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AbstractIn this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short‐lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.

ObjectivesThis article aims to investigate how local leaders' promotion is governed by the central state's concerns of maintaining political legitimacy in China.MethodsWe offer a theoretical framework regarding how to understand the statistical association between economic performance and local leaders' promotion in China. The empirical work is based on Probit models that were applied on a panel of data covering local leaders of 335 cities between 1999 and 2009.ResultsOur research confirms that a better record of relative local economic growth significantly boosts the promotion probability of the city‐level party secretary. However, the importance of economic work will significantly decrease if the cadres have strong open signals of their competence.ConclusionsThe findings in this article suggest that there exists a performance‐based screening scheme for selecting political elites in China. Portraying the positive image of political elites by the "tags" of their capacity in fostering economic development helps to boost both regime legitimacy and political authoritativeness in the Chinese‐style authoritative political regime.