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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research -- 1. Introduction: Laboratory Macroeconomics -- 2. Dynamic, Intertemporal Optimization -- 2.1. Optimal Consumption/Savings Decisions -- 2.2. Exponential Discounting and Infinite Horizons -- 2.3. Exponential or Hyperbolic Discounting? -- 2.4. Expectation Formation -- 3. Coordination Problems -- 3.1. Poverty Traps -- 3.2. Bank Runs -- 3.3. Resolving Coordination Problems: Sunspots -- 3.4. Resolving Coordination Problems: The Global Game Approach -- 4. Fields in Macroeconomics -- 4.1. Monetary Economics -- 4.2. Labor Economics -- 4.3. International Economics -- 4.4. Multisectoral Macroeconomics -- 5. Macroeconomic Policies -- 5.1. Ricardian Equivalence -- 5.2. Commitment versus Discretion -- 5.3. Monetary Policy -- 5.4. Fiscal and Tax Policies -- 6. Conclusions -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2 Using Experimental Methods to Understand Why and How We Give to Charity -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Preferences for Giving -- 2.1. Is Giving Rational? -- 2.2. Motives -- 3. Fundraising -- 3.1. Announcements: Sequential and Dynamic Giving -- 3.2. Lotteries -- 3.3. Auctions -- 3.4. Rebates and Matches -- 4. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3 Neuroeconomics -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. Neurobiological Foundations -- 1.1. The Cellular Structure of the Brain -- 1.2. From Neurons to Networks -- 1.3. Summary of Neurobiology -- 2. Functional MRI: A Window into the Working Brain -- 2.1. Functional MRI and the BOLD Signal -- 2.2. Design Considerations -- 2.3. Image Analysis -- 2.4. Summary of Functional MRI -- 3. Risky Choice -- 3.1. Statistical Moments -- 3.2. Prospect Theory -- 3.3. Causal Manipulations -- 3.4. Logical Rationality and Biological Adaptation -- 3.5. Summary of Risky Choice -- 4. Intertemporal Choice and Self-regulation.

Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Contributors -- 1. Introduction to Experimental Economics -- I. A Brief History of Experimental Economics -- A. Early Experiments: 1930-1960 -- 1. Individual Choice and the Wallis-Friedman Critique -- 2. Game-Theoretic Hypotheses -- 3. Industrial Organization -- B. The 1960s to the Present -- II. The Uses of Experimentation -- III. Some Series of Experiments -- A. Prisoners' Dilemmas and Public Goods -- 1. The Prisoner's Dilemma -- a. Experiments versus Simulations: A Methodological Digression -- 2. The Free-Rider Problem in Public Goods Provision -- B. Coordination -- C. Bargaining Behavior -- D. Market Organization and Competitive Equilibrium -- 1. Repeated Double Auctions with Stationary Parameters -- 2. Some Policy-Oriented Comparisons of Market Rules -- 3. Information Aggregation: Markets as Forecasters -- E. Auction Markets and Disequilibrium Behavior -- 2. Some Other Auction Results -- a. Controlling Incentives: A Methodological Digression -- F. Individual Choice Behavior -- 1. Preference Reversals -- a. Alternative Theoretical Directions -- b. Market Behavior -- 2. Other Choice Phenomena -- 3. Why Haven't These Demonstrated Anomalies Swept Away Utility Theory? -- 4. Experimental Control of Individual Preferences -- a. The BDM Procedure for Measuring Reservation Prices -- b. Controlling Preferences with Monetary Payoffs -- c. Controlling for Unobserved Risk Preferences with Binary Lottery Payoffs -- (1) Preferences and Probabilities: A Historical Digression on Binary Lotteries and Related Experimental Designs -- d. To Control or Not to Control? Costs and Benefits -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research -- I. Introduction -- A. A Simple Public Goods Experiment -- B. The Art of Experiment: Sensitivity and Control.

Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Contributors -- 1. Introduction to Experimental Economics -- I. A Brief History of Experimental Economics -- A. Early Experiments: 1930-1960 -- 1. Individual Choice and the Wallis-Friedman Critique -- 2. Game-Theoretic Hypotheses -- 3. Industrial Organization -- B. The 1960s to the Present -- II. The Uses of Experimentation -- III. Some Series of Experiments -- A. Prisoners' Dilemmas and Public Goods -- 1. The Prisoner's Dilemma -- a. Experiments versus Simulations: A Methodological Digression

We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.

Macroeconomics : a survey of laboratory research /John Duffy --Using experimental methods to understand why and how we give to charity /Lise Vesterlund --Neuroeconomics /Colin F. Camerer, Jonathan D. Cohen, Ernst Fehr, Paul W. Glimcher, and David Laibson --Other-regarding preferences : a selective survey of experimental results /David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel --Experiments in market design /Alvin E. Roth --Experiments in political economy /Thomas R. Palfrey --Experimental economics across subject populations /Guillaume R. Fréchette --Gender /Muriel Niederle --Auctions : a survey of experimental research /John H. Kagel and Dan Levin --Learning and the economics of small decisions /Ido Erev and Ernan Haruvy.

This book details the results of the authors' research using laboratory animals to investigate individual choice theory in economics-consumer-demand and labour supply behaviour and choice under uncertainty. The use of laboratory animals provides the opportunity to conduct controlled experiments involving precise and demanding tests of economic theory with rewards and punishments of real consequence. Economic models are compared to psychological and biological choice models along with the results of experiments testing between these competing explanations. Results of animal experiments are used to address questions of social policy importance

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the "mixed" region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the 'mixed' region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer ower is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning. (JEL D44, D83, J16)