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In: JPUBE-D-22-00803
SSRN
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 1225-1245
ISSN: 1468-0491
AbstractThis study examines how an important reform of local governance—village democracy—in the world's most populous areas has affected the happiness of residents in rural China. We find that introducing elections per se has no significant impact. In comparison, direct nomination of local leaders by villagers, which is a form of competitive election involving a high degree of public participation in political decision making, leads to higher levels of happiness. Further mechanism analyses show that direct nomination improves the local accountability of elected leaders by boosting the quality and effort of village heads and their governance performance by lowering the tax burden of villagers and vitalizing local public services. Our results highlight the importance of public participation in democracy and the underlying role of local accountability in affecting the subjective well‐beings of citizens.
In: (2022) Governance, 1– 21. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12738
SSRN
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 101, Heft 2, S. 557-583
ISSN: 1467-9299
AbstractThis study examines how ethnic diversity shapes the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in regimes such as China, where local accountability and resident mobility are largely absent. We argue that in these regimes, ethnic diversity largely captures potential social conflicts and instability, consequently requiring a higher level of fiscal centralization and regional equalization from upper‐level governments to preserve social stability. Using provincial and sub‐provincial level panel data from China for 1995–2019, we find strong supporting evidence that an increase in a province's ethnic diversity significantly increases fiscal centralization and the provincial government's fiscal equalization efforts. We also show that these effects tend to be stronger in provinces whose leaders have closer ties with the central authority and where local capture is less serious. Our study contributes to a better understanding of ethnic diversity's consequences on the policy choices governments make.
SSRN
In: China economic review, Band 59, S. 101371
ISSN: 1043-951X
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 59, S. 316-330
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 97, Heft 3, S. 680-700
SSRN
In: DEVEC-D-22-01437
SSRN
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 417-441
ISSN: 1467-6435
AbstractOur paper is the first to examine the impact of government‐firm collusion on firm tax avoidance in China by applying an instrumental variable approach. We take political turnover of local leaders as an external shock to the existing collusion and investigate firms' tax avoidance activities during local leadership transition. By using data on political turnover of prefectural leaders and listed firms from 2007 to 2014, we find that political turnover leads to the instability of existing collusion, and consequently a decrease in firm tax avoidance. This provides evidence of the pre‐existing collusion between government and firms. We then rule out the possibility that such change is driven by the effect of political uncertainty or tax competition by considering the heterogeneous effect of firms and cities. Finally, we show that firms' political connections, captured by political ties and ownership of firms, stabilize the existing collusion and help firms maintain their advantage while facing external political shocks.
In: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 16-06
SSRN
Working paper
In: OECD Fiscal Federalism Studies; Measuring Fiscal Decentralisation, S. 71-88
In: BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 20/2018
SSRN
This paper explores how fiscal incentives offered to local governments in China affect investment rates in their jurisdictions. Theoretically, we build a simple fiscal competition model to establish the linkage between local fiscal incentives and expenditure policy and consequently, capital movement. The key prediction of the model, borne out by data from Chinese provinces spanning 2004–2013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, which proxies fiscal incentives offered to local governments, motivates local governments to compete for capital investment through increased public expenditures. Our results contribute to the fiscal federalism literature by showing that local fiscal incentives significantly shape policy choices and local economic performance. In addition, by exploring fiscal incentives offered to local governments, we offer a novel explanation for the unusually high investment rate in China that has been sustained over a prolonged period of time.
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