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31 pages, 18 tables.-- JEL classification: C72, C78, D78, I20.-- Trabajo publicado como artículo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1860 ; The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy. ; The authors acknowledge support of Barcelona GSE Research Network and of the Government of Catalonia, Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (SEJ2005-01481, SEJ2005-01690 and FEDER), the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626) and the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006-00016) program. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Program. ; Peer reviewed

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. ; Nosotros estudiamos un problema de restitución de un bien indivisible (tierra o propiedad) sobre el que dos agentes tienen derechos de propiedad: la persona desposeída y el propietario actual. Un tercer agente, posiblemente el gobierno, busca resolver la situación asignando los derechos de propiedad a uno de los agentes y compensando al otro. Esta compensación no puede ser superior a un monto determinado por el tercer agente. Nosotros caracterizamos una familia de reglas que tienen consideraciones asimétricas de justicia, son inmunes al comportamientos estratégicos, garantizan niveles mínimos de bienestar a los agentes y satisfacen la restricción presupuestal.

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ''lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.