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States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders' desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.

Troops were deployed on an unprecedented scale during the Cold War. Much of the network of deployments established during that time has persisted long after the end of the Cold War. We look to contribute to a growing literature addressing the costs and benefits associated with hosting foreign troops. We ask: Does the presence of foreign troops affect stability in the host country? To answer this question, we develop an argument in which deployed troops are seen as a costly signal of the deploying state's interest in and commitment to stability in the host country. The presence of foreign troops positively affects the perceived stability of the host country and the robustness of their legal and political institutions. This bolsters the enforcement of agreements between the host government and latent and manifest opposition groups to pursue alternatives to fighting. We test this logic using instrumental variables regressions in which we endogenize deployment motivations. All tests support the expectation that the presence of foreign troops reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of civil conflict in the host state.

"Diffusion in International Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

A rich literature addresses how a state's capabilities, its desire to aid or exploit a warring neighbor, and its alliance commitments determine whether or not the state joins an ongoing conflict. However, an important geopolitical consideration – proximity to the location of the ongoing conflict – has yet to be examined. The authors argue that states are more likely to join conflicts that occur close to their territories than conflicts that are located at a greater distance, and that accounts that do not pay attention to this distance are incomplete. Proximity to the location of an ongoing conflict affects the opportunity for a state to join (by decreasing costs), while also affecting the state's willingness to join (by increasing the potential threat to the state's security). A series of statistical models provide evidence for the authors' claims: a state's opportunity to join and its willingness to aid or exploit a neighbor in conflict, or to fulfill its alliance commitments, are each conditioned by its proximity to the location of the conflict. This conditioning effect of dispute location is important because it helps account for cases that appear to contradict the expectations of existing arguments regarding capabilities, contiguity, and alliances – such as when weak, non-contiguous, and non-allied states join ongoing conflicts and strong, contiguous, and allied states do not join.