Suchergebnisse

Advances in science and technology, the rise of globalization, the emergence of new diseases, and the changing nature of conflict have increased the risks posed by naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. A growing acceptance of a broader definition of security since the end of the Cold War has facilitated the rise of biosecurity issues on the international security agenda. Developing strategies to counter biological threats is complicated by the lack of agreement on the definition of biosecurity, the diverse range of biological threats, and competing perspectives on the most pressing biological threats. A comprehensive definition of biosecurity that encompasses naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks can help to further research, analysis, and policymaking. Operationalizing this broad conception of biosecurity requires a taxonomy of biological threats based on a levels-of-analysis approach that identifies which types of actors are potential sources of biological threats and the groups most at risk from these threats. A biosecurity taxonomy can provide a common framework for the multidisciplinary research and analysis necessary to assess and manage these risks. It also has implications for how to prevent and respond to biological threats, as well as for the future of biosecurity research.

AbstractThe specter of the 1918‐1919 influenza pandemic, which killed an estimated 40‐100 million people worldwide, hangs over analyses of and responses to the current pandemic of swine‐origin novel influenza A (H1N1). There are four major differences between today and 1918 that reduce the likelihood that the current pandemic—or the next one—will be as deadly as the one in 1918. Today we have advance warning of the threat of a highly lethal influenza pandemic, we have a global human health surveillance and response system, we have new medical countermeasures, and there is no global conflict like World War I to act as an incubator and vector for a highly lethal influenza virus and an impediment to medical and public health responses to the pandemic.

The investigation of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the United States gave a strong impetus to the new discipline of microbial forensics, which involves the use of sophisticated genetic, chemical and physical techniques to characterise a pathogen or toxin agent that has been used as a weapon. Microbial forensic evidence can assist in the process of attribution, or identifying the country, group, or individual responsible for a biological attack, in order to pursue legal prosecution or military retaliation. An effective attribution capability can also play an important role in deterring biological warfare and terrorism. (Survival / SWP)