Suchergebnisse

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is developing regulations to amend existing standards for occupational exposure to respirable crystalline silica by establishing a new permissible exposure limit as well as a series of ancillary provisions for controlling exposure. This article briefly reviews OSHA's proposed regulatory approach and the statutory authority on which it is based. It then evaluates OSHA's preliminary determination of significant risk and its analysis of the risk reduction achievable by its proposed controls. It recognizes that OSHA faces multiple challenges in devising a regulatory approach that reduces exposures and health risks and meets its statutory goal. However, the greatest challenge to reducing risks associated with silica exposure is not the lack of incentives (for either employers or employees) but rather lack of information, particularly information on the relative toxicity of different forms of silica. The article finds that OSHA's proposed rule would contribute little in the way of new information, particularly since it is largely based on information that is at least a decade old—a significant deficiency, given the rapidly changing conditions observed over the last 45 years. The article concludes with recommendations for alternative approaches that would be more likely to generate information needed to improve worker health outcomes.

We investigate where consensus exists in the field of Economics and the Law by analyzing responses to a questionnaire mailed to members of the American Law and Economics Association. These specialists are impressed by the efficiency of the common law, while few believe that the jury system is efficient. Fifty-nine percent conclude that there are currently too many attorneys in the U.S. Forty-one percent believe that there are about the right number—none think that there are too few. Among the other issues in the survey are precedent, contract law, litigation abuse, negligence, nuisance, punitive damages, no-fault auto insurance, product liability, contingency fees, losers paying for civil litigation, compensation for regulatory takings, privacy rights, and the economics of crime and punishment.

AbstractWe believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).