Relative measures of economic insecurity
In: Social choice and welfare, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 571-581
ISSN: 1432-217X
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In: Social choice and welfare, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 571-581
ISSN: 1432-217X
SSRN
SSRN
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 109, S. 126-136
In: Journal of economic inequality, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 1-12
ISSN: 1573-8701
In: Social choice and welfare, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 707-722
ISSN: 1432-217X
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 134-139
In: International Economic Review, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 1017-1030
SSRN
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 258-262
We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of dominance.
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In: Economica, Band 76, Heft 302, S. 337-363
ISSN: 1468-0335
A reference‐dependent choice function is a generalization of a standard choice function where chosen alternatives may depend on a reference alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Such a function is non‐deteriorating if there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives according to which the chosen alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non‐deteriorating reference‐dependent choice functions in a general framework and in an economic environment.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 163-187
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximalelement rationalizability on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.
In: Social choice and welfare, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 77-88
ISSN: 1432-217X
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 131-142
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 327-339