The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics
In: The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, S. 621-624
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In: The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, S. 621-624
In: Public choice, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 59-72
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Economica, Band 33, Heft 131, S. 303
In: American political science review, Band 60, Heft 3
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: The Bell journal of economics, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 602
In: British journal of political science, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 419-452
ISSN: 1469-2112
The project on which this paper reports is aimed not only at increased understanding of the United States federal budget process, but also at predicting government expenditures in total and by bureau with a view to their determination within United States national econometric models. Estimates of likely expenditures using standard econometric techniques are poor, both in absolute terms and in comparison with our own work. Management of the economy should be improved by the use of predictors based on considering budgeting as a political process that is responsive to economic and social conditions. Use of mathematical models in the social sciences should be furthered, not by arguing their hypothetical utility, but by demonstrating that they work. The proof is in the prediction.
In: American political science review, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 152-153
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Public choice, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 63-132
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: American political science review, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 529-547
ISSN: 1537-5943
There are striking regularities in the budgetary process. The evidence from over half of the non-defense agencies indicates that the behavior of the budgetary process of the United States government results in aggregate decisions similar to those produced by a set of simple decision rules that are linear and temporally stable. For the agencies considered, certain equations are specified and compared with data composed of agency requests (through the Bureau of the Budget) and Congressional appropriations from 1947 through 1963. The comparison indicates that these equations summarize accurately aggregate outcomes of the budgetary process for each agency.In the first section of the paper we present an analytic summary of the federal budgetary process, and we explain why basic features of the process lead us to believe that it can be represented by simple models which are stable over periods of time, linear, and stochastic. In the second section we propose and discuss the alternative specifications for the agency-Budget Bureau and Congressional decision equations. The empirical results are presented in section three. In section four we provide evidence on deviant cases, discuss predictions, and future work to explore some of the problems indicated by this kind of analysis. An appendix contains informal definitions and a discussion of the statistical terminology used in the paper.
In: Urban studies, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 221-224
ISSN: 1360-063X
In: Urban studies, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 13-26
ISSN: 1360-063X
In: American political science review, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 426-448
ISSN: 1537-5943
The fundamental process of politics is the aggregation of citizens' preferences into a collective—a social—choice. We develop, interpret, and explain non-technically in this expository essay the definitions, assumptions, and theorems of a mathematical model of one aggregative mechanism—the electoral process. This mechanism is conceptualized here as a multidimensional model of spatial competition in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception of each candidate's positions, and in which the social choice is a policy package which the victorious candidate advocates.This approach, inaugurated by Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy, and falling under the general rubric "spatial models of party competition," has been scrutinized, criticized, and reformulated. To clarify the accomplishments of this formulation we identify and discuss in section 2 the general democratic problem of ascertaining a social preference. We review critically in section 3 the definitions and assumptions of our model. We consider in sections 4 and 5 the logic of a competitive electoral equilibrium. We assume in section 4 that the electorate's preferences can be summarized and represented by a single function; the analysis in section 5 pertains to competition between two organizational structures or two opposed ideologies (i.e., when two functions are required to summarize and represent the electorate's preference). Finally, we suggest in section 6 a conceptualization of electoral processes which facilitates extending and empirically testing our model.
In: American political science review, Band 64, Heft 2
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Public choice, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 91-101
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 106