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AbstractClaims about the deterrent role of forward military deployments often depend on the argument that attacks on troops stationed abroad will activate a "tripwire effect." It is assumed that this effect would generate strong domestic pressure for further military intervention by the country whose troops have come under attack. In theory, the anticipation of a strong tripwire effect prospectively ties the hands of leaders, thereby bolstering the reliability of extended deterrent threats and promises. In this paper, we define the tripwire effect and use both conjoint and vignette survey experiments to evaluate its operation and magnitude among Americans. Results suggest that the tripwire effect is, at best, far weaker than many analysts and policymakers commonly assume. This finding raises serious questions about a core logic underpinning the United States' forward military posture and highlights the need for more research on the deterrent functions of forward deployment.

Claims about the deterrent role of forward military deployments often depend on the argument that attacks on troops stationed abroad will activate a "tripwire effect." It is assumed that this effect would generate strong domestic pressure for further military intervention by the country whose troops have come under attack. In theory, the anticipation of a strong tripwire effect prospectively ties the hands of leaders, thereby bolstering the reliability of extended deterrent threats and promises. In this paper, we define the tripwire effect and use both conjoint and vignette survey experiments to evaluate its operation and magnitude among Americans. Results suggest that the tripwire effect is, at best, far weaker than many analysts and policymakers commonly assume. This finding raises serious questions about a core logic underpinning the United States' forward military posture and highlights the need for more research on the deterrent functions of forward deployment.

Abstract
How does the US public evaluate claims attributing responsibility for a cyberattack? It seems plausible that political factors complicate how the US public judges attribution claims. In this article, we collect original survey data and use two survey experiments to explore this subject. Specifically, we analyze how cues and endorsements from partisan, intelligence, and independent non-governmental actors affect public confidence in attribution claims regarding the identity of cyberaggressors and support for retribution. We find evidence of polarization, particularly regarding perceptions of Russia's threat in cyberspace. To uncover whether this polarization results from partisan cheerleading or more sincere motivations, we conduct two experiments regarding political factors and attribution claims. In the first experiment, we find that respondents respond similarly to independent observers' endorsements of attribution claims but that Democrats appear to respond strategically in a test of the link between attribution and retribution rather than endorse a proposal by then-President Trump. In the second experiment, we find that partisans respond similarly to intelligence and independent experts' evaluations of attribution claims, and that both respond much more favorably to independent experts than the intelligence community. Superficial polarization thus turns out to look more like partisan cheerleading.

Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.

Buzan and Lawson'sThe Global Transformationestablishes that many of the basic parameters of world politics originated in the 'long 19th century'. Despite finding much to admire in their book, we are concerned that it lacks an explicit theory of change. In its drive to highlight the novelty and exceptionalism of the 19th century, it offers insufficient guidance on two key issues: first, how international relations scholars should situate Buzan and Lawson's 'global transformation' in existing debates over transhistorical processes; and, second, how they should apply lessons from that transformation to understanding emergent trends in the contemporary world. We argue that a more explicit study of causal factors might help account forwhythe 19th century was unusual. We conclude with thoughts about how the field should proceed afterThe Global Transformation. In particular, it points to how concatenating changes could profoundly alter international politics – an approach we term 'Exotic International Relations'. Buzan and Lawson's book therefore serves as a marker for the importance of systematically theorizing how radical potentialities for transformation might rearrange existing structural assemblages in world politics.

Is grading polarized in political science classrooms? We offer experimental evidence that suggests it is not. Many have argued that instructors' grading in political science classrooms is skewed by the political characteristics of the instructor, the student, or an interaction between the two. Yet the evaluations of whether such biases exist has been asserted and denied with little evidence—even though prominent theories in political science suggest that the charge is not entirely implausible. Using a set of anonymous essays by undergraduates graded by teaching assistants at a variety of institutions, we test for the presence of bias in a framework that avoids the usual selection bias issues that confound attempts at inference. After evaluating the evidence carefully, we find that the evidence for bias is much weaker than activists claim.

Theorists offer many predictions about how Americans will respond to significant cyberattacks but systematic evaluations of American public opinion regarding these issues remain rare. We present results from a conjoint experiment and find that the public supports retaliation-in-kind against cyberattacks but is willing to escalate as the economic damage and human casualties of a hypothetical attack mount. Respondents support harsher retaliation after attacks carried out by terrorist groups or state agencies rather than those conducted by individuals or civilian hackers. Finally, the dynamics of the public's judgment regarding responses to a domestic or an international cyber attack are broadly similar.

Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries' elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public's views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.

Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries' elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public's views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.

Theorists offer many predictions about how Americans will respond to significant cyberattacks but systematic evaluations of American public opinion regarding these issues remain rare. We present results from a conjoint experiment and find that the public supports retaliation-in-kind against cyberattacks but is willing to escalate as the economic damage and human casualties of a hypothetical attack mount. Respondents support harsher retaliation after attacks carried out by terrorist groups or state agencies rather than those conducted by individuals or civilian hackers. Finally, the dynamics of the public's judgment regarding responses to a domestic or an international cyber attack are broadly similar.