From Stalinism to Eurocommunism: The Bitter Fruits of 'Socialism in One Country'
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 984-986
ISSN: 0022-3816
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 984-986
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: American political science review, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 1258-1259
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 289-291
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 1751-1752
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: American political science review, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 868-869
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 686-687
ISSN: 2325-7784
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 678-678
ISSN: 2325-7784
In: Studies in comparative communism, Band 4, Heft 3-4, S. 104
ISSN: 0039-3592
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 704-705
ISSN: 2325-7784
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 318-320
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 172-174
ISSN: 2325-7784
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 317, Heft 1, S. 130-137
ISSN: 1552-3349
The Soviet leaders have not broken as abruptly with Stalinist doctrine as the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union attempted to suggest. Yet the post-Stalinist modifications of doctrine concern ing the inevitability of war and the status of the colonial and former colonial areas are directly related to the more flexible conduct of foreign relations by the Khrushchevite leadership. The course of events, themselves, rather than any premeditated doctrinal revisions was responsible for the crisis between Moscow and the national Communist parties and has given some substance, notably in Poland, to the doctrine of "national roads to socialism."
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 317, S. 130-137
ISSN: 0002-7162
The Soviet leaders have not broken as abruptly with Stalinist doctrine as the 20th Congress of the Communist Part of the USSR attempted to suggest. Yet the post-Stalinist modifications of doctrine concerning the inevitability of war & the status of the colonial & former colonial areas are directly related to the more flexible conduct of foreign relations by the Khrushchevite leadership. The course of events, themselves, rather than any premeditated doctrinal revisions was responsible for the crisis between Moscow & the national Communist parties & has given some substance, notably in Poland, to the doctrine of `national roads to socialism. AA.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 76-87
ISSN: 1086-3338
IT was once suggested that the basic trait of psychological warfare—and, incidentally, the greatest asset to those that practice it—is its lack of known positive results.1 No satisfactory method has yet been developed to measure the effects of a propaganda campaign on its chosen audience. This characteristic is at once the greatest weakness of propaganda and psychological warfare (how does the operator know whether his effort was well spent or not?) and their greatest strength (if there is no reliable evaluation of the effort, it had better be continued, or even intensified, lest ground be lost).
In: The review of politics, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 157-169
ISSN: 1748-6858
The international Communist movement is commonly described as a conspiracy and so, in part, it is. It is a conspiracy in the sense that the national Communist parties are members of a coordinated international political movement which attempts to undermine the present social and economic order and replace it with the Soviet brand of collectivism. It is also a conspiracy in the sense that Communist parties, unlike other national parties, would, if given power, deliberately place their countries under the domination of, or at least align them with the USSR. The Communist parties with their clandestine organization and their addiction to violence when they think they stand to gain by its use, simply cannot be put on a par with other political parties. All this is well known and needs no retelling.