Suchergebnisse

The Palestinian leadership's serial rejection of the numerous opportunities for statehood since the Peel Commission report of 1937 casts a serious doubt on its interest in the creation of an independent state. Instead of engaging in the daunting tasks of nation-building and state creation, all Palestinian leaders without any exception have preferred to immerse their hapless constituents in disastrous conflicts that culminated in their collective undoing and continued statelessness. If subscription to the pan-Arab dream has made the Palestinian cause captive to inter-Arab machinations, stirring unrealistic hopes and expectations in Palestinian political circles and, at key junctures, inciting widespread and horrifically destructive violence that has made the likelihood of Palestinian statehood ever more remote, adherence to Islamist ideals has subordinated Palestinian identity to the far wider ambition of Islamic world domination. For nearly a century, Palestinian leaders have missed no opportunity to impede the development of Palestinian civil society and the attainment of Palestinian statehood. Adapted from the source document.

Had Israel lost the war, its territory would have been divided among the invading Arab forces. The name Palestine would have vanished into the dustbin of history. By surviving the pan-Arab assault, Israel has paradoxically saved the Palestinian national movement from complete oblivion. Self-serving interventionism under the pretence of pan-Arab solidarity has transformed the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli dispute into a multilateral Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby stirring unrealistic hopes and expectations in Palestinian political circles and, at key junctures, inciting widespread and horrifically destructive violence. The consequence has been to increase the intensity of the conflict and make its resolution far more complex and tortuous, leaving the Palestinians stateless for over six-and-a-half decades. The sooner the Palestinians reject this spurious link and recognize that their cause is theirs alone, the sooner are they likely to make their own peace with the existence of the Jewish state -- as stipulated by the 1947 partition resolution -- and win their own state at long last despite their Arab brothers. Adapted from the source document.

In the aftermath of Arafat's death, many political leaders have expressed the hope that there now exists a renewed opportunity for the creation of a peaceful settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This article explores two contending approaches to resolving the conflict: one, endorsed by George W. Bush, contends that there is little that outsiders can do to create a peaceful solution if the Palestinians do not want it; the other, endorsed by most other world leaders and followed through most of the past half century, suggests that the Arabs and Israelis can be forced into a lasting peace by outside influences. It is argued here that the latter view is mistaken. It is argued, furthermore, that even if combined US and European pressure succeeded in driving the Israelis and Palestinians into a formal peace treaty, such a pact would fail to eliminate violence or ameliorate terrorism in the wider Middle East. So long as the Palestinian territories continue to be led by people with ideals similar to those of Arafat, it is argued, there can be no lasting reconciliation with Israel.