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In contrast to recent successful developments in macro monetary policies, the modelling, measurement and management of systemic financial stability has remained problematical. Indeed, the focus of most effort has been on improving individual, rather than systemic, bank risk management; the Basel II objective has been to bring regulatory bank capital into line with the (sophisticated) banks' assessment of their own economic capital. Even at the individual bank level there are concerns over (i) appropriate diversification allowances, (ii) differing objectives of banks and regulators, (iii) the need for a buffer over regulatory minima, and (iv) the distinction between expected and unexpected losses (EL and UL). At the systemic level the quite complex and prescriptive content of Basel II raises dangers of 'endogenous risk' and procyclicality. Simulations suggest that this latter could be a serious problem.

In 1989 The Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Act Gave The Rbnz the operational independence to vary monetary instruments, in particular to control the level of short-term money market rates, in such a way as to hold inf lation within a stated range over a stated period of time. That numerical range and period were to be agreed in a contractual arrangement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor, and the Governor was to be held personally responsible for achieving those agreed objectives.

Given the long and variable time lags between interest rate changes and responses in output and inflation, an inflation forecast must lie at the heart of monetary policy. In the UK the Bank's inflation forecast and Report were developed when the interest rate decision still lay with the Chancellor. Its, largely unchanged, continuation has led to certain tensions once that decision was delegated to a Monetary Policy Committee of independently responsible experts. In this paper the question is raised whether such a Committee should be jointly and individually responsible for the inflation forecast, and what might be considered as alternative procedures.

AbstractThis paper examines the problems of the transition to EMU, on the assumption that stage 3 of the EMU process begins in 1999. A number of issues are addressed, ranging from the attachment to national countries to problems of fiscal adjustment in the final path to EMU, and I suggest that the Maastricht fiscal criteria may turn out to be more flexible than many commentators suggest. Other problems relate to the possibility of a final parity realignment between the participants of EMU, and the relationship between those countries joining EMU, and the excluded countries. Finally, the paper concludes that there is no need to rush quickly from stage 3A to stage 3A to stage 3B of the EMU process until public and political support for the introduction of the Euro is built up.

Figures published in the Hospital In-Patient Enquiry (1967), and also for a population of known size in Aberdeen, confirm a previous conclusion, derived primarily from mortality statistics, that currently accepted estimates of 100,000 illegal abortions in Great Britain each year before the Abortion Act 1967 came into operation are much exaggerated. A National Opinion Polls estimate of 31,000 is also regarded as too high, and the Aberdeen data suggest that the true figure probably did not exceed 20,000. It is important to arrive at an accurate estimate for the proper assessment of the demographic and other effects of the change in the law. The Registrar General's figures for legal terminations during the first months' operation of the Act are discussed in a postscript.