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The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections.

We introduce an approach for the empirical study of the quantity theory of money (QTM) that is novel both with respect to the specific steps taken as well as the general methodology employed. Empirical studies of the QTM have focused directly on the relationship between the rate of change of the money stock and inflation. We believe that this is an inferior starting point for several reasons and focus instead on the Cambridge form of the QTM. We find that the coefficient k fluctuates strongly in the short run, but has a low and steady rate of change in the long run, which makes the QTM a useful instrument for the long-run control of inflation. An important finding that contradicts all of the previous literature is that the QTM holds for low inflation as well as for high inflation. We discuss how our findings relate to monetarism generally and propose an adaption of McCallum's rule for a Friedmanian monetary policy.