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The New Zealand government recently announced a rather far‐reaching policy of deregulation and reorganization of certain governmental entities, including electricity generation and transmission. Electricorp, a state‐owned enterprise whose actions will be subject to a standard of commercial efficiency, has been formed to take over these functions and to sell bulk power at wholesale to localized distribution entities–who then will resell it at retail. Electricorp will be unregulated but subject to antitrust jurisdiction, as will be the distribution entities. Neither Electricorp nor the distributors will have any protected monopoly status. Substantial possibilities exist for competition in both bulk power and retail power markets over the long run, and one has reason to be optimistic that antitrust can deal with the remaining monopoly issues. New Zealand's radical deregulation yields favorable inferences about the outcome of the somewhat slower deregulation of electricity in the United States.

An extensive set of self‐reported survey data exists on illegal drug use. The survey data show that drug use is quite frequent among the younger adult population, relatively infrequent among those of high‐school age, and rare among middle‐aged and older adults. Drug use varies by occupational category in ways that are difficult to rationalize. This study utilizes a model in which an individual's time is allocated among labor, non‐drug consumption, leisure, and drug use, where the individual is cognizant of the effect of drug use on his wages. The study analyzes comparative static results and then uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate a probit model of the individual decision to use drugs. The findings of the study are that non‐economic factors dominate the decision for both harder drugs and drugs more broadly defined. One must consider this finding tentative, however, since usable drug price data were not available.

Decontrol of the wellhead price of natural gas under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ended the general shortage of natural gas, which had begun in the 1960s. It also led to dislocations in gas markets because of regulatory uncertainties that created difficulties in renegotiating contracts made during the shortage period. Together, the decontrol and dislocations led to a decline in the traditional role of interstate gas pipelines as full‐requirements suppliers to local distributors, who now use pipelines primarily as transporters of gas purchased independently of the pipelines. The growth in transport transactions has increased greatly the potential scope of efficient exchanges in gas markets. Achieving efficiency gains, however, requires an underlying right of access to pipelines that is non‐discriminatory, exchangeable, and consistent with both existing regulation and pre‐existing contractual relationships. The authors define such a right, which they call exchangeable transport entitlement (ETE). They show that ETE satisfies the criteria for efficiency gains, and they examine the practical problems of the transition that a regulatory regime incorporating ETE faces. The analysis has important implications for other industries and for the economic theory of regulation. Specifically, the analysis shows that economists must realize the importance of diverse contractual relationships in both their theoretical literature and their proposals for regulatory reform.

Editor's Note: This is an edited transcription from the general session of the 73rd Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International, held in Lake Tahoe, Nevada.