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The proposition that security threats can drive states to pool their sovereignty has been around for some time. The existence of these threats, according to William Riker, is a necessary condition for political unification. A less common argument centers on linguistic homogeneity; it asserts that states must be sufficiently similar and speak the same language before they can successfully imagine a common state. This paper tests both hypotheses in a large-N analysis that identifies all instances of voluntary political unification between 1816 and 2001. It takes the form of a falsification probe and examines whether any unification happened in the absence of either an external security threat or a common language. It finds that political unification has occurred in relatively tranquil settings, but that all unifying dyads have shared a common language. Security threats are not a necessary condition, but a common language may well be. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractIt is thought that political order in premodern Europe was characterized by overlapping and crosscutting forms of authority. Scholars have called this heteronomy, arguing that it preceded and may follow the modern sovereign state system and that it has characterized various historical locales around the world. We maintain that this conception has been under-examined, and we identity three different forms of heteronomy that existed historically. These include: (1) interstitial heteronomy, where polities with limited capacity in low-density regions experience zones of informal mixed rule on the frontier; (2) functional heteronomy, where states in thickly populated systems develop complex patterns of functional differentiation; and (3) personalistic heteronomy, where power that is invested in individuals rather than territorially defined polities can produce patterns of dual vassalage. We develop a theory of heteronomy based on the density of the system (low, high) and the nature of political relations (territorial, personal), and using the resulting two-dimensional map we explore the form of heteronomy that existed and may exist in different systems across time and space. We conclude that when scholars envisage heteronomy in the modern system, it is mostly functional, and not interstitial or personalistic heteronomy, which they have in mind.

How have the structures of state systems varied over time and space? We outline a game theoretic model of the decision by political units to accept offers of graded sovereignty from imperial centers. We conceptualize four types of sovereign bargains – tributary, informal extractive, suzerain, and departmental – as a function of whether a polity has external sovereignty and whether resources flow from the subordinate polity to the imperial center through transfers or direct extraction. We then specify the payoffs for these bargains and theorize how increasing interaction capacity and international competition shape the structure of state systems. We show how increasing interaction capacity is related to the transition from transfers to extraction while international competition plays a role only when interaction capacity is already high. We demonstrate the applicability of our model with case studies from low- and high-density environments during the early modern period, respectively: (1) The Oyo Empire of western Africa; (2) Mysore of south Asia.

AbstractThere are more than 60 secessionist movements around the world, and they all advance arguments for why they deserve independence. These include a history of conflict with the state, illegal occupation and the democratic right to choose independence, among others. Yet no one has conducted a comparative analysis to see how these claims stack up and examined whether some movements actually deserve independence more than others. In this article, we construct a dataset of secessionist grievances. We develop a set of grievance indicators, we specify how they are operationalized and we detail how the grievances are categorized and aggregated. We then tally the results for each contemporary movement and discuss the broader patterns. Our findings show that the secessionist movements with the highest combined scores are, in order, the Saharawis, Palestinians, Tamils, Kachins and Cabindans. The nations with the lowest scores are the Scots and the Faroese.

Mindful of the growing interest in non-Western and pre-modern political systems, we propose a framework for the analysis of states, state systems, and international orders. We provide a culturally neutral definition of the state and outline a method for assessing variation in political organization both within and above the state. Our framework cleanly delineates hierarchy from anarchy and can be applied to a diverse set of state systems. We then show how the content of international order inter-relates with system structure and the local density (interaction capacity) of a region. We argue that our framework captures similarities—and exposes differences—between different systems and orders over time and space. It strikes a balance between the traditional focus on the Western experience and the current trend toward regional studies in which it is difficult to accumulate knowledge in a rigorous manner.

We introduce version 2 of the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), a register of sovereign states across the 1816–2016 period that include numerous states that are missed in commonly used datasets like the Correlates of War (COW) Project. Whereas ISD version 1 identified 363 states between 1816 and 2011, version 2 identifies 482. This version also records valuable information on a range of corollary variables, including start dates, end dates, estimated population sizes, diplomatic relations with Europe, conflict episodes, the existence of borders, and the location of capital cities. This dataset makes an important contribution to the study of international relations. It provides a more accurate understanding of the development of the international system over the last two centuries, it moves beyond the Eurocentric bias that sits at the heart of existing quantitative IR scholarship, and it will enable scholars to pursue a range of research topics such as the historical importance of state borders and boundaries, the practices surrounding recognition, and the frequency and intensity of conflict across regions. In this article, we discuss the existing state system membership lists and show how the ISD addresses their shortcomings. We outline the key concept and operationalization of statehood that the ISD adopts. We detail the variables included in this version of the ISD, discuss the data collection process, and show temporal and spatial distributions that illustrate the uniqueness of the ISD. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of bringing the ISD into one of many potential research topics: the study of conflict.

Recent research suggests that the strategic use of violence may increase a group's chance of gaining independence. We investigate this topic using comprehensive data on all secessionist movements between 1900 and 2006 and an original data set on the institutional and extrainstitutional methods that secessionists have used from 1946 to 2011. Our analysis yields several important findings. First, strategy depends on context. Not all secessionist movements are the same, and many have legal and/or institutional routes to independence that shape the methods that they employ. Second, no secessionist movement challenging a contiguous state has won its sovereignty without using institutional methods, either exclusively or in combination with extrainstitutional methods. Finally, we identify four successful combinations of secessionist methods and discuss how these movements develop in relation to their strategic setting. Overall, we find no evidence that violence helps a secessionist movement to gain independence.

Recent research suggests that the strategic use of violence may increase a group's chance of gaining independence. We investigate this topic using comprehensive data on all secessionist movements between 1900 and 2006 and an original data set on the institutional and extrainstitutional methods that secessionists have used from 1946 to 2011. Our analysis yields several important findings. First, strategy depends on context. Not all secessionist movements are the same, and many have legal and/or institutional routes to independence that shape the methods that they employ. Second, no secessionist movement challenging a contiguous state has won its sovereignty without using institutional methods, either exclusively or in combination with extrainstitutional methods. Finally, we identify four successful combinations of secessionist methods and discuss how these movements develop in relation to their strategic setting. Overall, we find no evidence that violence helps a secessionist movement to gain independence.