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This article examines the way in which Albert Weale's procedural account of democratic justice understands: (1) the boundaries of the democratic social contract, in terms of who is included or excluded from the contract; and (2) the boundaries of justice (i.e. the scope of entitlements and obligations of justice) that result from the contract. Either Weale's empirical method justifies the problematic exclusion of certain groups of agents from the democratic contract and thus potentially from the scope of justice, or his method is not as empirical as Weale wants it to be, because in order to evaluate those exclusions as unjust and to prevent them, the theory needs to postulate thick moral standards that are independent from, and external to, democratic procedures. Furthermore, the boundaries of justice resulting from Weale's empirical-contractarian theory are likely to lead to the absence of justice where it would be most needed, especially at the international level. These concerns notwithstanding, Weale's book remains a highly significant contribution to both democratic theory and theories of justice, as well as to our understanding of the relationship between them.

Friendship distributes critical benefits across society and does so unequally. Income, levels of education and health vary dramatically according to the quality of individuals' friendships. Further, friendships shape the motivations and aspirations of their participants. In light of these facts, this article questions whether and how egalitarian requirements should apply to personal friendship. I first show that existing theories of distributive justice, whether they are 'outcomes centred' or 'institutionalist', have reasons to consider personal friendship as a direct subject of justice. However, both fail to provide reasonable guidelines for how to apply the requirements of justice to friendship. I thus argue that principles of justice, in particular fair equality of opportunity, ought to assess and govern that part of the social structure that controls the production and distribution of friendship bonds across society. I theorise a 'relational distributive structure', mainly constituted by civil society associations, as the appropriate subject of justice.

Privatization is a widespread phenomenon in contemporary liberal democracies. One facet of privatization is the state delegation of welfare and primary-good-supporting services to private associations. Governments give subsidies to so-called 'public charities' to deliver public services such as basic education, healthcare, and childcare. They hire and create incentives for nonprofits and NGOs to perform public functions and to implement social policies. This process is called 'privatization,' given the assumption, more normative than factual, that the state has a primary duty to provide their citizens with sufficient public options to access the above services. Privatization thus refers to the provision of these public goods through private nonprofits. Adapted from the source document.

Global capital mobility is a crucial determinant of economic, political, and social life. While much has been written about the ethics of human movement, political theory has remained nearly silent on the ethics of capital movement. In this article, we intend to develop a general account of the ethics of global capital mobility—identifying both the forms of mobility that merit protection and those that merit restriction. By integrating normative theorizing with an economic analysis of global investment, we argue that the movement of capital, with important exceptions, should be much more restricted than it is today. We make the case, on both grounds of global justice and international assistance, for imposing coercive limits on cross-border inflows and outflows of capital. To enable them, we also propose a radical reform of the international monetary system—a new global currency—that would simultaneously facilitate beneficial capital movements.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction. Philanthropy in Democratic Societies / Bernholz, Lucy / Cordelli, Chiara / Reich, Rob -- Part I. Origins -- One. Altruism and the Origins of Nonprofit Philanthropy / Levy, Jonathan -- Two. Why Is the History of Philanthropy Not a Part of American History? / Zunz, Olivier -- Three. On the Role of Foundations in Democracies / Reich, Rob -- Part II. Institutional Forms -- Four. Contributory or Disruptive: Do New Forms of Philanthropy Erode Democracy? / Horvath, Aaron / Powell, Walter W. -- Reconciling Corporate Social Responsibility and Profitability: Guidelines for the Conscientious Manager / Brest, Paul -- Six. When Is Philanthropy?: How the Tax Code's Answer to This Question Has Given Rise to the Growth of Donor-Advised Funds and Why It's a Problem / Madoff, Ray D. -- Seven. Creating Digital Civil Society: The Digital Public Library of America / Bernholz, Lucy -- Part III. Moral Grounds and Limits -- Eight. The Free-Provider Problem: Private Provision of Public Responsibilities / Beerbohm, Eric -- Nine. Philanthropy and Democratic Ideals / Pevnick, Ryan -- Ten. Reparative Justice and the Moral Limits of Discretionary Philanthropy / Cordelli, Chiara -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Contributors -- Index

Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy's role in democratic societies. The contributors balance empirical and normative approaches, exploring both the roles philanthropy has actually played in societies and the roles it should play. They ask a multitude of questions: When is philanthropy good or bad for democracy? How does, and should, philanthropic power interact with expectations of equal citizenship and democratic political voice? What makes the exercise of philanthropic power legitimate? What forms of private activity in the public interest should democracy promote, and what forms should it resist? Examining these and many other topics, the contributors offer a vital assessment of philanthropy at a time when its power to affect public outcomes has never been greater.