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Climate change may cause most harm to countries that contribute least to greenhouse gas emissions. This paper identifies deontology, solidarity and consequentialism as the principles that can serve as a basis for a fair international burden sharing scheme of adaptation costs. We translate these principles into criteria that can be applied in assigning contributions of individual countries, namely historical responsibility, equality and capacity to pay. Specific political and scientific choices are discussed, highlighting implications for international burden-sharing. Combining historical responsibility and capacity to pay seems a promising starting point for international negotiations on the design of burden-sharing schemes. From the numerical assessment, it is clear that UNFCCC Annex I countries carry the greatest burden under most scenarios, but contributions differ substantially subject to the choice of an indicator for capacity to pay. The total financial contribution by the Annex I countries could be in the range of $55-68 billion annually.

A post-2012 regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could develop towards a universal or fragmented regime. The fundamental difference between a universal and a fragmented regime is that the first involves a single comprehensive climate regime in which all countries participate, whereas the second involves either multiple treaties or a single treaty in which not all countries participate. This study assesses the literature on a wide range of different model studies concerning the environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of various universal and fragmented climate regimes. The most important conclusions (e.g. relative position of regions in terms of costs) are generally consistent across different studies, despite the differences in methodology. We conclude that stabilising GHG concentrations at low levels is more costly with a fragmented regime than with a universal regime, because reduction targets must be achieved by a smaller number of countries or because fragmented treaties may prevent reducing GHGs where it is cheapest to do so. However, establishing a universal regime will be challenging due to cost differences between regions if emissions are allocated based on specific allocation rules and incentives to free-ride on a universal regime. Even though alternative behaviours such as responsibility, the implementation of transfer schemes or exclusive membership can increase the likelihood of achieving a universal regime, a fragmented regime seems more feasible. Therefore, a transitional fragmented 'coalition of the willing' could be established first, which could provide the basis for a larger, universal regime in the long term. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACTOne of the most fundamental questions surrounding the new Paris Agreement is whether countries? proposals to reduce GHG emissions after 2020 are equally ambitious, considering differences in circumstances between countries. We review a variety of approaches to assess the ambition of the GHG emission reduction proposals by countries. The approaches are applied illustratively to the mitigation part of the post-2020 climate proposals (nationally determined contributions, or NDCs) by China, the EU, and the US. The analysis reveals several clear trends, even though the results differ per individual assessment approach. We recommend that such a comprehensive ambition assessment framework, employing a large variety of approaches, is used in the future to capture a wide spectrum of perspectives on ambition.POLICY RELEVANCEAssessing the ambition of the national climate proposals is particularly important as the Paris Agreement asks for regular reviews of national contributions, keeping in mind that countries raise their ambition over time. Such an assessment will be an important part of the regular global stocktake that will take place every five years, starting with a ?light? version in 2018. However, comprehensive methods to assess the proposals are lacking. This article provides such a comprehensive assessment framework.

This article presents the regional emission targets corresponding to different climate regimes for differentiating commitments beyond 2012 on the basis of the Multi-Stage approach. This approach assumes a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved & their level of commitment according to participation & differentiation rules. The analysis focuses on two global greenhouse gas emission profiles resulting in CO2-equivalent concentrations stabilising at 550 & 650 ppmv in 2100 & 2150, respectively. Three Multi-Stage cases have been developed in order to assess different types of thresholds. These share three consecutive stages representing different commitments: stage 1 -- no quantitative commitments; stage 2 -- emission-limitation targets & stage 3 -- emission reduction targets. The analysis shows that by 2025 all three cases result in emission reduction objectives for all Annex I regions of at least 30-55% below their 1990 levels for 550 ppmv, whereas for 650 ppmv target they range from 0 to 20%. Furthermore, early participation is required of the major non-Annex I regions through emission limitation targets i.e. before 2025 & 2050 for the 550 & 650 ppmv targets, respectively. The first participation threshold for adopting emission-limitation targets on the basis of a capability-responsibility index (as introduced here) can provide for a balanced & timely participation of non-Annex I regions. Major strengths & weaknesses of the climate regimes are discussed & important obstacles & pre-conditions for their feasibility & acceptability are highlighted. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The "South - North Dialogue" Proposal, developed by researchers from developing and industrialised countries, outlined equitable approaches to mitigation. These approaches were based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate, and include deep cuts in industrialised (Annex I) countries and differentiated mitigation commitments for developing countries. This paper quantitatively analyses the implications of the proposal for countries' emissions and costs. The analysis focuses on a "political willingness" scenario and four stabilisation scenarios. The analysis shows that stringent stabilisation targets imply that many developing countries would have to take on quantitative mitigation obligations by 2030, even when the Annex I countries take on ambitious mitigation commitments far beyond the Kyoto obligations. The "political willingness scenario" will probably not suffice to limit a warming of the Earth's atmosphere to below 2 °C.