Suchergebnisse

The government of Quebec is presently holding a public debate on the province's future energy policy . Encouraging new energy sources is one of the options to be examined. Wind power is considered as one of the most promising "new" sources available. The object of this communication is to determine whether wind energy can play an import ant and profitable role in th e province's electricity supply, essentially composed of hydroelectric power. Treating the output from a complex of wind farms as negative load, we specify the energy value and capacity value of this complex. The estimations are then used in a cost-benefit analysis applicable to Hydro-Quebec. We conclude that wind energy is still economically unattractive. Expected losses to the provincial corporation vary between 40-47% of the global costs of the complex for a conservative cost scenario and 18-32% f or an alternative cost scenario. However, moderate reductions in the costs of wind energy technology would be sufficient to render a well-situated wind farm economically viable.

Higher than expected electricity consumption in recent years and increasing objections to capacity expansion on environmental grounds have led Quebec's government owned electric utility, Hydro-Quebec, to launch an innovative program to reduce peak period residential electric heating demand. When the outside temperature drops below -12°C, customers who have opted for the program are charged 10¢/kWh for their electricity (substantially above the 4.46¢/kWh paid by normal residential customers) and they are automatically switched to a non-electric heating source, whereas above -12°C they pay 2.75¢/kWh for all uses. A cost-benefit analysis of this dual-energy program finds that if, as Hydro-Quebec forecasts, 150,000 residential customers were to opt for the program, they would benefit by $19.0 million per year, while the utility and government would lose $21.6 million and$1.6 million respectively, with a total net loss to Quebec society of $4.25 million a year.

Les travaux de Boadway et Hayashi (2001) et de Smart (2007) tendent à confirmer l'hypothèse selon laquelle des provinces bénéficiaires de paiements de péréquation adopteraient des comportements stratégiques en réduisant leur capacité fiscale pour accroître les montants reçus. Dans ce texte, nous analysons l'impact qu'une nouvelle redevance hydroélectrique payée par Hydro-Québec au Trésor québécois a sur les sommes reçues par cette province en péréquation ; pour ce faire, nous considérons les formules de péréquation appliquées avant 2004 et depuis 2007. Cette redevance, qui génère environ 600 millions de dollars par année, réduit les paiements de péréquation du Québec d'un peu plus de 100 millions de dollars selon l'une ou l'autre formule. En vertu de la formule actuelle de péréquation, le Québec perd 38 ¢ en droits de péréquation pour chaque dollar additionnel reçu en revenu de ressources naturelles. La nouvelle redevance hydroélectrique et la hausse du taux de dividende appliquées à sa société d'État ont permis au gouvernement québécois de profiter d'un transfert de 1,15 milliard ; par contre il perd 437 millions de dollars en paiements de péréquation. Il s'agit d'un contre-exemple important concernant le comportement stratégique d'une province bénéficiaire de la péréquation.