Suchergebnisse

The COVID-19 epidemic has been exacerbated by failures in diagnostic testing for the virus in the United States. In response to these problems, two bills have been introduced in Congress to not only reform emergency use of diagnostic tests, but to fundamentally reform diagnostics regulation in non-emergencies. There has been a long-standing recognition that current U.S. regulation of diagnostics is outdated and problematic, and the history of public health legislation is that emergencies and crises have been the primary motivating factor to break Congressional inertia and to implement new legislation. Thus, the COVID-19 may create a useful "window of opportunity" to pass much-needed legislative reform of diagnostic regulation in both emergency and non-emergency contexts. At the same time, rushing radical legislative changes, especially if they have not been subject to careful stakeholder engagement and Congressional deliberation in advance, is precarious and could result in reckless and disruptive changes. We review and apply the historical lessons of legislating in response to a crisis and conclude the one but not both of the pending legislative proposals may satisfy the criteria for an appropriate opportunistic change for diagnostics regulation.

Human transmission to offspring and future generations of acquired epigenetic modifications has not been definitively established, although there are several environmental exposures with suggestive evidence. This article uses three examples of hazardous substances with greater exposures in vulnerable populations: pesticides, lead, and diesel exhaust. It then considers whether, if there were scientific evidence of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, there would be greater attention given to concerns about environmental justice in environmental laws, regulations, and policies at all levels of government. To provide a broader perspective on environmental justice the article discusses two of the most commonly cited approaches to environmental justice. John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, a form of egalitarianism, is frequently invoked for the principle that differential treatment of individuals is justified only if actions are designed to benefit those with the greatest need. Another theory, the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, focuses on whether essential capabilities of society, such as life and health, are made available to all individuals. In applying principles of environmental justice the article considers whether there is a heightened societal obligation to protect the most vulnerable individuals from hazardous exposures that could adversely affect their offspring through epigenetic mechanisms. It concludes that unless there were compelling evidence of transgenerational epigenetic harms, it is unlikely that there would be a significant impetus to adopt new policies to prevent epigenetic harms by invoking principles of environmental justice.

This book examines the growing gap between the pace of science and technology and the lagging response of legal and ethical oversight that society relies on to govern emerging technologies. Offers potential paths to more responsive regulation and governance.

AbstractIt is often argued that immediate government action regarding nanotechnology is needed to ensure that public opinion does not mistakenly view nanotechnology as dangerous, to restore public trust in government, and to increase the legitimacy of government action through increased public participation. This article questions whether governments can achieve these goals. As the world lurches toward regulation of nanotechnology, we should ask Why the rush? Can anticipatory action, perceived as the government doing something, fulfill the competing hopes to "restore trust,""pave the way" for nanotechnology, "increase awareness," and "satisfy democratic notions of accountability"? Or is government action more likely to increase existing divisions over nanotechnology's future?

In this forward-looking volume the invited authors argue that the world must critically assess the potential pitfalls of new technologies in advance. Many of the developments in modern technology are complex, risky, and, to begin with, cloaked in uncertainty. How should we deal with such developments - that may not only have positive effects (such as an increase of our well-being or an improved ability to control and cure diseases) but also negative effects for human beings and the environment (such as global warming or the medicalisation of human beings)? The fact that technological 'progress' often occurs under conditions of uncertainty makes the issue even more pressing. Frequently, we are completely devoid of information concerning the applications of new technologies and what their impact will be on human beings and the environment. History has shown that taking a retrospective perspective by passively awaiting the practical consequences of new technologies is both dangerous and inappropriate, as often damage will already have occurred. The genie is well and truly out of the bottle and those who once had control over the new processes no longer have that power, as the science will have a momentum of its own, unheeding of belated attempts to stop it or slow it down. What is more, technology is often 'logically malleable', with far wider applications than even we can anticipate. Thus, say editors Sollie and Duwell, an anticipatory attitude is required towards dealing with new technology. This book addresses methodological issues with regard to the ethical evaluation of new and emerging technology. It focuses specifically on the concept of uncertainty that, unlike the notion of risk, is greatly undervalued in the field of ethics. It is a must-read for anyone involved in (ethical) technology assessment: philosophers, those involved in science and technology studies, and policy-makers alike.