Suchergebnisse

Can empirical data generate consensus about how to regulate firearms? If so, under what conditions? Previously, we presented evidence that individuals' cultural worldviews explain their positions on gun control more powerfully than any other fact about them, including their race or gender, the type of community or region of the country they live in, and even their political ideology or party affiliation. On this basis, we inferred that culture is prior to facts in the gun debate: empirical data can be expected to persuade individuals to change their view on gun policies only after those individuals come to see those policies as compatible with their core cultural commitments. We now respond to critics. Canvassing the psychological literature, we identify the mechanisms that systematically induce individuals to conform their factual beliefs about guns to their culturally grounded moral evaluations of them. To illustrate the strength and practical implications of these dynamics, we develop a series of computer simulations, which show why public beliefs about the efficacy of gun control can be expected to remain highly polarized even in the face of compelling empirical evidence. Finally, we show that the contribution culture makes to cognition could potentially be harnessed to generate broad, cross-cultural consensus: if gun policies can be framed in terms that are expressively compatible with diverse cultural worldviews, the motivation to resist compelling empirical evidence will dissipate, and individuals of diverse cultural persuasions can be expected rapidly to converge in their beliefs about what policies are best. Constructing a new, expressively pluralistic idiom of gun control should therefore be the first priority of policy-makers and -analysts interested in promoting the adoption of sound gun policies.

7 pages ; What are the respective contributions of culture and rationality to risk perception? Do disagreements between lay persons and experts (and among members of both groups) originate in conflicting values, differing abilities to comprehend technical information, or both? If conflicting values do play a role, should the law be responsive to popular perceptions of risk even when expert regulators believe that popular beliefs are w1'ong? These are the central questions in the debate between Professor Sunstein and us. We take the position that cultural worldviews pervade popular (not to mention expert) risk assessments and that a genuine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such perceptions as products of ''bounded rationality. "1 Sunstein disagrees.1 The critical impo1t of Sunstein 's arguments notwithstanding, we are grateful for his thoughtful reply to our review essay. We now respond to two of Sunstein 's criticisms, one methodological and the other substantive.

This research note presents evidence that political polarization over the reality of human-caused climate change increases in tandem with individuals' scores on a standard measure of actively open-minded thinking. This finding is at odds with the position that attributes political conflict over facts to a personality trait of closed-mindedness associated with political conservatism.