During recent years in France, the number of HIV infections in the gay community has been constantly increasing. How can we explain the number of transmissions being still so prevalent? Since the arrival effective therapies, HIV may no longer be perceived as a fatal disease, and therefore it may have become trivialized. This paper will merge variables linked to homophobia and interiorized homophobia in order to bring a new insight in understanding to the motivations of gay men having non protected sex, whether it is systematic or episodic. Interiorized homophobia appears to be an essential element of the construction of the identity among gay men. A real "coping strategy", it allows firstly a protection from the surrounding environment, but in a second step becomes harmful to the development of healthy self-esteem. Gay men partially construct their identity from elements such as heterosexism and insults targeting gays as feminine, submissive individuals. We suggest that unprotected sex between men answers a quest for identity. On the one hand, there is an act of virility with unprotected sex and transmission of seminal fluids and exposure to a risk, reinforcing the masculine side. On the other hand, we can see identification with homophobic rejection, and becoming the carrier of a contagious, chronic, rejected disease. It is in this status of rejection—the transfer from homophobia to the disease—that gay men may find themselves. This paper proposes to approach the phenomenon in a replay of previous contributions on this topic.
Policy makers have for many years taken for granted that implementing dedicated structures aimed at supporting start-ups had a positive impact on the development of those start-ups. Indeed, building on insights provided by the literature on National/Regional Innovation Systems (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Cooke et al. 1998; Asheim et al. 2003) and Incubations mechanisms (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Phan et al., 2005; Bergek and Norman, 2008; Bruneel et al, 2012) policy makers perceive such "business incubators" as a way to promote regional economic growth through the support of young and innovative firms. The underlying assumption is that incubators help young firms to develop their innovative products, commercialize them, and maintain a sustainable growth during the start-up period. As a consequence local policy makers have been and still are very enthusiastic in establishing and/or granting financial supports to incubators. For example, the National Business Incubation Association estimates that the number of incubators in the United States has increased from 12 in 1980 to 1,250 in 2012 and that there were about 7,000 such structures across the world. However, there is surprisingly little empirical validation of the positive impact of those structures, with few or no evaluation of their long term performance in helping incubated firms (Vanderstraeten et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2011). As a result, there is evidence of potential political pressure to keep some results under the radar (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2008; Amezcua, 2010; Bergek and Normann, 2008; Mian, 1997). Indeed, some studies indicate that among the new firms incubated, few became fast-growing firms and/or reached the status of middle-sized companies (Schwartz, 2011; Amezcua, 2010; Barringer, Jones and Neubaum, 2005; Phan, Siegel, and Wright, 2005). Besides the above-mentioned mixed research results (Amezcua, 2010; Phan, Siegel, and Wright, 2005), related methodological, theoretical, and empirical limitations (Yu and Nijkamp, 2009) raise criticism about incubator performance studies. Furthermore, those studies rely upon either quantitative (accounting) data available about the incubated start-ups to measure their development, or the qualitative coding and interpretation of interviews using standard content analysis techniques (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). (See for example Barringer, Jones and Neubaum, 2005, with both suffering from the typical limitations of such approaches). In particular it remains largely unknown whether incubation really helps overcoming the resource deficiencies that young firms face in the first years after their market entry (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Stinchcomb, 1965). Overall, an assessment of public policies regarding incubators is still needed (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; OECD, 2006; Mian, 1996a; Mian, 1997). Moreover, there are few studies investigating the impact of incubation on incubated ventures' performance from their own point of view (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2008; Schwartz, 2013; Vanderstraeten et al., 2014). As a consequence, research call for more qualitative bottom-up approach (see Diez, 2001) to explore the impact of incubators' support on incubated firms. In particular, how do incubators create a context that helps firms bring together the various resources they need (Hellmann & Puri, 2002)?
Policy makers have for many years taken for granted that implementing dedicated structures aimed at supporting start-ups had a positive impact on the development of those start-ups. Indeed, building on insights provided by the literature on National/Regional Innovation Systems (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Cooke et al. 1998; Asheim et al. 2003) and Incubations mechanisms (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Phan et al., 2005; Bergek and Norman, 2008; Bruneel et al, 2012) policy makers perceive such "business incubators" as a way to promote regional economic growth through the support of young and innovative firms. The underlying assumption is that incubators help young firms to develop their innovative products, commercialize them, and maintain a sustainable growth during the start-up period. As a consequence local policy makers have been and still are very enthusiastic in establishing and/or granting financial supports to incubators. For example, the National Business Incubation Association estimates that the number of incubators in the United States has increased from 12 in 1980 to 1,250 in 2012 and that there were about 7,000 such structures across the world. However, there is surprisingly little empirical validation of the positive impact of those structures, with few or no evaluation of their long term performance in helping incubated firms (Vanderstraeten et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2011). As a result, there is evidence of potential political pressure to keep some results under the radar (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2008; Amezcua, 2010; Bergek and Normann, 2008; Mian, 1997). Indeed, some studies indicate that among the new firms incubated, few became fast-growing firms and/or reached the status of middle-sized companies (Schwartz, 2011; Amezcua, 2010; Barringer, Jones and Neubaum, 2005; Phan, Siegel, and Wright, 2005). Besides the above-mentioned mixed research results (Amezcua, 2010; Phan, Siegel, and Wright, 2005), related methodological, theoretical, and empirical limitations (Yu and Nijkamp, 2009) raise criticism about incubator performance studies. Furthermore, those studies rely upon either quantitative (accounting) data available about the incubated start-ups to measure their development, or the qualitative coding and interpretation of interviews using standard content analysis techniques (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). (See for example Barringer, Jones and Neubaum, 2005, with both suffering from the typical limitations of such approaches). In particular it remains largely unknown whether incubation really helps overcoming the resource deficiencies that young firms face in the first years after their market entry (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Stinchcomb, 1965). Overall, an assessment of public policies regarding incubators is still needed (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; OECD, 2006; Mian, 1996a; Mian, 1997). Moreover, there are few studies investigating the impact of incubation on incubated ventures' performance from their own point of view (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2008; Schwartz, 2013; Vanderstraeten et al., 2014). As a consequence, research call for more qualitative bottom-up approach (see Diez, 2001) to explore the impact of incubators' support on incubated firms. In particular, how do incubators create a context that helps firms bring together the various resources they need (Hellmann & Puri, 2002)?