Simulation Modeling in Political Science
In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 42, Heft 10, S. 1509-1530
ISSN: 0002-7642
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In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 42, Heft 10, S. 1509-1530
ISSN: 0002-7642
In: Public choice, Band 88, Heft 3-4, S. 309-331
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 299-330
ISSN: 1460-3667
This paper presents results of simulation models of democratic government in voluntary organizations. The models explore the impact of changes in the institutions that control exit and entry into the organization as well as some basic parameters that determine the distribution of preferences. Results indicate the following. First, democratically governed groups evolve in ways that are not predictable from information about the nature of the preferences in the society from which they are drawn. Rather, the long-run membership and policy stances of a group depend on an intricate evolutionary process that links membership adjustments with democratically determined policy shifts. Second, the evolutionary process is significantly affected by the overall willingness of people to join groups as well as the way that people are selected to participate in the group's first meetings. The implications for the formation of new interest groups are discussed.
In: Public choice, Band 88, Heft 3-4, S. 309-332
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 299-330
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 377-396
In: Rationality and society, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 399-401
ISSN: 1461-7358
In: European journal of political economy, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 377-396
ISSN: 0176-2680
In an exploration of the logic of political competition between interest groups, an attempt is made to show how a general model of group allocation of resources can be simplified so that it is equivalent with G. Tullock's well-known rent-seeking game model ("Efficient Rent-Seeking" in Buchanan, J. M., et al [Eds], Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M U Press, 1980) of government resource allocation. After the existence of equilibrium is investigated, comparative statistics results illustrating the impact of changes in the players' preferences are presented. The analysis is conducted within the framework of a two-person game & an "imperfectly discriminating" government response to interest group pressure. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Formal Theories of Politics, S. 397-404
In: International series in modern applied mathematics and computer science volume 20
Front Cover; Pergamon Titles of Related Interest; Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; EDITORIAL FOREWORD; FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS: THE SCOPE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODELS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; ABOUT THE ARTICLES; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; PART 1: MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODELS OFLEGISLATIVE DECISION; CHAPTER 1. LIMITS ON AGENDA CONTROL INSPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. AGENDA CONTROL; 3. MAJORITY RULE IN SPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 4. AGENDA PROPOSITIONS; 5. CONCLUSIONS.
In: Review of policy research, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 187-204
ISSN: 1541-1338
AbstractRecent highly publicized traffic accidents involving older drivers have led to renewed interest in state policies and administrative practices that award and renew drivers' licenses in the American states. Because the probability of traffic accidents is linked to the medical conditions that are more prevalent among the elderly, and because the number of older drivers is expected to rise over the next several decades, one might expect that this will be an increasingly important policy issue. This article discusses variations that are observed across states in law and administrative practice. A longitudinal analysis of data on crashes involving elderly drivers in fifteen states indicates that crash rates are directly related to the length of the renewal cycle for older drivers and inversely related to the stringency of testing at renewal. It is also likely that states requiring physicians to report conditions that would impair driving will experience lower crash rates. A secondary analysis of policy impacts on the licensing rates is not conclusive, a finding that is attributable to inaccuracies in the reported numbers of licensed drivers.
In: The review of policy research: RPR ; the politics and policy of science and technology ; journal of the Science, Technology, and Environmental Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 187-204
ISSN: 1541-132X
Recent highly publicized traffic accidents involving older drivers have led to renewed interest in state policies & administrative practices that award & renew drivers' licenses in the American states. Because the probability of traffic accidents is linked to the medical conditions that are more prevalent among the elderly, & because the number of older drivers is expected to rise over the next several decades, one might expect that this will be an increasingly important policy issue. This article discusses variations that are observed across states in law & administrative practice. A longitudinal analysis of data on crashes involving elderly drivers in fifteen states indicates that crash rates are directly related to the length of the renewal cycle for older drivers & inversely related to the stringency of testing at renewal. It is also likely that states requiring physicians to report conditions that would impair driving will experience lower crash rates. A secondary analysis of policy impacts on the licensing rates is not conclusive, a finding that is attributable to inaccuracies in the reported numbers of licensed drivers. 2 Tables, 4 Figures, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 575
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 575-598
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: The family coordinator, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 488