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Argues that although technology can occasionally favor military offense or defense, perceptions of relative ease of offense and defense have little effect on decisions to initiate war; based on case studies of emergence of railroads, development of artillery and small arms, innovation of the tank, and the nuclear revolution, 19th-20th centuries.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Realism and Utopianism in World Affairs -- No Peace without Arms -- Perpetual Peace? -- Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism -- On the Study of International Relations -- World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century -- The Economic Road to War -- The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict -- The Study of International Politics -- Courage or Perdition? -- Beyond National Interest -- Reflections on the State of Political Science -- History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomatist -- The Role of the Learned Man in Government -- The Ethical Dimensions of Diplomacy -- Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism.

Do some technologies provoke war? Do others promote peace? Offense-defense theory contends that technological change is an important cause of conflict: leaders will be tempted to launch wars when they believe innovation favors attackers over defenders. Offense-defense theory is perhaps best known from the passionate and intricate debates about first-strike capability and deterrence stability during the cold war, but it has deeper historical roots, remains a staple in international relations theorizing, and drives modern arms control policymaking.In War and the Engineers, the first book systematically to test the logical and empirical validity of offense-defense theory, Keir A. Lieber examines the relationships among politics, technology, and the causes of war. Lieber's cases explore the military and political implications of the spread of railroads, the emergence of rifled small arms and artillery, the introduction of battle tanks, and the nuclear revolution. Lieber incorporates the new historiography of World War I, which draws on archival materials that only recently became available, to challenge many common beliefs about the conflict. The author's central conclusion is that technology is neither a cause of international conflict nor a panacea; instead, power politics remains paramount

This report is the product of collaboration between Keir Lieber, Daryl Press, the Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; "This report examines why and how regional powers armed with nuclear weapons may employ those weapons coercively against the United States or U.S. allies during a conventional war. We argue that the problem of intra-­†war deterrence -- preventing nuclear-­†armed adversaries from escalating during a conventional conflict -- is arguably the most important deterrence challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. The strategic environment facing the United States, its allies, and its potential adversaries has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For nearly four decades, the United States and its NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies planned to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves from a major Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The armies of the Warsaw Pact were perceived to be too formidable to confront with a strictly conventional defense -- at least at spending levels that would be acceptable to the North Atlantic alliance. Nuclear weapons were thus NATO's 'trump card': NATO planned to employ nuclear weapons coercively during a war to raise the costs and risks to the Warsaw Pact and thereby convince them to halt their military operations before they could inflict a total defeat on NATO. Today, the global balance of power is reversed. Now U.S. military forces are the most formidable, and potential U.S. adversaries need trump cards of their own to stalemate the United States. This reversal in the balance of power helps explain why the United States now seeks to delegitimize nuclear weapons and reduce their role in the world. Unfortunately, the same conditions that once made NATO rely on nuclear weapons will now likely compel other countries -- including several potential U.S. adversaries -- to rely upon nuclear weapons." ; Funded by the Naval Postgraduate School ; Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) ; Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted a rise in balancing against the United States. More recently, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Indeed, some analysts claim that signs of traditional hard balancing can already be detected, while others argue that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. grand strategy has generated a new phenomenon known as soft balancing, in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. There is little credible evidence, however, that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against the United States is not occurring because contemporary U.S. grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups. Most countries either share U.S. strategic interests in the war on terrorism or do not have a direct stake in the confict. As such, balancing behavior is likely only among a narrowly circumscribed list of states and actors being targeted by the United States.

The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: The Nuclear Puzzle -- 1. Power Politics in the Nuclear Age -- 2. Getting to Stalemate: How Much Is Enough? -- 3. Escaping Stalemate: The New Era of Counterforce -- 4. Deterrence under Stalemate: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation -- Conclusion: Solving the Nuclear Puzzle -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: The Nuclear Puzzle -- 1. Power Politics in the Nuclear Age -- 2. Getting to Stalemate: How Much Is Enough? -- 3. Escaping Stalemate: The New Era of Counterforce -- 4. Deterrence under Stalemate: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation -- Conclusion: Solving the Nuclear Puzzle -- Notes -- Index

Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so competitive? Indeed, why are today's major geopolitical rivalries intensifying? In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press tackle the central puzzle of the nuclear age: the persistence of intense geopolitical competition in the shadow of nuclear weapons. They explain why the Cold War superpowers raced so feverishly against each other; why the creation of "mutual assured destruction" does not ensure peace; and why the rapid technological changes of the 21st century will weaken deterrence in critical hotspots around the world. By explaining how the nuclear revolution falls short, Lieber and Press discover answers to the most pressing questions about deterrence in the coming decades: how much capability is required for a reliable nuclear deterrent, how conventional conflicts may become nuclear wars, and how great care is required now to prevent new technology from ushering in an age of nuclear instability.