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International audience ; This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We test them on a sample where the analysts' discretionary evaluations are minimal, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We test them on a sample where the analysts' discretionary evaluations are minimal, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.

International audience ; This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.

In this paper, we aim at evaluating from an economic perspective the recent Italian legislation on transparency to investigate whether the potentialities of transparency as a tool to improve performance and integrity are fully exploited. We first construct a synthetic indicator (CTI) consisting of two sub-indicators, CTI Integrity and CTI Performance, which are able to describe in numerical terms the overall degree of transparency of Italian public administrations as well as the two different aspects of the public activity's transparency. Then, using as a sample of Italian municipalities, we address the question whether there is a relation between the fulfillment of transparency obligations and both the institutional quality and the performance of the public administration activity. Our preliminary results suggest that our transparency indicators show a satisfactory correlation with widely used measures of the quality of institutions as well as with the official data on municipalities public spending performance. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper extends the empirical literature about the effects of fiscal decentralization on the growth of government along three dimensions. It distinguishes between the effects of the level of decentralization from the way local governments finance their expenditures (common pool versus own resources); it uses a panel cointegration approach to separate the long run effects of decentralization from the short run dynamics; and it extends and revises the datasets generally used in these empirical analyses. The results show that the amount of revenue raised by sub-national governments leads to a long-term fall in the size of government but grants have the opposite effect. In addition, a greater decentralization of expenditure leads to greater overall spending. When the short-term is considered these influences work slowly, as the speed of adjustment towards the desired government size is relatively sluggish. In addition, in the short run, there is also a clear effect from the role of local revenue raising powers that stimulates the growth of government. These results appear robust to changes in the composition of the variables, countries and periods included the sample. Adapted from the source document.

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian Regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials between the Northern and the Southern regions, we also analyze the interaction between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth.

[Abstract] This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian Regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials between the Northern and the Southern regions, we also analyze the interaction between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian Regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials between the Northern and the Southern regions, we also analyze the interaction between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth.

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth in the Italian Regions. We estimate a dynamic growth model for the period 1980-2004 addressing both the potential bias of the measures of corruption and the endogeneity between corruption and economic development. We find strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and growth. Moreover, since government intervention has been traditionally used to reduce income differentials between the Northern and the Southern regions, we also analyze the interaction between corruption and government expenditure. Our results indicate that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth.

This paper focuses on the issue of the electoral & ideological cycles in state government budget for the 11 Western German Lander. We verify this hypothesis over the period 1974-1994 for the following budgetary variables: total expenditures, surplus/deficit, administration, health care, education, roads, & social security benefits. While overall our results seem to show that generally the party variable does not play a systematic role in spending decisions, they provide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showing that the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of the upcoming election on government spending inclinations. 5 Tables, 1 Appendix, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.