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In this paper I argue that reform capacity, defined as the extent to which political institutions facilitate the adoption of socially efficient reforms, is not primarily determined by the number of veto players in the political system, but by the availability of institutional mechanisms that allow political agents to solve commitment problems associated with bargaining over reform. Specifically, I argue that power sharing is compatible with high reform capacity if policy areas involved in package deals are all controlled by the central government (or whatever level of government makes the reform), and if the 'losers' are confident that they will remain veto players in the future.

Economic crises tend to have important political consequences. The Great Depression in the 1930s led to political realignments in many democracies (such as Sweden and the United States), and even to the breakdown of democracy in some European countries (such as Austria and Germany). More recently, the deep economic downturns in the aftermaths of the first and second oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 marked the beginning of a period of "permanent austerity" in economic and social affairs (Pierson, 2001). The economic crises of the 1930s and the 1970s have been studied by generations of social scientists, and the literature on the political consequences of these two crises has generated important theoretical developments in political science. These events were not only exceptionally important in their own right; studying politics in periods when countries confront international economic crises also has methodological advantages, for when countries are exposed to common shocks, it becomes possible to examine the impact of institutions, party politics, and other factors that political scientists are concerned with (Gourevitch, 1986, 221). The current economic crisis, which began in 2007-2008, provides political scientists with a rare opportunity to study the political consequences of a deep economic crisis in real time. My research project, which will be carried out in the period 2010-2013, covers four of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), paying particular attention to Sweden, since the extensive literature on Swedish policy responses to the 1930s and 1970s crises allows for useful historical comparisons (single-country case studies include Lewin, 1967; Jonung, 1999; and Lindvall, 2004; influential comparative studies where Sweden is one of the cases include Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Gourevitch, 1986; Mjoset, 1987; Scharpf, 1991; Berman, 1998; Iversen, 1999; and Blyth, 2002, to name but a few). The first research question is why policy responses to economic crises vary among countries and over time. The second research question concerns the effects of economic crises on electoral politics and I mass political behavior. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper I argue that reform capacity, defined as the extent to which political institutions facilitate the adoption of socially efficient reforms, is not primarily determined by the number of veto players in the political system, but by the availability of institutional mechanisms that allow political agents to solve commitment problems associated with bargaining over reform. Specifically, I argue that power sharing is compatible with high reform capacity if policy areas involved in package deals are all controlled by the central government (or whatever level of government makes the reform), and if the 'losers' are confident that they will remain veto players in the future. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

A number of influential studies in political science argue that important economic policy changes in the rich democracies since the mid-1970s were caused by the introduction of new economic ideas. This article claims that while experts exert strong influence over the selection of policy instruments, their influence over the formulation of policy objectives is much weaker. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the predominance of Keynesianism in Austria and Denmark did not lead Austrian and Danish governments to maintain low unemployment longer than Sweden, where Keynesianism was less strong. But it did lead them to regard fiscal policy as an instrument that can be used to control the level of activity in the economy, while their Swedish counterparts relied instead on exchange rate and monetary policy. (World Politics / SWP)

A number of influential studies in political science argue that important economic policy changes in the rich democracies since the mid-1970s were caused by the introduction of new economic ideas. This article claims that while experts exert strong influence over the selection of policy instruments, their influence over the formulation of policy objectives is much weaker. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the predominance of Keynesianism in Austria and Denmark did not lead Austrian and Danish governments to maintain low unemployment longer than Sweden, where Keynesianism was less strong. But it did lead them to regard fiscal policy as an instrument that can be used to control the level of activity in the economy, while their Swedish counterparts relied instead on exchange rate and monetary policy.

The main challenge faced by case study researchers is how to make the most of a rich & varied body of evidence. One way of achieving this goal is to use a combination of analytical strategies. This paper presents three case study strategies -- the periodization strategy, the process-oriented strategy, & the counterfactual strategy -- discussing the methodological problems involved & suggesting ways of combining the strategies in order to produce high-quality case study research. References. Adapted from the source document.