Suchergebnisse

We study cooperative optimal Ramsey equilibria in the open economy, addressing classic policy questions: Should restrictions be placed to free trade and capital mobility? Should capital income be taxed? Should goods be taxed based on origin or destination? What are desirable border adjustments? How can a Ramsey allocation be implemented with residence-based taxes on assets? We characterize optimal wedges and analyse alternative policy implementations. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

We offer a theoretically based narrative that attempts to account both for the formation of the European Monetary Union and the callenges it has faced. Lack of commitment to policy plays a central role in this narrative. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

The traditional Mundellian criterion, which implicitly assumes commitment to monetary policy, is that countries with similar shocks should form unions. Without such commitment a new criterion emerges: countries with dissimilar temptation shocks, namely those that exacerbate time inconsistency problems, should form unions. Critical to this new criterion is the idea that monetary policy is benevolent in that it takes into account the interests of all the countries in the union. When countries have dissimilar temptation shocks, benevolent unions can help overcome the time inconsistency problems that individual countries face. Existing unions can strictly gain by admitting new members with more severe time inconsistency problems, because policy in the expanded union is less sensitive to the temptation shocks of members of the existing union. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuates over time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the volume of trade falls when collateral values fall. Without reputation, the equilibrium has separation, adverse selection is quickly resolved, and trade volume is independent of collateral value. With reputation, the equilibrium has pooling and adverse selection persists over time. The equilibrium is efficient unless collateral values are low and originators' reputational levels are low. We describe policies that can implement efficient outcomes. (JEL D82, G11, G21, G28)

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation—that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk‐sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union, are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

The recent financial crisis and the difficulty of using mainstream macroeconomic models to accurately monitor and assess systemic risk have stimulated new analyses of how we measure economic activity and the development of more sophisticated models in which the financial sector plays a greater role. Markus Brunnermeier and Arvind Krishnamurthy have assembled contributions from leading academic researchers, central bankers, and other financial-market experts to explore the possibilities for advancing macroeconomic modeling in order to achieve more accurate economic measurement. Essays in this volume focus on the development of models capable of highlighting the vulnerabilities that leave the economy susceptible to adverse feedback loops and liquidity spirals. While these types of vulnerabilities have often been identified, they have not been consistently measured. In a financial world of increasing complexity and uncertainty, this volume is an invaluable resource for policymakers working to improve current measurement systems and for academics concerned with conceptualizing effective measurement

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- ILLUSTRATIONS -- TABLES -- PREFACE -- CONTRIBUTORS -- 1. Economic Growth and Business Cycles -- 2. Recursive Methods for Computing Equilibria of Business Cycle Models -- 3. Computing Equilibria of Nonoptimal Economies -- 4. Models with Heterogeneous Agents -- 5. Business Cycles and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations -- 6. Household Production in Real Business Cycle Theory -- 7 Money and the Business Cycle -- 8 Non-Walrasian Economies -- 9 Dynamic General Equilibrium Models with Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets -- 10 Asset Pricing Implications of Equilibrium Business Cycle Models -- 11 International Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence -- 12 Policy Analysis in Business Cycle Models -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- AUTHOR INDEX -- SUBJECT INDEX