a constraint on development? / Roberto Lampa -- Commodity economies and international assistance: lessons drawn from Ukraine's experience / Sergey Korablin -- Global economic governance, human security, and socio-economic development in Latin America: the Colombian and Mexican experiences / Eunice Rendon -- Global economic governance and the challenge of human development: Afghanistan case study / Paul Fishtein and Emily Bakos.

"Using quantitative and qualitative approaches to economic policy analysis in developing countries, this book examines whether ODA policies actually contribute to economic growth and human development in low and middle-income countries. By advancing the debate as to which policy and legal provisions should be adopted by them, it demonstrates how to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs derived from the process of integrating international economic regimes"--

This book critically engages with a long tradition of scholarly work that conceives of the European Union as a peculiar international actor that pursues a value-based, normatively oriented and development-friendly agenda in its relations with international partners. The EU is a pivotal player in international trade relations, holding formidable power in trade but also exercising substantial power through trade. Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and a global power. In this field, the EU has declared a twofold ambitious goal, namely that of fostering economic growth in Europe while, at the same time, promoting development and growth abroad, both in developed and developing countries. In other words, the EU aims to increase its competitiveness in world trade while acting as an ethical and normative power. Here, Poletti and Sicurelli explore the tension between these two roles.

'In this eloquently written book, Arlo Poletti and Daniela Sicurelli assess rival explanations for the European Union's trade policy towards small and developing trading partners. Through careful cross-case comparison, they uncover how and why the motives of policy-makers, business groups and NGOs make high normative aspirations diverge from actual negotiation outcomes.' -- Dirk De Bièvre, University of Antwerp, Belgium This book critically engages with a long tradition of scholarly work that conceives of the European Union as a peculiar international actor that pursues a value-based, normatively oriented and development-friendly agenda in its relations with its international partners. The EU is a pivotal player in international trade relations, holding formidable power in trade but also exercising substantial power through trade. Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and a global power. In this field, the EU has declared a twofold ambitious goal, namely that of fostering economic growth in Europe while, at the same time, promoting development and growth abroad, both in developed and developing countries. In other words, the EU aims to increase its competitiveness in world trade while acting as an ethical and normative power. Here, Poletti and Sicurelli explore the tension between these two roles. Arlo Poletti is Associate Professor of International Political Economy at University of Trento, Italy. Daniela Sicurelli is Associate Professor of International Relations at University of Trento, Italy.--

In 2017, Italy, France, and Germany jointly supported the setting up of an EU-wide investment screening mechanism to strengthen the EU's capacity to screen and eventually block foreign investments. In a few months, however, the Italian government changed position dramatically, shifting from leading supporter to staunchest opposer of this pol-icy initiative. Such a change of positioning was decisive in both watering down the initial proposal and moving for-ward with the idea of a looser mechanism coordinating national investment screening activities. This article develops an explanation of the Italian government's changing negotiating stance. We develop an argument that stresses how two factors combined to produce this puzzling outcome. First, we stress the role of political parties as drivers of governments' foreign economic policy choices. More specifically, we show that the preferences of the parties form-ing the Italian government after the 2018 general elections (the Lega Nord and the Five Star Movement) were crucial in shaping Italy's evolving stance on this important issue. Second, we highlight the implications of the tension that exists between two different "varieties" of anti-globalism. While "self-proclaimed" anti-globalist political parties usu-ally combine a traditional critique of globalization and opposition to further political integration in the EU, they may be forced to prioritize one over the other when they prove incompatible. In this context, we show how Italian anti-globalist parties' choice to prioritize anti-Europeanism over anti-globalism led them to prefer strengthening domes-tic-level institutions to screen FDIs rather than allowing the EU to acquire new powers.

European institutions have repeatedly represented the EU as an actor that can use the attractiveness of its market to promote human rights internationally. From this perspective, EU trade sanctions represent a hard power tool to push the government of states accused of major human rights violations to abide by international law. In its reaction to the Rohingya crisis in 2018, despite the European Parliament's call for the lifting of Myanmar's trade preferences, the Council of the EU stated that it would rather tackle the problem by taking a "constructive approach" based on dialogue. We provide a political-economy explanation of this choice, making a plausible case that the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position. The firms interested in maintaining preferential trade relations with Myanmar were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid a disruption of trade and investment links within global value chains (GVCs) so that they could continue competing with Chinese enterprises.

AbstractAs a result of the economic and political rise of China and Trump's decision to undermine the liberal international order, theories of hegemony have regained center stage in both policy-oriented and scholarly debates. Yet, a careful analysis of the evolution of the US foreign policy strategy in the realm of international trade politics reveals that traditional theories of hegemonic decline are ill-equipped to account for both the timing and the content of the Trump administration's behavior in this issue area. This paper argues in favor of integrating structural theories of hegemonic transition/stability with an analysis of the domestic sources of trade policy preferences. To do so, we draw on the International Political Economy literature highlighting how the domestic political process triggered by the dynamics of international economic competition combined with structural forces in shaping the timing and content of the Trump administration's disengagement from the existing multilateral trade governance structures.

AbstractNumerous empirical studies suggest that global interest communities are heavily biased in favor of wealthier countries. This research note critically reviews these works suggesting that they (i) lack a benchmark to assess the biased nature of global interest communities and (ii) conflate the concepts of "wealth" (based on GDP per capita) and "economic power" (based on GDP) into one analytical category. As a corrective to these problems, we compare variation in global interest group mobilization across countries to the size of these countries' national economies. Relying on an original dataset mapping interest groups communities at the World Trade Organization (1997–2012) and the United Nations Climate Summits (1997–2011), we show that (i) global interest representation almost perfectly reflects differences in countries' relative economic power and (ii) contrary to the conventional wisdom, wealthier countries are, relative to their economic size, actually underrepresented in global interest communities.

AbstractA growing number of studies focus on the two-way channels connecting public opinion and interest groups, highlighting how public support affects interest groups' mobilization, strategies, and influence, while also showing how interest groups manage to shape public opinion. We contribute to this debate, assuming that interest groups are fundamentally survival-maximizing organizations. First, we investigate whether public opinion bears on advocacy groups' assessment of their own survival prospects. Second, we assess whether public opinion-driven mortality anxiety affects advocacy groups' choices regarding different lobbying strategies. Empirically, we rely on data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, including over 2500 interest group respondents across six European Union (EU) countries as well as groups working at the EU level. Our analysis shows that (1) public opinion crucially influences how advocacy groups estimate their chances of survival, particularly for citizen groups and (2) public opinion-related survival concerns stimulate greater relative use of outside lobbying by citizen groups.

AbstractThis article introduces and summarizes the key questions and findings of this special issue of Global Policy on the role of domestic and international institutions in the study of global value chains (GVCs). The article starts by briefly introducing the concept of GVCs and the state‐of‐the‐art of the existing literature focusing on the political implications of these landmark changes in the global economy. Then, we make a case for grounding this emerging literature more strongly into an 'institutionalist' perspective. More specifically, we argue that while a great deal of attention has been paid to intra‐chain governance modes – that is, the different ways in which firms organize their cross‐border production arrangements – the role external institutional forces play in structuring chain dynamics remains surprisingly under‐researched. These observations invite an analytical perspective that brings institutions back into the study of GVCs. The contributions to the special issue focus on multiple causal pathways linking GVCs and various types of domestic‐ and international institutions. Altogether, these contributions underscore that the politics engendered by GVCs, as well as how they evolve, can only be fully understood by paying attention to the external institutional context in which they are embedded.

The article introduces and summarizes the key questions and findings of this special issue of Global Policy on the role of domestic and international institutions in the study of Global Value Chains (GVCs). The article starts by briefly introducing the concept of GVCs and the state-of-the-art of the existing literature focusing on the political implications of these landmark changes in the global economy. Then we make a case for grounding this emerging literature more strongly into an "institutionalist" perspective. More specifically, we argue that while a great deal of attention has been paid to intra-chain governance modes – i.e. the different ways in which firms organize their cross-border production arrangements – the role external institutional forces play in structuring chain dynamics remains surprisingly under-researched. These observations invite an analytical perspective that brings institutions back into the study of GVCs. The contributions to the special issue focus on multiple causal pathways linking GVCs and various types of domestic- and international institutions. Altogether, these contributions underscore that the politics engendered by GVCs, as well as how they evolve, can only be fully understood by paying attention to the external institutional context in which they are embedded.

One of the central assumptions underlying the stakeholder model is that strengthened opportunities for involvement of non-state actors in political procedures hold significant promise for making those procedures more democratically legitimate. However, recent studies show that more open international organisations (IOs) are not perceived as more legitimate by non-state actors. In this article we explore one potential reason to explain this apparent paradox, investigating whether, and under what conditions, strengthened opportunities of stakeholder involvement enable the effective representation of global constituencies. The article shows that globalisation and politicisation of IOs go hand in hand with greater political activity by non-state actors defending domestic, rather than global, interests. Globalisation and politicisation may thus contribute to the exponential growth of the community of non-state actors active at IOs, but they do not make such community more globalised in nature. The article also illustrates that granting greater access to stakeholders in international institutions can somehow mitigate the effects of this underlying structural factors, and that institutional openness disproportionally fosters political activity by civic, rather than business, global stakeholders. We advance these arguments relying on a novel dataset including over eight thousand organisations active at the UN climate conferences and the WTO Ministerial Conferences.

AbstractOne of the central assumptions underlying the stakeholder model is that strengthened opportunities for involvement of non-state actors in political procedures hold significant promise for making those procedures more democratically legitimate. However, recent studies show that more open international organisations (IOs) are not perceived as more legitimate by non-state actors. In this article we explore one potential reason to explain this apparent paradox, investigating whether, and under what conditions, strengthened opportunities of stakeholder involvement enable the effective representation of global constituencies. The article shows that globalisation and politicisation of IOs go hand in hand with greater political activity by non-state actors defending domestic, rather than global, interests. Globalisation and politicisation may thus contribute to the exponential growth of the community of non-state actors active at IOs, but they do not make such community more globalised in nature. The article also illustrates that granting greater access to stakeholders in international institutions can somehow mitigate the effects of this underlying structural factors, and that institutional openness disproportionally fosters political activity by civic, rather than business, global stakeholders. We advance these arguments relying on a novel dataset including over eight thousand organisations active at the UN climate conferences and the WTO Ministerial Conferences.