Suchergebnisse

Abstract
While most international relations (IR) scholars tend to minimize the effect of relations between statespersons on foreign policy, this article argues that interpersonal relationships have more weight than the literature suggests. On the basis of twenty-one interviews conducted with senior Israeli statespersons, we propose a two-level model-linking positive interaction between statespersons and actual consequences at the state level. At the personal level, positive interactions can create receptiveness, build trust, facilitate accessibility and availability, and advance personal commitment. Translating these outcomes into consequences at the state level is mediated either by persuasion or by commitment. If persuasion is effective or there exists a high level of personal commitment, statespersons are more likely to succeed in mobilizing international support, removing obstacles to agreements, gathering sensitive information, and diffusing interstate tension. We conclude by discussing the limitations and advantages of good personal relations between statespersons and their implications for IR practice and theory.

International Relations scholars and practitioners commonly agree that relationships in world politics are managed impersonally. Personal connections between agents of states are perceived as having only little impact on foreign policy of states. The current article challenges this impersonal ethos, suggesting that personal relationships play an important role in conducting, and thus understanding, interstate relations. Interviews conducted with 21 senior Israeli officials concerning mundane professional practices reveal three elements that are essential for successful statecraft: acknowledging the power of interpersonal relations; substantive knowledge of counterparts; and the excellent communicative competencies needed to realize the potential of personal connections. We argue that statespersons' behavior can be located on an impersonal-interpersonal continuum. Furthermore, we suggest explanations for deviations from the impersonal ethos and discuss the role of interpersonal practices in managing interstate relations. At the very least, the personal aspect should be taken into consideration when examining foreign policy. However, personal relations may have a highly significant impact on interstate interactions, thus requiring a revision of the current paradigm in IR, which marginalizes the personal aspect.

This article claims that normative arguments play a greater role in negotiations than existing scholarship implies. While the approaches of communicative and rhetorical action limit the use of arguments to environments that meet certain conditions, in fact normative arguments are widely used and can be found in almost every example of negotiations. This article seeks to explain this phenomenon. Negotiating parties that feel obligated to tackle normative arguments raised by the opposing side – either because of the presence of an audience or to maintain its reputation – have a number of tools at their disposal. Negotiators who are unsuccessful in tackling these arguments will tend to offer a proposal that is more attractive to the other side. Although normative arguments do not generally have a sweeping influence on the outcome of negotiations, they are still likely to play a significant role. The article applies this theoretical framework to the case of the lengthy negotiations between the EEC and Israel, in which the former had no material motivation and desire to cede to Israel's demands and nevertheless did so.

This paper conceptualizes the phenomenon of revenge in international politics and seeks to specify the conditions that increase or diminish the tendency of states to take revenge against enemies. We situate the discussion of revenge within the broader context of emotions in IR. We argue that whether or not a state will take revenge depends on the combinations of three interrelated and mutually constitutive variables: (1) the degree to which a state emotionally experiences harm against it as morally outrageous, (2) the extent of humiliation the harmed state feels, and (3) the degree to which international retaliation is institutionalized by rules and laws that govern the use of cross-border force. We examine the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) as a case of revenge in international politics. Adapted from the source document.

State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilize political change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming' are often ineffective, suggesting that policy makers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violating norms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allow them to pursue policies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomena that provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion, while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theory by examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel's political agenda during the first decade of its existence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparation agreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political forums.

The study examines whether defeat in war increases the probability that states will be involved in an international crisis (as a diversionary policy), enter a process of political liberalization, or alternatively, curtail political rights. More generally, it examines the impact of the leaders' weakness on their tendency to adopt these different strategies in order to overcome internal unrest. We look at defeat in war as an indicator of the leader's weakness since we can assume a strong correlation exists between the two. The results showed a significant positive connection to political rights liberalization, indicating that defeat in war increases the probability of liberalization in political rights but does not significantly increase the probability of de-liberalization and diversionary policies. Therefore, the study strengthens the claim that a leader's weakness tends to push him or her toward initiating political reforms.

Abstract
This study questions to what extent state agents invest efforts in building interpersonal relations with their counterparts. It is based on data collected during two years of ethnographic fieldwork at the Israeli president's residence, where we observed credential ceremonies involving ambassadors from twenty-three states and interviewed the president's advisors. We consider the credential ceremony an extreme case study regulated by highly formalized protocol, including the strictest guidelines existing in the world of diplomacy. We assume that if relation-building between statespersons takes place in the most unexpected spaces of international politics, we can detect it in all sites of diplomacy. Adopting a relational practice approach, we identified two methods of positive signaling for relationship building: preplanned by the organizers "from above," directed at the individual-as-state-representative, and conveyed by participants "from below," targeting the individual-as-guest/host. We conclude by discussing the implications of the prevalence of interpersonal relation-building in international politics, the role of diplomatic protocols as a communicative resource that affects the diplomatic environment, and how the concept of affordances provides a fresh look at one of the most fundamental debates in the field of IR: the relationship between agency and structure.

Reminiscing during foreign state visits serves as a discursive means for building interstate relationships. When political leaders strategically narrate their states' historical legacies, they construct a collective memory that serves as a resource for creating and sustaining amicable relations between states. Studying evocations of past events in 455 speeches delivered during foreign state visits between 2010 and 2020, we demonstrate the prevalence and significance of the practice of reminiscing in interstate politics. We suggest bonding narratives as a device through which a connection is generated between two collectives to create and sustain positive relations. Despite the unique nature of bonding narratives, the constructed collective memory mostly relies on shared memories of wars, once again underlining the link between nations and violence.

Personal commitments are a ubiquitous but undertheorized phenomenon in the everyday wheels of world politics. While resonating with multiple threads in international relations theory, the role of individuals' commitments in statecraft, diplomacy, and foreign policy has hardly been addressed in and of itself. Drawing on insights from symbolic interactionism and organizational psychology, this article conceptualizes the notion of commitment highlighting its omnipresence in foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Specifically, the article demonstrates the analytical cache of the notion of commitment by focusing on moments when state-agents deviated from their commitment to the national interest, acting on behalf of other foci of commitment. Relying on Israeli, French, and EU diplomatic archives, we examine three illustrative case studies that show how and why state-agents dedicate time, energy, and resources to advance interests other than those of the state.

Abstract
The goal of this study is to capture the meaning of interstate friendship from the perspective of international
actors and to underline the benefits of analyzing speech acts as a tool for revealing the relational scripts that guide interstate
relations. Analysis of the discourse surrounding 215 assertions of friendship made by statespersons in a variety of diplomatic
encounters and cultural contexts allows us to identify the factors that state actors articulate to develop friendly interstate
relations, the practices expected from a friendly state, and the goals attributed to practices of friendship. In the Conclusion we
discuss the differences between interpersonal and interstate friendships, and how the speech act of friendship plays a part in the
construction of interstate relations.