Stuck in the Mud: Parties and Party Systems in Democratic Southeast Asia
In: Taiwan journal of democracy, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 23-46
ISSN: 1815-7238
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In: Taiwan journal of democracy, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 23-46
ISSN: 1815-7238
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. xiii-xiv
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 26-46
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 187-204
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 180-186
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 149-179
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 116-148
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 86-115
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 47-85
In: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies, S. 1-25
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 162, S. 1-11
World Affairs Online
In: Contemporary Southeast Asia
ISSN: 1793-284X
World Affairs Online
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 785-803
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractResearch in legislative politics suggests that the desire to get reelected encourages legislators to "bring home the pork"—by delivering electorally rewarding, targeted spending. This is particularly true where the electoral system encourages incumbents to cultivate a personal vote. We analyze how Philippine Senators spend their Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and using the staggered elections to identify variation in reelection status, we show that senatorial reelectionists do not always bring home the pork. Because Philippine Senators are elected by plurality-at-large voting by the national electorate, they tend to spend their CDF allotments closer to elections but avoid allocating them disproportionately to their local strongholds. These findings illustrate how electoral rules can deter targeted spending but lead legislators to find alternative ways to build a personal vote.
Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors shield them from the influence of vote buying? We explore the role of both formal and informal social networks in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with private inducements. We argue that when the poor lack access to formal social networks, they become increasingly reliant on vote buying channelled through informal networks. To test our theory, we build the informal, family-based network linkages between voters and local politicians spanning a city in the Philippines. We then collect survey data on formal network connections, electoral handouts, and voting behaviour of 900 voters randomly drawn from these family networks. We show first that campaigns disproportionately target poorer voters. We then show that familial ties further influence targeting among poor voters. Finally, we show that access to formal networks such as workers' associations mitigate voter fears of punishment for failing to reciprocate.
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